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The stimu]u;> for tliis dissertation was provided by V.O. Y.ey
in Southern Politics (New York: Knopf, 19^^9) . In his study of
politics and policy in the southern states, Key found that policy
decisions were more redistributive in states v;ho3C political
arrangc-onts v;ero more competitive.
In recent years advances in quantitative metliodolo[',y and
approaches to comparative inquiry have facilitated the testing of
Key's original position. Ikisically the contemporary debate has
been concerned witli tlio question of the wliich of socioeconomic
and political variables is more useful in explaining interstate
va r i a tions in expenditure patterns. Generally, the research has
indicated that social variables are more povjerful.
A major contention of this research is that the debate cannot
be resolved as yet because political competition has not yet been
measured adequately. Previous measures have relied on a distribu-
tion of seats measure of legislative competition. This study,
for its measure, concentrates on competition witliin the context
of each inaividual legislative district. The theoretical
rationale undorgirding each rp.easure is crucial: the conventional
mcaGuros are supported by a responsible parties model of politics
which docs not reflect the realities of politics in the states;
the new raeasure addresses itself to the more pluralistic pattern
of politics in the American states.
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CHAPTER I
STATE POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY
Introduction
In the preface to The Semi- SovcroiRn People
.
E. E.
Schattschneider stated:
The great problem in American politics is:
What makes things happen? We might under-
stand the dynamics of /Vmerican politics if
we knew what is going on x^hen things are
happening. (This) question (is) worth ask-
ing because obviously tremendous things are
going on in American public affairs, even
in quiet times,
^
While the structure and functioning of politics and political
systems -- the more process-oriented aspects of political in-
quiry have always been a major concern of political scientists,
the outcomes of these have received far less attention. The out-
comes of the political process arc the central facts of politics
and must be explained if we are truly to understand the process
indeed, if we are to understand politics at all. For these out-
comes express the value allocations of a given society, which in
turn reflect the situation and "spirit"' of that society.
The initial task of the political scientist is describing
what happens. From there he can go on to explain v;hy x occurs
rather than a,b,c, This research attempts to describe
E, E. Schattschneider, The Semi -Soverei gn People (New
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), p. vii.
2and explain inter alia
,
why some states spend more than others
for certain governmental services. By examining various possible
relationships of social, economic, and political conditions with
state policy choices an attempt is made to examine the perennial
question of politics: "What makes things happen?"
This chapter introduces the issues that are dealt with in
this research. Essentially, there are three: 1) which variables
are most useful in explaining variations in state policy choices?;
2) how are we to conceptualize the relationship of political competi
tion to the outcomes of the policy-making process?; and 3) is
there only one kind of policy system which is capable of describ-
ing policy-making in all issue-areas, or does the structure of
the policy process vary among different issue areas? In addition,
V.O. Key's theory of state politics and public policy is outlined,
as is the systems approach of David Easton which is utilized to
help test Key's theory. Finally, the variables that are
used in this study are discussed, as they relate both to Key's
theory and to the ideas of Theodore Lowi which bear on #3 above.
2
The States as Units for Comparative Analysis
The utility of comparative analyses has come to be more and
The following discussion draws heavily on those pro-
vided by Thomas R. Dye in Politics , Economics , and the Public ;
Policy Outcomes in the American States (Chicago: Rand Mc-
Nally and Company, 1966), pp. 10-13 and Richard E. Dawson and
James A. Robinson, "Inter-Party Competition, Economic Variables,
and Welfare Policies in the American States, Journal of Politics ,
23 (May, 1963): 267-70.
3more appreciated by political scientists. Comparison is basic to
the way we perceive, conceptualise, and explain the problems of
politics. VThen describing and explaining various political
phenomena, our facts make sense only in relation to other facts
(which may be similar or quite different)."^ Macridis believes
that comparative inquiry "entails the comparison of variables
against a background of uniformity either actual or analytical
for the purpose of discovering causal factors that account for
variations."^ And, in the words of Thomas Dye:
Comparison is an integral part of explana-
tion. And all meaningf-ul description is
comparative; that is, facts can only be
perceived when they are contrasted with
some other element in the environment.^
The immediate issue, then, concerns the viability of the Ameri-
can states as units for comparative analysis.
Since a priniary focus of this study is to determine the rela-
tive strength of economic and political varii^bles in explaining
variations in state expenditures for certain government services,
it is necessary to isolate the effects of each of these factors
at various points of the analysis. Dye believes that the American
states are very conducive to this mode of inquiry':
"^For a fuller discussion of these and related issues
see William E. Connolly, "The Challenge to Pluralist Theory,"
in Connolly ed. , The Bias of Pluralism (New York: Ather-
ton Press, 1969), pp. 20-24.
^Roy C. Macridis, The Study of Comparative Government
(Garden City, New York: Doubicday & Company, 1955), p. 2.
^Dye, o£, cit.
,
p. 11.
The American states provide an excellent opportunity
for applying comparative analysis in non-experiment-
al research. These fifty separate political systems
share a common institutional framework and cultural
milieu. All states operate under written constitu-
tions which divide authority between executive,
legislative, and judicial branches. The structure
and operations of these branches arc quite similar
from state to state. All states function within
the common framework of the American federal system.
All states share a national language, national
symbols, and a national history. In short, im-
portant institutional and cultural factors may
be treated as constants for analytical purposes.
This background of institutional and cultural
uniformity in the American states makes it
easier to isolate causal factors in our analysis
of public policy outcomes. Comparative analysis
of national political systems is made very dif-
ficult because of the many great institutional
and cultural differences among national societies;
.
it is difficult to isolate the reasons for varia-
tions in system characteristics or policy out-
comes where vast differences exist in geography,
climate, language, economy, history, religion,
and so on. In contrast, when one focuses on the
American states many important independent variables
are held constant, and the explanatoiry power of a
single set of variables can be more clearly ob-
servW.
^-Thile the /unerican states share many cultural and system character-
istics, at a later point it is demonstrated that they vary widely
on other political process dimensions. This situation should
lend itself to an appraisal of the explanatory power of one set
of political variables while holding the other group constant.
The economic development dimension is comprised of at least
five socioeconomic indicators -- wealth, population density,
^Ibid., pp. 11-12.
education, industrialization, and urbanization. Here again,
while some similarity exists among the states, there are con-
siderable differences, thereby making comparative analyses in
this area potentially fruitful. For example, of the states
considered, median school year completed (1970) ranges from
10.6 for West Virginia to 12.4 for California, Wyoming and
Colorado.^ This relative similarity can be contrasted with
median family income data which spans $7,414 for West Virginia
and $12,441 for Alaska in 1970.^ The most pronounced variation
occurs on the population density measure where in 1970 Alaska
contained 0.5 people per square mile and New Jersey had 953.1
people per square mile.^ The existence of considerable dif-
ferences within a general similarity on the economic develop-
ment dimension vv'ould seem to be consistent with the requisites
of comparative analysis.
The above has hopefully established at least a prima facie
case for the present comparative analysis of state policy out-
puts. The exact contours of this analysis are specified in
the ensuing chapters.
V. 0. Key, Jr., Politics, and Competition
The stimulus for the current policy output debate is usually
U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1970.
^ T.dcm
.
^Idcm.
attributed to V. 0. Key, Jr.^^ Although Key himself never
actually constructed a theory of the state policy process, the
broad features of such a theory can be gleaned from his analysis
of politics in the southern states. The most general idea of
Southern Politics is that the concept of a two-party system
does not apply to the South. Some sense can be made of southern
politics if v;e speak not of inter-party competition but rather
of the different varieties of one-party arrangements. Bi-
factional parties exliibit many of the characteristics of and
perform many of the functions (and in similar ways) of two-party
systems outside the South. But while there are a few bi-faction
al parties in the South there are far more multi-factional
systems, and these are the rather unique phenomena which give
rise to Key's theory.
In contrast to some Southern states whose politics are
organized relatively coherently around two stable and enduring
factions, multi-factional politics is a more personalized,
diffuse arrangement. Campaigns are organized around individual
candidates rather than the more conventional notions of parties
bearing indentifiable and alternative issue positions . Key
explained
:
^^V. 0. Key, Jr., Southern Politics (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, Inc., 1949), especially pp. 288-311.
^•Key believes this factor in part explains the occa-
sional demagogic campaigns of Southern politicians, and the
rise of someone like lluey Long.
Consider the element of discontinuity in
factionalism. The battle for control of
a state is fought between groups newly
formed for the particular campaign. The
groups lack continuity in name — as exists
under a two-party system and they also
lack continuity in the make-up of their in-
ner core of professional politicians or
leaders. Naturally, they also lack contin-
uity in voter support which, under two-
party conditions provides a relatively stable
following of voters for each party's candi-
dates whoever they may be.
Discontinuity of faction both confuses
the electorate and reflects a failure to
organize the voters into groups of more
or less like-minded citizens with some-
V7hat similar attitudes toward public policy.
Under a system of fluid factions, the
voters' task is not simplified by the
existence of continuing competing parties
with fairly well-organized, general-policy
orientations, tactions that form and re-
form cannot become identified in the mind
of the electorate, and the conditions of
public choice become far different from
those under tv;o-party conditions. The
voter is confronted with nev; faces, new
choices, and must function in a sort of
st£lte of nature.^
This set of conditions obviously modifies the character of
electoral processes in some southern states. These cir-
cumstances also have far-reaching policy consequences, for a
multi-factional politics tends to be an "issue-less" politic
as well. Campaign oratory is centered on the various candi-
dates rather than on a discussion of substantive issues.
Perhaps the major ramification of an issue-less politic
Key, o£. cit . , p. 303.
is that the stakes of the conflict are changed to a battle for
power as opposed to a conflict over "power for what purpose?"
as in tne two-party systems. Since political conflict is often
a battle between the "haves" and the "have-nots", this change
of the stakes of political conflict is particularly compelling,
for issue-less politics is infected with a bias which tends to
favor those classes which are on the upper rungs of the social
ladder. This works against the lower classes, for it is they
who are most in need of public policies that will improve their
economic positions. The upper classes, on the other hand, are
not as disadvantaged by this brand of politics because their
relative socio-economic positions are more secure. Further,
the lower classes should pursue a public/political strategy
rather than a "private" one, for it is the latter sphere which
has put them at a disadvantage in the first place. But a multi-
factional system works against the lower classes precisely be-
cause it inhibits the crystallization of these issues and their
subsequent entry into the political process. Key further out-
lined the situation of the classes in a multi-factional system:
It follows that the grand objective of the
haves is obstruction. Organization is not
always necessary to obstruct; it is essen-
tial, however, for the promotion of a sus-
tained program in behalf of the have-nots,
although not all party or factional organ-
ization is dedicated to that purpose. It
follows, if these propositions are correct,
that over the long run the have-nots lose
in a disorganized politics.
The factional system simply provides no in-
stitutional mechanism for the expression of
lower-bracket viewpoints. By change and by
exertions of temporary leaders and connivers,
candidates are brought into the field, but
no continuing, competitive groups carry on
the battle. The great virtue of the two-
party system is, not that there are two
groups with conflicting policy tendencies
from V7hich the voters can choose, but that
there are two groups of politicians. The
fluidity of the factional system handi-
caps the fonnation of two such groups with-
in the southern Democratic party, and the
inevitable result is that there is no continuing
group of "outs" which of necessity must pick
up V7hatever issue is at hand to belabor the
Key made no attempt to extrapolate his findings to the
American states generally. But his work generated a series of
hypotheses which are now being dealt with in the more recent
literature on state policy processes. The value of Key's
research is that the different structures of political compe-
tition in bi- and multi- factional southern states can be per-
ceived as reflecting different state competitive situations in
states outside the South. Although these different competitive
arrangements usually take place between the Republican and
Democratic parties rather than only within the Democratic party,
the logic of his theory is still applicable. Wliat now follows
is a brief outline of "the Key theory."
13
14ibid.
, pp
307.
30y- 10.
Above all else, political parties want power, i.e., to
win elections. The precise content of a prospective substantive
electoral mandate will be determined to a large extent by the
input of the various groups which comprise the party's electoral
coalition. In a very real sense, the parties will put forth the
kinds of issue-positions which are likely to attract sufficient
blocs of voters to ensure a majority. In most states, the
largest voter group is made up of the middle, lower-middle,
and working classes. Since it is usually necessary to obtain
the support of these groups if the party is to be successful,
each party will compete with the other in an effort to demon-
strate that it (rather than the other) is supporting the inter-
ests of the relevant voter blocs. Key claimed that this type
of scenario is observed more frequently in bi-factional systems
than in multi-factional systems in the South. From this vje can
infer that the more intense the competition, the more the
parties will opt for the kind of legislation that would benefit
the have-nots. We now have something of a working hypothesis:
On issues which bear on the have have-not
struggle, the greater the degree of inter-
party competition exhibited within a political
system, the more redistributive will be the
policy outcomes on those issues.
It is imperative to understand that this hypothesis does not
apply across the board to all areas of state policy. It is
concerned only with issues that bear directly on the have--
have-not struggle. So while certain welfare policies such as
Aid to Dependent Children payments would be expected to con-
form to the hypothesis, others, like highway expenditures and
utility taxes, would not. This distinction is fundamental to
any test of Key's theory.
The Mode l
The model that is utilized in this study, which is pre-
sented in schematic form below, is an adaptation of the
systems paradigm of David Easton,^-^
Figure 1.1
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Inputs are the things which make the system fluid; in a
sense, they are the raw materials of the system, the "stuff"
of which political decisions are made. Inputs enter the polit
ical system as demands and supports. Demands arise when indi-
^^Sec A Fra-iicvjork for Political Analysis (New Jersey:
Prentice-llall, 1965), and other works.
viduals and groups respond to (real or imagined) environmental
conditions and act to promote particular interests, goals, etc.
Supports underlie the entire system and consist of the accept-
ance by the actors in the system of things like procedural
norms, the legitimacy of political authority, and acceptance
of the eventual outcomes of the system as authoritative and
binding on the society. The political system comprises the
political institutions, structures, and activity of the
society's decision-making apparatus. Outputs are the decisions
of the system or, to borrow from Easton, "the authoritative
allocation of values for a society. "^^ The environment in-
cludes the social make-up of the society, as well as its cul-
tural and historical traditions v;hich -- when taken together --
manifest the composite "identity" of that society. The environ
ment includes as well influences which are external to the
system (e.g., decisions of the national government, and even
actions of other nations).
To summarize briefly the dynamics of the systems paradigm:
demands are generated in the environment, and along with the
relevant supports become the inputs, the energy of the system.
These demands, when acted upon by the political system, are
converted into outputs the authoritatively allocated values
of that society. The feedback function registers the changes
Ibid
. , p. 50.
exerted on the other aspects of the system as a result of the
outputs. From a systems perspective, a change in any part of
the system modifies in some way all the other features of that
system. For example, a decision to raise taxes will alter the
situations of the social classes in the society and will pro-
bably modify certain of the procedural arrangements which exist
in the polity.
An effort should now be made to put the present study in
the context of this systems framework. There are two types of
Independent variables considered; these two taken together
comprise the inputs to the system. The first set Attempts to
tap certain relevant aspects of the environment. Serious
operational problems are encountered here. For example, how
are things like cultural norms and historical traditions to be
defined, and even more difficult, measured? This study does
not pretend to accomplish these tasks, although it does af-
firm their importance for explaining political behavior. Five
socioeconomic variables vv/ere chosen as indicators of the
general contours of the states' social environments. Median
family income isolates the extent of the economic cleavages
within the states. Median school year completed for persons
over 25 years of age should provide some modest clue to the
cultural achievements of the states. Population density, per
cent of the labor force employed in non-agricultural activi-
ties, and per cent of the population living in urban areas'""^
are variables which indicate the extent of industrialization in
the states, as v;cll as the spatial distribution of their citi-
zens. Hopefully, these five variables are capable of dif-
ferentiating the states on significant economic and social di-
mensions.
The second set of independent variables is political in
nature; in the language of Easton they are called "withinputs .
"
The distinction between the tv.'o is of considerable logical
significance:
At times I have been writing as though all
the influences or disturbances that had to
be considered in understanding how a system
manages to persist occurred in the environ-
ment of a system. (But) many of these in-
fluences may occur within a system itself.
Insofar as things happening within a system
shape its destinies as a system of inter-
actions, it will be possible to take them
into account as they are reflected through
the inputs of the members of a system. It
does not seem reasonable to speak of these
events as inputs since they already occur
within the system rather than outside. For
the sake of logical consistency we might
call them "withinputs." All that would
be meant by this neologism is that we have
decided to treat, in a unified way, the ef-
fects (of) events and conditions both with-
in and without a system.'^'^
This group of political variables attempts to measure and rank
'•'^According to the 1970 Census definition of urban.
^^See Easton, o£. cVt., p. 114.
the states on the basis of the degree of inter-party competi-
tion exhibited within the states. Two different competition
indices have been utilized for this task. A primary concern
of this research is the determination of which of these two
indices more adequately measures the extent of party competi-
tion in the American states. We will be able to "hold
constant" the influence of certain structures and processes
since certain similarities among the states (e.g., separation
of powers, Bills of Rights, etc.) have already been established.
Undoubtedly this tactic will obscure important differences araong
the states, but this is a problem common to all such quantita-
tive analyses and cannot be overcome in the present study.
Five policies have been selected to represent policy outcomes:
total general expenditures per capita, number of police per
10,000 civilian population, per pupil education expenditures
for those in average daily attendance, per capita expenditures
for public welfare, and average monthly payments per family for
those covered by the Aid to Families v;ith Dependent Children
program. More is said concerning the rationale for selecting
these particular policies in the next section.
One purpose of this study is to try to determine why some
states spend more per capita than others for certain govern-
mental services. The relevant literature suggests two possible
explanatory hypotheses which are explored in the pages that
follow. These two are presented in the diagrajn below.
Figure 1.2
Ec onomic
Develo prnent
Variables
Political
iToce ss
Variable s
The
Political
System
Outputs/
Political
lieci sions
The first hypothesis (broken line) posits a strong positive
relationship between economic development and policy outputs.
Objective economic conditions are converted into political de-
mands which are then reflected in political decisions. It is
something of a one-to-one relationship. The second hypothesis
(solid line) assumes significant relationships in this respect,
but also posits an "intervening influence," and this influence
Dye, op. cit
. ;
Key, o£. cit .
is political competition. In other words, political variables
play a mediating role between the environment and the politi-
cal system which makes the eventual political decisions.
Factors other than political variables should be examined,
but a full explanation of public policy outcomes cannot be
achieved without some consideration of this influence of politi-
cal variables. By means of correlation and regression analyses,
an evaluation v;ill be made concerning the explanatory power of
each of these two sets of variables, and both of theiTi taken to-
gether.
The Policy Typolop^y
The selection of policy outcome indicators for the present
study is based on the typology offered by Theodore J. Lowi.^*^
Lowi believes that public policy should not be analyzed as if
it v;ere an undifferentiated mass of governmental actions sub-
ject to the same influences and processes. A better under-
Theodore J. Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy,
Case-Studies and Political Theory," World Politics , 6 (July,
1964). Two other representative examples of policy typol-
ogies are those of Lewis A. Froman, Jr. "An Analysis of
Public Policies in Cities," Journal of Politics , 29 (February,
1967), and Robert H. Salisbury and John P. Heinz, "A Theory
of Policy Analysis and Some Preliminary Applications,"
paper delivered at the American Political Science Association
Convention, Washington, D. C, 1968. For a discussion of
some of the rationale and motivation for these new kinds of
endeavors in policy analysis see, for example, Austin Ranney
ed.
,
Political Science and Public Policy (Chicago: Markhara
Publishing Cor.ipany, 1968).
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standing of policy can be achieved if one thinks in tcnns of a
set of policy sub-systems distinguishable from one another along
certain key dimensions. Lowi posits three policy types dis-
tributive, regulative, and redistributive
. If these categories
are both distinct from one another and inclusive of all public
policies, certain "middle- range" generalizations can be infer-
red. For example, policies of a distributive nature resemble
one another in terms of the nature of the political actors, the
relationships among them, the type of power structure for that
policy area, etc. So if it is reasonably certain that a given
policy is a distributive one, then certain important aspects
of how that policy is made and implemented tend to follow.
Cy doing this for all Llirce types and for all policies, our
thinking about particular policies and the policy process gen-
erally will be significantly simplified and crystallized.
This policy typology is presented in schematic form on the fol-
lowing page.
The chart indicates that Lowi's typology immediately
encounters some logical and theoretical problems. First, the
logical problem concerns the boundaries of the three policy
t>T)es. Simply stated, how does one decide to draw the line be-
tween distributive and redistributive or, for that matter, be-
tween any of the types; one could thus argue that these categories
^•'Lowi, o£. c i
t
.
,
p. 713.
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are not sufficiently distinct from one another. That is, any
policy has some regulative, distributive, and redistributive di-
mensions contained within it. Second, a theoretical problem is
encountered if one defines politics as an essentially redistri-
butive phenomenon. Indeed, Lowi himself is sensitive to this
dilemma:
In the long run, all governmental pol-
icies may be considered redistributive,
because in the long run some people pay
more in taxes than they receive in ser-
vices. Or, all may be thought regulatory
because, in the long run, a governmental
decision on the use of resources can only
displace a private decision about the
same resources or at least reduce private
alternatives about the resource.
Lowi's framework is adopted here because it is a useful organiza-
tional device and, in spite of the above problems, its potential
utility as an analytic tool has not yet been subjected to
practical analyses. It should be borne in mind, though, that
Lowi devised his framework for use in urban community political
analyses, and some adjustments to it must be made for its
application to the politics of the American states.
Lowi describes distributive policies as follows:
Distributive policies are characterized by
the ease with which they can be disaggregated
and dispensed unit by small unit, each unit
more or less in isolation from other units
and from any general rule. These are poli-
cies that are virtually not policies at all
but are highly individualized decisions that
22ibid.
,
p. 690.
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only by accumulation can be called a policy. ^3
Total general expenditures per capita was selected as an
example of a distributive policy for this study, muie surely
this could not be called the paradigm case of a distributive
issue, many of the features exhibited in state budgetary processes
suggest reasonable conformity with Lowi's notion of distributive.
The regulatory policy sub-system manifests many of the
characteristics embodied in a pluralist approach to politics and
political analysis. ^ Policy tends to be the result of the inter-
play of group conflict.
Regulatory policies are not capable of
the almost infinite amount of disaggre-
tation typical of distributive processes.
The impact of regulatory decisions is one
of directly raising costs and/or reducing
or expanding the alternatives of private
individuals. Regulatory policies are dis-
tinguishable from distributive in that in
the short run the regulatory decision in-
volves a direct choice as to who will be
indulged and who deprived.
Further, the regulatory arena is composed of relatively un-
stable cleavages among a multiplicity of groups organized
^•^ Ibid
. , p. 690.
Some sense of the mechanics of state budgetary decisions
can be gleaned from a reading of Aaron Wildavsky's description
of the federal process in The Politics of the Budgetary Process
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1964)
.
^^The now classic statement of this position is contained
in David B. Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, Inc.
,
1951) .
^°Lowi, 0£. £it., pp. 690-91.
around tangential relations. Police protection and per pupil
expenditures for education^'^ were chosen as examples of
regulative state policies.
Redistributive policies are broad and intense in their
impacts. They are in some sense class issues, and are clearly
those policies that Key had in mind in his discussion of the
have--have-not struggle. Per capita public welfare expendi-
tures and Aid to Families with Dependent Children payments
were selected as redistributive policies because these two
particularly the latter are ideally have~-have-not issues.
l-Hiat Lies Ahead
The next chapter reviews some of the literature which bea
on the Key theory. Subsequent chapters include a discussion
of the concept of political competition as applied to state
politics, and an attempt to determine which factors provide
the best explanation of why some states spend more than others
for certain governmental services.
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For an interesting discussion of the national policy
process in education matters see, for example, Stephen K.
Bailey, "The Office of Education and the Education Act of
1965," Inter-University Case Program, #100 (Indianapolis:
The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc.) and Eugene Eidenberg and
Roy D. Morey, An Act of Congress (New York: W. W. Norton
and Company, Inc., 1969). For state education policy see,
for example, Robert H. Salisbur>', "State Politics and Educa-
tion," in Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines eds. ,
Politics in the American States (Boston: Little, Brown
and Company, 1965).
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C H A P T E R II
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
V. 0. Key's seminal effort in Southern Politics provides a
convenient starting point for an overview of the state policy
studies which is the purpose of this chapter. We begin by pro-
posing some general criteria against which we can evaluate this
body of literature, and then present the major findings which bear
on an analysis of comparative state policy. In a sense, this
chapter endeavors to construct the context within which the find-
ings of this study are assimilated.
Cri teria
Perhaps a useful way to begin is to enumerate some of the
general criticisms which have been levied against the policy out-
put studies. These provide us with a standard which will be
helpful in determining the exact "state of the literature" in
methodological, substantive, and theoretical terms. Articles by
Coulter, and Jacob and Lipsky are useful in this regard. Since
these studies are referred to throughout this chapter, perhaps a
recitation of some of their major claims will suffice for now.
Coulter saw the following as the major problems in the policy
literature: correlation is too often confused with explanation
and/or causation; the "residual" or unexplained policy variation
is unsatisfactorily accounted for; questionable inferences are
often made, for example about connections among cleavages, demands,
24
policy outputs, and conversion processes; political processes
among different communities and conversion processes among dif-
ferent communities and among different policy substructures of
the same communities are too often assumed to be identical; con-
sidering aggregate expenditures as sufficient indices of policy
outputs often obscures important considerations such as the qual-
itative outcomes of these expenditures and various priorities
given to certain governmental activities; the failure to develop
policy typologies (for example, regulatory, redis tributive, etc.);
the assumption of linearity in complex statistical relationships;
misuse of the concept of regionalism; the unwarranted assumption
of significance of formal governmental institutions.-^
To these Jacob and Lipsky added: the improper operationali-
zation of key concepts; the lack of attention to what goes on in
Easton's "little black box"; the failure to coordinate behavioral
and role perception studies; the lack of contextual analysis in
the studies of specific institutions, that is, the failure to com-
pare these institutions with other institutions in the same system
or with sLnilar institutions in different systems; the failure
to make specific concepts sufficiently distinct and the failure to
make total models sufficiently inclusive.^
^Philip B. Coulter, "Comparative Community Politics and Public
Policy," Po lity 3 (Fall, 1970).
'"Herbert Jacob and Michael Lipsky, "Outputs, Structure and
Power: An Assessment of Changes in the Study of State and Local
Politics," Journal of Politlcr. 30 (May, 1968).
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Two of the above arguments should be emphasized; these
concern the notion of conversion processes, and the manner in
which certain key concepts are operationalized
.
On the simplest level, conversion processes indicate how,
for example, inputs are transformed into outputs. These processes
are not often specified in some of the policy literature. For
instance Dye and others argued that there is something of a direct
relationship between economic development and state policy choices.
3
But how is per capita income transformed into a particular level
of budget expenditure? Dye paid little attention to things
like demand structures, institutional and/or policy elite behavior,
etc. Correlation analycis measures association, and that is
all. To accept even unusually strong coefficients of correlation
as the final products rather than as cues to more complex phenom-
ena does not help very much in terms of solid explanation.
My second point concerns the operationalization of certain
key concepts in the model. Specifically, one can easily be con-
fused by the heretofore classification of inputs and outputs.
That is, what is an input? Is it really an output? Or is it both?
What is the nature of their respective boundaries? For example,
if outputs alter certain environmental and political process
3Politics
,
Economics
,
and the Public (Chicago: Rand McNally
and Company, 1966) ,
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variables (which Easton^ clearly states that they do), are
these variables inputs or outputs or both? If process variables
are affected by the environment but do not independently affect
policy outputs, can they still be considered intervening variables?
Can they even be considered under the broader rubric of inputs
or environment? Whether they are inputs or outputs or both of
course depends entirely upon how the analyst conceptualizes them.
The point is, though, that these conceptualizations should be
made clear vjhen reporting research results. In addition, some
of the newer approaches to the study of public policy conceive
the model in terms different from their predecessors for
example by treating outputs as the Independent variables and
examining their impacts on things like the political process
(which has traditionally been taken as an independent variable).^
'^See A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), pp. 24 and 127-29.
^These and other provocative arguments can be found in, inter
alia, Austin Ranney,ed., Political Science and Publi c Policy
(Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1968); Ira Sharkansky, ed
.
,
Policy Analysis in Political Science (Chicago: Markham Publishing
Company, 1970); Michael D. Reagan, "Policy Issues," Polity 1
(Fall, 1968); Laurence H. Tribe, "Policy Science: Analysis or
Ideology," Philosophy and Public Affairs 2 (Fall, 1972); Charles
0. Jones, An Introduction to the Study of Public Policy (Belmont,
California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1970); L, L. Wade and
R. L. Curry, Jr. , A Logic of Public Policy : Aspects of Political
Economy (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company,
1970) ; Larry L. Wade, The Elements of^ Public Policy (Columbus,
Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1972).
Further, some would argue that factors like urbanization and
median school year completed are phenomena which are essentially
political variables rather than aspects of some nebulous
"economic development" dimension because these conditions are in
large part determined by political decisions.^
While these caveats are often compelling their effect should
not be to immobilize comparative research, but rather to serve
as guides for more reflective and theoretically-sound scholar-
ship.
The Earlier Studies
The broad contours of the Key theory were sketched in the
first chapter. Briefly, Kay found that states with relatively
intense and organized political competition were more likely to
produce policies conducive to the interests of the lower income
groups than were their less-competitive counterparts. These
effects were most pronounced in policy areas which were redis-
tributive in nature.
Duane Lockard's study of politics in New England corrobo-
rated many of Key's findings for the South, so much so that even
the language of the two studies is strikingly similar, Lockard's
"This argument was suggested to me by Patrick L. Eagan
(Department of Political Science, University of Massachusetts,
Amherst), himself in the vanguard of the new breed of public
policy analysts.
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obse„ea in „.He.
^^^^^^^
it has on the^aklne nT' T,^""Ln maki g of public policy.
are differed l' procls^rchf '"T"^
Rliode Island, but the pressures of the have-^o^son the political leaders of competitive plrt^esseem to have helped to produce a generaUyfairer tax structure in those states.
7
In 1963, Richard Dawson and James Robinson published a study
which attempted to test the Key-Lockard thesis. Utilizing
various measures of political process variables (ipc), socio-
economic variables, "and policy outputs they found - by means of
simple correlation analysis
- that the Key-Lockard theory appear-
ed valid. However, when they controlled (partial correlation
analysis) for the effects of different variables they found that
the relationship between ipc and outputs was not an independent
one, but rather a function of the influence exerted by socio-
economic conditions on both ipc and policy outputs. This led
^Duane Lockard, New England State Politics (Princeton. NewJersey: Princeton University Press, 1959),
^
pp. 320 and 331.
I
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tho. to concl.de:
"Intc.-party competition does not play as
influential a role m determining the scope of welfare policies
as earlier studies suggested; the level of public social welfare
programs is more an effprt- r,f 4t ect of socio-economic factors, especially
per capita income."^
In 1966 Richard Hofferbert published a study that dealt
with essentially the same kinds of relationships examined by
Dawson and Robinson.
^ His findings led him to conclude that:
"Structural characteristics and the nature of the party system
and its operation do not seem to go very far toward explaining
the kinds of policies produced in the states.
Nineteen sixty-six also brought the massive study of Thomas
Dye.^1 Dye utilised additional process variables (e.g., malap-
portionment) and additional environmental variables (e.g., edu-
cation). He started with almost 100 policy measures, but
utilized 54 on the basis of significance. These variables span-
ned the fields of education, health and welfare, highways, tax
and revenue policy, and public (social) regulation. He con-
sistently found process, environmental, and policy variables to
8Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Interparty
Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies in the
American States," Journal of Politics 23 (May, 1963).
Richard I. Hofferbert, "The Relation Between Public Policy
and Some Structural and Environmental Variables in the American
States," American Political Science Review 60 (March» 1966)
^yibld.. p. 82. -
^'Dye, o£. cit
.
be mcer-rolated. uuu.lng pa«lal co„eUelo„ analysis, how-
ever, ho found policy variables Co be
.ost dependent upon
environmental conditions, „lth process variables exerting Uttle
or no independent eflect. His findings - which agreed with
Hofferbert and Dawson and Robinson - led hi™ to conclude:
"In
short, party competition has no apparent Independent effect on
52 of the 54 policy outcomes Investi8ated...l2 The two outcomes
that passed the significance tests did not Imply an i.„portant
general role for party competition:
"Party competition appears
Independently related to drop-out rates and mental failures, but
this relationship is a product of the peculiar influence of the
southern states. "^"^
Finally, 1966 also brousht the previously unpublished study
of John Fenton. 1^ Borrowing heavily from the work of Key on
taxonomic schemes of political parties, Fenton's findings large-
ly agreed with those of his former mentor: "The data thus
showed that two-party competition does have a measurable effect
on the levels of welfare, Aid to Dependent Children, and per
pupil expenditures independent of both urbanism and income. "15
Fenton did not summarily dismiss the importance of socioeconomic
l^Ibid.
. p. 253.
}? Ibid . , p. 110.
John H. Fenton, People and Parties in Politics (Glenview.
Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1966)
p. ^5.
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conditions; indeed, his data documented their importance, 16
Rather he .erely asserted that competition is more important
than the Dye school would admit.
A word should be said in an effort to resolve the differ-
ences among these early studies, particularly since they .ere
so important to the consequent controversy. This may be done
on three levels. Considerable work has been done in attempting
to resolve the methodological differences. Fenton and Chamber-
layne have identified a number of possible areas that could pos-
sibly lead to differential findings. Among these are differ-
ences in the operationalization of key concepts: for the poli-
tical process variables Hofferbert used national election scores
in his index (a dubious strategy to he sure), Hofferbert and
Dawson and Robinson utilized the statistically questionable
method of rank ordering their competition scores, Dawson and
Robinson for some reason alternated between unit scores and com-
posite scores, Fenton alone consistently used a composite index,
Dye used the additional measures of apportionment and partisan-
ship (the latter also might tend to suppress the other competi-
tion scores). The socioeconomic variables were generally uniform
but differences existed on things like Fenton using per capita
income and Dye utilizing median income. On the policy variables
there were, for example, different measures of ADC; Dye included
^^Ibid., p. 44.
federal grants-in-aid while Fenton did not.l7
,,,3 broad range
Of methodological differences suggests two things: first, any
atte.pt at useful comparative analysis is frustrated; second,
the stark differences a.ong the various findings leads one to
suspect all of the studies of operational shortcomings.
An important substantive question also arises. It will be
recalled that the original theory, as stated by Key, maintained
that competition exerts greater influence the closer the issue
is to the have
- have-not struggle. Therefore, Fenton's find-
ing that his most significiant competition correlation was with
ADC benefits would tend to substantiate the Key-Lockard theory.
On the other hand, many of Dye's findings that suggest no inde-
pendent influence for competition (e.g., highways, total expendi-
tares) do not detract from the validity of the Key theory. It
is important to remember, however, that Dye's findings concerning
policy outputs in general are probably of even greater signifi-
cance than the dispute surrounding the Key theory. After all,
our efforts should be aimed at the total systein rather than any-
one part, no matter how interesting and significant that one
area may be.
These studies also raise important intuitive questions -
John H. Fenton and Donald W. Chamberlayne
, "The Literature
Dealing with the Relationships Between Political Processes, Socio-
economic Conditions, and Public Policies in the American States:
A Bibliographical Essay," Polity 1 (Spring, 1969).
pamcula.ly in .he .eno. of Bye's ad.i.able study. Po. example
in his study Of public regulatory policy he found four outputs
that were related to voter participation, even after controlling
for the effects of economic development - crime rates, prison-
era, parolees, and governments per population. Instead of as-
cribing causal value to voter turnout, he concluded that these
outputs
-are all symptomatic of a general underdevelopment of
human capacities
. The same explanation was offered for the
independent relationships between competition and dropouts and
tnental failures. I do not quarrel with his inference. Rather,
I question his eagerness to dismiss the importance of process
variables, while he is simultaneously reluctant to treat the
relationships between economic development and outputs in a
similar fashion.
The above discussion suggests that the range and depth of
the different conceptions of the three types of variables makes
any inference concerning the Key theory tenuous at best. Per-
haps the best way to sort out the subsequent literature is to
discuss it in terms of these three sets of variables, and see
how these studies taken as a whole bear on Key's theory.
Economic Development
It would bo presumptious for any contemporary branch of the
^ye, o£. cit., p. 236.
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-cial sciences to clai™ that it had discovered the need for
examining the relationships between social structures and poli-
tical systems; the importance of this notion goes back at least
as far as Aristotle. ;^ile the exploration of these ideas was
relatively dormant in the earlier parts of this century, in-
terest in them has been revivied. Advances in technological
expertise and scientific comparative analysis have enhanced
greatly the possibilities for research in this area.l9
As stated above, operationalizing the term "environment"
poses formidable analytical problems. The phrase "economic
development" has been more or less uniformly adopted by politi-
cal scientists as the analog of the environment, apparently for
two reasons. The first is that it is a more descriptive and
more readily operationalizable concept. Th.e second concerns
the idea that much of what is engendered in the amorphous term
For some examples of comparative analyses of sociopoliti-
cal relationships at the cross-national level see, inter alia
Lyle W. Shannon, "Socioeconomic Development and Dem^i^^hiT"' •
Variables as Predictors of Political Change," Sociological
quarterly 3 (January, 1962); Phillips Cutright, "Kational Polit-ical Development: Measurement and Analysis," America n Socio-
logical Review 28 (April, 1963); Seyn;our Martin LipseT,~^m~e
Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Polit-
ical LegitljTiacy," American Pol itica l Science Review 52 (March,
1959); Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (Garden City, New'
York: Doubleday, I960); Deane E. Neubauer, "Some Conditions of
Democracy," American Political Science Review 61 (December,
1967) ; Marvin E. Olsen, "Multivariate Analysis of National Polit-
ical Development," American Sociological Review 33 (October,
1968)
;
Arthur K. Smith, "Socio-Economic Development and Political
Democracy: A Causal Analysis," Midwest Journal of Political
Science 7 (February, 1969).
••cnviron.ea... culminates in the objective social setting which
economic development measures. While this certainly does not
account for everything that is included in the environment,
A dilexmna for students of state politics has been one of
defining the contours and boundaries of this notion of economic
development. For while most concede its importance, there is
considerable disagreement concerning the contours of this di-
mension. That is, which of a whole host of socioeconomic vari-
ables best taps the significant features of economic develop-
ment? ^Thile examining the various concepts of this phenomenon,
it is important to bear in mind that economic development is the
Issue, and the socioeconomic variables are employed onb^ because
they are potentially useful in measuring this dimension of
social life.
Economic development in the states
. A useful starting point for
an examination of quantitative approaches to comparative state
policy is Solomon 'Fabricant's study of state spending patterns
for the first half of this century.20 His conception of economic
development consisted of three socioeconomic variables: per
capital income, urbanization, and population density. He found
these variables to be of considerable help in explaining inter-
20
T^^cnd o_f Government Activity in the United States
Since 190U (Now York: Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 1952).
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state variations in expenditure patterns:
These three factors together account for alittle over 70 nprf>^^n^
states- in per capUa to^fl
^'^'^""^
fu /, pit ta expenditures Tn
actors ' -
have the ZTo'r
activity. 21
in government
The earlier studies of state policy undertaken by political
scientists followed Pabrlcanfs lead 1„ the selection of indi-
cators of economic development. For example, Dawson and
Robinson used per capita income; the percentage of Inhabitants
engaged In occupations other than agriculture, forestry, and
fishing (Industrialization): and the percentage of the state's
population residing in urban areas. 22 Rt^^ard Hofferbert used
the same three variables in his study.23 i„ ^^^^^^^ ^^^^^
Dye added median educational level achieved in each state to
the list. and Fenton chose to use only income and urbanism
as measures of economic development. 25
Despite the fact that Dye, Fabricant, and others found
these socioeconomic variables to be - at times - highly corre-
'
lated with state expenditure levels, social scientists have begun
to question their ability to focus on the more subtle aspects
lll^" P- 123.
Dawson and Robinson, o£. cit_.
, p. 280.
^fHofferbert, o£. £it.
T)ye, o£. cit:, pp. 28-34. Dye used median family income
rathej^than per capita income.
Fenton, Peopl e and Parties
, pp. 37-41.
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of th= social setting. The assumption of a unldl.enslonal
.
"linear" social structure which Is reflected in a few socio-
economic variables collectively labelled economic development
la becoming less tenable. Although directed at Dye's concept,
Richard Hofferbert's comments apply generally to all of these
earlier studies
:
Dye's study, while providing a groundbreaking
compendium of findings and rigorously testedhypotheses, does not clearly take into account
the possible multidimensionality of the eco-
nomic development process he discusses. 26
Further refinements of economic development have taken
many different tracks. One new approach is essentially methodo-
logical in nature. For example, Sharkansky and Hofferbert em-
ployed factor analysis in attempting to demarcate the dimensions
of economic development . ^7 While they achieved some relatively
high factor loadings they are less than clear about how those
factors are related theoretically to the concept of economic
development. Further, it can be argued that factor analysis as
an empirical and theoretical tool must be viewed judiciously in
Richard I. Hofferbert, "State and Community Policy Studies
A Review of Comparative Input-Output Analyses," in James A.
Robinson ed.
,
Political Science Annual
.
Volume 3 (Indiana-
polis- The Bobbs-MerriU Company, Inc., 1972), p. 33.
Ira Sharkansky and Richard I. Hofferbert, "Dimensions of
State Politics, Economics and Public Policy," American Political
S^^gnce Review 63 (September, 1969). Factor analysis was also
utilized by John Crittenden in his study of "Dimensions of
Modernization in the American States," American Political Science
Review 61 (December, 1967).
38
the study of essentially social phenomena.
Young and Moreno utilized Guttman scaling techniques to
outline certain aspects of industrialization and social rigidity
in the states. 28 Although this study might have been better
conceived in political terms, its design offers considerable
potential for unravelling some of the complexities of economic
development.
Others have attempted to conceive of unique variable matri-
ces. Dye endeavored to construct an index of income inequality . 29
This measure, which is of considerable theoretical import, evoked
fairly high coefficients of correlation with policy outputs.
These results should be read with caution, though, for Riley and
Walker argued persuasively that Dye's index might only be epiphe-
nomenal in the sense of it being merely a regional phenomena
rather than a true reflection of income inequality in the states.
Hofferbert believes that the major problems with traditional
conceptualizations of social structure and economic development
are their assumptions of linearity and unidimensionality
.
28Ruth C. Young and Jose A. Moreno, "Economic Development
and Social Rigidity: A Comparative Study of the Forty-Eight
States," Economic Development and Culturc-il Change 13 (July, 1965).
^^Thomas R. Dye, "Income Inequality and American State
Politics," American Political Science Review 63 (March, 1969).
^'-'oennis D. Riley and Jack L. Walker, "Communications,"
American Political Science Review 63 (September, 1969). See also
Dye 'srejoinder.
Hofferbert, "State and Community Policy Studies," pp. 11-15.
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Elliott endeavored to meet some aspects of the linearity problem
by laying out the precise contours of a definition of
..industri-
alization- his points are well-. taken. 32 And Hofferbert him-
self has made a major advance toward delimiting some of the
salient dlonensions of economic development in the states.
In a factor analysis of socioeconomic conditions in the
states, Hofferbert discovered two significant dimensions -
"industrialisation- and "cultural enrichment/'^S industrializa-
tion included things like income, percent of the population in
manufacturing, relative number of telephones, and the value of
farm land. Cultural enrichment included factors such as rela-
tive number of motor vehicles, divorce rates, percent foreign
stock, percent of dwellings owner-occupied, etc. The low amount
of variation over time in the infrastructure of his factors added
credibility to his analysis. In a parallel study, Hofferbert
further exhibited a commendable appreciation of the value and
necessity of comparative analyses over time. Here he found that
the range of ecological development among the states was narrowing,
largely due to the extraordinary achievements of the South in
32James R. Elliott, .'A Comment on Inter-Party Competition,
Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies in the American States,".
Jom^"'-^l of Politics 27 (Febrxiary, 1965).
Richard I. Hofferbert, "Socioeconomic Dimensions of the
American States: 1890-1960," Midwes t Journal of Po litical
Science 12 (August, 1968). Hofferbert later substituted "afflu-
ence" for the phrase "cultural enrichment." See footnote #34.
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this regard.
-^^'^'^^^^^^^^^^^
Perhaps the .est
intractable of all the economic development variables is region-
alism.36
^^^^^^^ ^^^^ regionalism should not
be treated as an economic development variable at all. Most
scholars have considered regionalism as something related to
economic development, and there are in fact intra-regional eco-
nomic Similarities which support this approach. But there are
many ideas contained in regionalism which are not purely economic
geography, attitudes, culture, and demographic development pat-
terns, for example. So although regionalism is a variable which
has more than just an economic component, it is discussed here
as an economic development variable for organizational purposes
and because it is in this manner that it is considered by most
students of comparative state politics.
In operationalizing the concept, one must make many diffi-
cult decisions such as how to divide up the states, whether or
not state boundaries should be considered, whether or not conti-
guity should be a criterion, how to measure regions in empirical
Richard I. Hofferbert, "Ecological Development and PolicyChange in the American States," Midwest Journal of Political
Science 10 (November, 1966).
^Sub-section title taken from Coulter, o£. ci_t
. ,
p. 38.
On this point see, for example, Joe B. Frantz, "The South
as Confirmation," Alvin L. Bertrand, "Comments by a Regional
Sociologist," Clarence E. Ayrcs, "Some Reflections on Region-
alism," Charles R. Adrian, "Regional Analysis in Political
Science," These four studies appeared in the Social Science
Quarterly 49 (June, 1968).
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ter^s, etc. Further, how can the shared experiences which cul-
minate In a regional culture be measured - or „ore difficult,
be held constant. For example, 1„ devising a model of the
state policy process Ilofferbert allowed for the importance of
historical factors, but offered little assistance in conceptu-
alizing this notion. 37
Until recently, case studies were the medium through which
regional cultures were analyzed. 38 Although many of these
analyses are highly informative, it is often difficult to inte-
grate them with comparative studies of state policy choices.
Again the problem of operationalism looms large. Sharkansky has
attempted to conceive regionalism in empirical terms, to unravel
some of its components (such as types and levels of economic
37
"Elite Influence in State Policy Formation," Polity 2(Spring, 1970). For some provocative ideas concerniI^i~7^e of
the consequences of historical factors for local governmental
policy, see, for example, John H. Kessel, "Government Structure
and Political Environment: A Statistical Note About American
Cities," American Political Science Review 55 (September, 1962);
and Pvaymond E. Wolfinger and John Osgood Field, "Political
Ethos and the Structure of City Government," Americ an Political
Science Review 60 (June, 1966).
"
^See for example, Lockard, o£. cit
.
; Frank H. Jonas, ed.,
^^stern Politics (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press,
1961); V. 0. Key, Jr., Southern Politics (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1966); John H. Fenton, Politics in the
Bord er States (New Orleans: Ilouser Press, 1957); George Goodwin,
Jr. and Victoria S chuck, eds.. Party Politics in New England
,
Special Supplement to Polity 1 (1968)..
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activity), eo
.olato the coacept to policy outputs. Al-
though his
.ather groundbreaUlns ideas are still i„ a formative
stage, th»y merit attention.
Sharkansky began his analysis by presenting the rationale
for considering regions as significant units of analysis. He
argued his case cogently:
simlariLies in state politics and public policyreflect sorae underlying behavioral process wherebythe structure and outputs of politics in neighbor^ing states come to resemble one another. Thetendency of political leaders and government of-ficials to acquire their cues from regional neigh-bors has several causes: the belief that neigh-bors have problems similar to one's own; the at-titude among officials and interested citizens
that it is "legitimate" to adapt one's programs
to those of nearby governm.ents ; and the structure
or o.-iicials organizational affiliations, wnichput them into frequent contact with counterpartsin neighboring governments.
The belief that officials of neighboring juris-
dictions have similar problems is expressed in
simple fashion by public officials; beneath it
however, lies a complex set of reasons. On the
surface, it means that elites in neighboring
states probably have encountered policy questions
sijDilar to those currently being faced; consequent-
ly the neighbor is likely to have a concrete sug-
gestion to offer or to be informed about the pit-
falls to be encountered along the way to certain
solutions. But underlying this expectation is the
more basic assumption: that the neighboring
government is serving a population akin to one's
own, with similar needs for public service and
similar demands on government agencies. The
neighboring government's economy is likely to be
similar, presenting a comparable set of resources
and needs to government agencies; the same resem-
blance usually exists between the political en-
vironments, with respect to the levels of service
A3
that can receive popular support and to the
relationships among administrators, executives,legislators, and private interests. Such
IZTuTW^^ population and the economicand po itical characteristics of neighboringjurisdictions may result from underlyinp rgo-graphical similarities, leading to similar
economic and population characteristics- orfrom shared historical experiences, which maygive rise to common political values and -
similar desires for public services.
Because one's neighbors face similar problems •
with similar resources, the norms which guide
their own service decisions are likely to be
within reach of one's own agency; thus, the
adaptation to regional models is considered
'relevant," "easy," or "feasible" in the
light of local conditions. (Further), the
legitimacy of (these) regional comparisons tends
to feed upon its own past habit.
Sharkansky proceeded to establish four different regional
typologies comprising different assortments of the states, which
were classified into seventeen regional groupings. His findings
concerning the ability of these regional measures to help explain
policy variations ajTiong the states are discussed later. For now,
it is sufficient to state Sharkansky's conclusions on the via-
bility of regionalism as a theoretical concept.
Ira Sharkansky, Regionalism in Amer ican Politics (Indiana-
polis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1970), pp. 9-15. Sharkansky
presented many of these ideas in two earlier publications; "Eco-
nomic Development, Regionalism and State Political Systems," Mid-
Journal of Political S cience 12 (February, 1968), and "Region-
alism, Economic Status and the Public Policies of American States,"
Social S cience Quarterly 12 (June, 1968). Support for this ratio-
nale of the regional component can be found in Jack L. Walker,
"The Diffusion of Innovations Among the American States," American
Political Science Review 63 (September, 1969).
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On the measures of state politics considered in
this book, there is greater uniformity within
regions than in the nation as a whole. Although
these findings do not provide direct evidence
about the existence of shared historical experi-
ences or regional norms that govern the behavior
of politicians, citizens, or public officials,
they do suggest the existence of regional pro-
cesses -- processes which may include shared ex-
periences and norms — at work upon the character of
of state affairs. ^0
Sharkansky's analysis represented a new and potentially fruit-
ful approach to the study of regionalism. Most of the work in
this area, though, lies ahead. Indeed, Sharkansky himself pru-
dently exercised caution when he "makes no claim to identify
the specific features associated with each region (independent
of current economic levels) that provide the explanation of current
policies. "^'^
Conceptualization and Measurement of the Political Process
As with the socioeconomic variables, the conceptualization of
the political process presents formidable operational problems;
the distinction between political and social variables is ullus-
trative in this regard. Lineberry and Fowler, for example, have
argued that socioeconomic conditions are influential in explain-
ing the differential patterns of adoption of local governmental
'^'^ Regionalism
,
p. 75.
^llbid., p. 26.
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forms. These kinds of issues will continually bo raised, and
rightfully so. For now, thouch, some attempt should be made to
present some of the research which bears on the conceptualiza-
tion and measurement of the political process.
Measurin g Executive Pcrfon^nnce . The growing complexity of
modern society has as a concommitant the enlargement of executive
power. Wliile this phenomenon is most clearly observed at the
national level, it is evident at the lower strata of government
as well. The subtleties of executive performance are difficult
to estimate, almost Impossible to quantify. The ascendance of
quantitative comparative analyses of state government has spawned
a few noteworthy, although usually only partially successful,
endeavors in this regard.
The problems of measurement have led some scholars to con-
centrate on the formal powers of governors. Schlcsinger' s index
of formal gubernatorial power was perhaps the best known effort
in this regard. ^ Governors vjere assigned a composite score
^*^Robcrt T.. Lineberry and Edmund P, Fowler, "Reformism and
Public Policies in American Cities," American Po] Itical Science
Review 61 (September, 1967).
^3jo3eph A. Schlesinger, "The Politics of the Executive,"
in Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines, eds
.
, Pol i tics in the
American States (Jioston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965). See
also Coleman B. Ransone, Jr., The Of fle e of Governor in the United
Stat es (University: University of Alal>ama Press, 1956), and
Ransone, "Political Leadership in the Governor's Office," Journal
of Pol itics 26 (February, 1964).
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based on points received for four formal powers: budget powers,
appointive powers, tenure potential, and veto powers, Beyle,
by means of intei.,iew data, attempted to check Schlesinger
'
s
index against the perceptions of power of the governors them-
selves/^ In general, there was a fairly good match/between the
two. Beyle suggested, though, that Schlesinger' s index could be
improved by adding a few more items and devising a procedure for
"weighting" the various items contained in it.
The major drawback of operations like that of Schlesinger
is that, by definition, they analyzed only a part of the picture -
and a small part at that. Formal powers do not necessarily pro-
vide realistic cues as to the success of governors in "getting
their way" in terms of the enactment of substantive public poli-
cies. Further, formal powers say little of things like "antici-
pated reactions." Sharkansky, and Sharkansky and Turnbull at-
tempted to meet some of these problems in their studies of agency
requests, gubernatorial support, and legislative appropriations.^^
And in her study of the relationship of the governor to his
Beyle, "The Governor's Formal Powers: A View From
the Governor's Chair," Public Administration Review 28 (November-
December 1968)
.
^^Ira Sharkansky, "Agency Requests, Gubernatorial Support,
and Budget Success in State Legislatures," Americ an Political
Science Review 62 (December, 1968); Ira Sharkansky and Augustus
Turnbull, III, "Budget-Making in Georgia and Wisconsin: A Test
of a Model," Midwest Journal of Political Science 13 (November,
1969). Also relevant in this regard are Sharkansky, "Four Agencies
and an Appropriations Subcommittee: A Comparative Study of Budget
Strategies," Midwe<^ t Journal of Political Science 9 (August, 1965);
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legislative party, McCally found size of legislative majority and
proximity of the next election to be associated with the frequency
of votoes being sustained/^ m this study, McCally employed
highly advanced quantitative techniques. However, these were of
little help in measuring things like the personal influence of
governors with their legislators. That McCally found this personal
influence to be of crucial explanatory value once again under-
scores the problems of theory and measurement of executive per-
formance.
Legislative Structure. In regard to the various institutional
structures of the state governments, it is the legislatures which
are most frequently the targets of "reformist" movements. The
tv.'o areas which hr-ve been given the most attention are apportion-
ment and legislative professionalism.
Of all the levels of government, probably the states have
been subject to the most criticism in terms of their responsiveness
to the needs of the people. The lack of numerical equality in
state representative systems has been thought to disadvantage
and Sharkansky, "An Appropriations Subcommittee and Its Client
Agencies," American Political Science Review 59 (September, 1965).
^^^''The Governor and His Legislative Party," American Polit -
ical Science Review 60 (December, 1966).
n this see, for example, Ira Sharkansky, The Mal igned
_
States (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1972), and DuaneHockard,
The Perverted Priorities of American Politics (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1971).
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the interests of those groups in the states who are n.ost in need
of help from the government. Yet despite the centrality of
concern over apportionment, until recently little research was
performed to check the specific extent, causes and consequences
of inequality of apportionment. One reason for this has been
the absence of any widely accepted measure of malapportionment.
Several efforts have been made to devise an acceptable index
of equality of apportionment. In its landmark decision - Baker
V-
-Qat-r — the Supreme Court relied on the test of the ratio
of the smallest to the largest single member district in the
state. If one legislator represented a population of 300,000
and another represented 10,000 the rationwould be 10 to 1.^^
This approach, however, encountered several difficulties. For
example, it said nothing about the representativeness of a poten-
tial majority in a legislature; it merely specified a range, with
no reference to the pattern of distribution within that range.
In a real sense, this measure obscured many of the same subtle-
ties exhibited in income distribution data.
Three somewhat more rigorous apportionment indices have been
devised in an attempt to overcome some of these problems. Dauer
and Kelsay have developed an "index of representativeness" which
assigned a score to each state based on the minimum percentage of
^^Dye uses this measure in Politics
,
Economic s , and the
Public
, p. 63.
49
the state's population which could elect a majority of state
legislators. They began with the least populous district and
then, in ascending order, added the populations of the larger
districts until they got a majority of the legislative districts.
This figure was then divided by the population of the state to
get a ratio of from
.00 to .50. This was done for both houses,
whose ratios were added, producing a maxisnum score of 1.00.^9
While this measure was more refined than that of Dye, it did not
directly address itself to some of the more salient cleavages in
state politics (like urban v. rural); only "highness" and "little-
ness" of districts was considered.
David and Eisenberg's "index of urban representation" en-
deavored to estimate the status of this urbsn-ntral cleavage in
state legislatures. The total population of the state was divi-
ded by the number of legislative districts in each house, to get
something of an "ideal average." This average was then compared
with the actual population of the legislative districts in the
state's urban areas. A score measuring the degree of urban repre-
sentation in the state legislature was arrived at by averaging
the ratios of both houses of the legislature,^^
49Manning J. Dauer and Robert G. Kelsay, "Unrepresentative
States." National Municipal Review 44 (April, 1955).
^^Paul T. David and Ralph Eisenberg, Devaluatio n of the
Urban and Suburban Vote (Charlottesville, Virginia: Bureau of
Public Administration, University of Virginia, 1961).
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A methodologically sophisticated
'•apportionment score"
devised by Schubert and Press combined a measure of the relative
distribution of district populations (..Ue^ness.., or the no^ality
of the distribution) with measures of the spread of the popula-
tion (-Icurtosis.., or the peakedness of the population curve) .51
The scores of each of these three procedures varied suffi-
ciently so that one might conclude that each was tapping a dif-
ferent dimension of apportionment. Taken together, they probably
dealt with most of the significant aspects of apportionment.
The ability of these measures to account for variations in state
spending patterns is explored later on in this chapter.
Textbooks and reformists alike have been harsh in their
evaluations of the "professionalism" of state legislators. Ama-
teurism is often thought to be in large part attributable to a
set of structural factors extant in state legislatures: low
salaries, short sessions, inadequate research and staff facili-
ties, high mobility patterns of state legislators, etc. Until '
'
recently, however, little research has been devoted to refining
the concept of professionalism in state legislatures, and esti-
mating its impact on state policy. While the latter area is
^^Glendon Schubert and Charles Press, "Measuring Malap-
portionment," American Political Science Review 58 (June, 1964).
51
still largely unexplored terrain. Grun.n.52 Grun^ and Clark^a
have devised a "legislative professionalism index." By .eans
of factor loadings, Grurm, has isolated several aspects he feels
are indicative of professional legislatures among which are
salaries, expenditures for staffs, number of bills introduced
during the session, length of sessions, etc. His findings can
at best be temed preliminary; much more needs to be done in
this area for it to be a useful policy analytic tool.
PatterBS_olJ>cU^
attempt to consider cru-
cial aspects of politics not included in analyses of formal
powers, political scientists have constructed certain behavioral
indices of political activity. Concern has usually been focused
on three particular aspects of state politics: voter turnout,
Inter-party competition, and the partisan structure of state
policy-making bodies.
The viability of the first two as policy cues was first
suggested by Key.^'^ Political scientists have devoted a consider-
able amount of time to examining the relationships between
socioeconomic characteristics and political participation. The
^2john G. Grumm, "Structure and Policy in the Legislature,"
paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southwestern Social
Science Association, Dallas, March, 1967.
53john G. Grumm and Calvin W. Clark, Compensation for Legis -
^ators in_ thc_ Fifty States (Kansas City, Missouri: Citizens
Conference on State Legislatures, 1966).
^^See Chapter One for a fuller discussion of the Key theory.
^^Lester V/. Milbrath, "Political Participation in the States,"
in Jacob and Vines, o£. cic ; see also Angus Campbell, ej:. al.
,
The American Voter (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964), and
52
-la.lonshlps between these variables and pa«y preferences 1„
the states has also been eo„slCered.36
,
^^^^^^^^^^^
question concerning feelings toward particular state policies
has been explored by Weber, and Hunger and Mezey.57
The partisan structure of poUcy-.aklng bodies Is usually
determined by, for example, using the percent democratic 1„ a
"ate legislature. This Index Is ordinarily used in conjunction
with so.e measure of Interparty competition. =8 Taken together,
these three variables have been utilized in trying to account
'
for differences In state policy decisions. Their success In
this endeavor is examined In the next section.
For now. It is essential to stress that these kinds of
variables In no way exhaust the consideration of the political
process. Often they are used primarily because they rather than
others lend themselves to quantification. Other, more subtle
factors are of considerable Importance as well. For example,
~! iMfy^ ^^^^^^ RandMcNally.
Vlne^^'^nr"".'*''"'"'^'
State Politics," in Jacob andillcb, op
. C 1 L ,
57Frank Hunger and Michael Mezey, "Participation and PartyCompetition as Determinants of State Policy," paper presented
at the annual meeting of the New York State Political ScienceAssociation, Poughkeepsie, 1968; Ronald Weber, 'T^in.ensions of
fiJ u^'
Systems," paper presented at the annual meeting ofthe Northeastern Political Science Association, Hartford 1969
^^The literature dealing with classifications and typolopies
of state party systems is discussed in the following chapter.
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the efforts of the parties to Influence both election results
and their
.embers, behavior once elected are probably cruclal.59
This factor, how.ever. is difflrniftticult to measure precisely, as are
things U,e the Info^al contacts and powers a^ong the various
political actors. 60
^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^^
voted to these nuances If „e are really to get at the "stuff"
of politics.
Measures and Eetermlnants_o£_state Policy
A short time ago, a discussion of the detennlnants of state
policy could have been organised around the distinction between
those studies which did and those which did not find political
process variables to be of some explarat"- va'"» t.j...
the discussion of the Fenton, Dye, Hofferbert. and Dawson and
Robinson studies at the beginning of this chapter adopts that
very approach. 61 But welcomed advancements in the study of
state policy have transformed this simple distinction into an
anachronism. State policy has been demonstrated to be a multi-
faceted, multi-dimensional, highly differentiated phenomenon.
9x„o excellent studies of party behavior are those ofSamuel J. Eldersveld, Political Parties : A Behavioral Analysis
np ^''^f^r.
^""^ I-5^Nally and Company, 1964). Tr^rnl^rrrjTc^^ty
,
Party Lffort and Its Impact on the Vote," Americm PoliticalScience Review 65 (June, 1971). See also u'^CMi;''c^TTrt
6UThe classic statement of "the power to persuade""i7 con-tained in Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power (New York-
John Wiley & Sons, 1960).
~~
6lSee footnotes 3, 7 and 8.
Accordingly. I conclude this chapter by discussing see of the
earlier literature which treated state policy as a socioecono.-
Ically-determined output, then .ove on to some refinements of
this rather rigid position, and conclude „ith some new research
dealing with Innovative conceptualizations of policy outputs
and policy subsets.
^2Sl^l^eterjni^^
previously stated,
the earlier studies by political scientists taken as a whole
seemed to refute the venerable Key theory, m the words of
Dawson and Robinson:
If the data reported and operations employed
have been measuring what we have presumed them
to measure, inter-party competition does not
play as influential role in dcterrr.ining the
nature and scope of welfare policies as earlier
studies suggested. High levels of inter-party
competition are highly related both to socio-
economic factors and to social welfare legisla-
tion, but the degree of inter-party competition
does not seem to possess the important interven-
ing influence between socio-economic factors and
liberal welfare programs that our original hypoth-
esis and theoretical scheme suggested. In short,
the evidence points to the relatively greater in-
fluence of certain external conditions over one
aspect of the political process in the forrr.ula-
tion of selected public policies. ^2
At first blush, these earlier studies would seem to be
rather disquieting for political scientists in general, and V. 0,
Key in particular. But two caveats are in order. First, al-
though Dye stated his conclusions concerning the relative im~
"Dawson and Robinson, o£. cit
. , p. 289.
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Portance of the two sets of variables rather confidently, there
is good reason to be cautious in drawing inferences. Richard
Hofferbert, for one, was skeptical of the tenor of Dye's study:
Examining the policy impact of four measures ofeconomic development, Dye finds between theseand each of fifty-four measures of public poUcy
^ultxp e correlation coefficients that rangefrom
.27 to .90. From 2.0 percent to 81.0 per-
theLf
in these policy indicators,ere ore, xs explained by the joint impact offour economic variables. Furthermore, of fifty-four multiple correlation coefficients, onlytwenty- two are above
.70. Only a little morethan a third of Dye's policy measures have halfor more of their variance explainted by the
socioeconomic indicators. Furthermore the
multiple R of the fifty-four coefficients aver-
ages to 60.62, indicating that the mean percent-
age of the variance in any policy indicator ex-plained by the four economic measures is 36.57.
This 36.57 percent explained by socioeconomic
structure is a significant gain over what we
knew prior to Dye's research. Nevertheless it
clearly shows that — insofar as these fifty-four
policy indicators are representative of our
universe of dependent variables -~ we still have
an average two-thirds of the variance in policy
to be accounted for by something other than these
particular socioeconomic indicators
.
The first caveat, then, is that Dye's evidence was not as strong
as a first reading of his conclusions would seem to indicate.
The second note of caution refers to the selection of poli-
cies and how these relate to the Key theory. For example. Dye's
highest partial correlation coefficients for socioeconomic
^^Ilofferbert, "State and Community Policy Studies," p. 39.
He based these observations on Dye's table in Politics, Economics
and the Publ ic, pp. 286-87.
variables were with average teachers' salaries and public em-
ployees' salaries. V/hile it is no doubt true that it is useful
to know what causes variations in these policies fro™ state to
state, these findings did not address the^.selves to Key's theory.
It is therefore in^possible to say that these findings were evi-
dence against Key, when the terns of Key's theory do not ad.it
these findings as relevant data. It is imperative to keep these
two caveats in mind in an analysis of the relevant literature.
E^onornists^^ In studying per capita total general
expenditures, Fabricant claimed that three socioeconomic indi-
cators
- particularly income - could "explain" 7'07o of the
variance. 64 This study stands as something of a landmark in
both cross^sectional and longitudinal analysis, and has inspired
a number of studies by economists which are similar in research
design.
Fisher used Fabricant 's socioeconomic variables in attempt-
ing to ex-plain variations in expenditure patterns for several
policies. 65 His 1957 data did not have explanatory power equal
to Fabricant's 1942 set. He claimed that the economic develop-
ment measures correlated rather strongly with expenditures for
police and fire protection, but could explain "a very low pro-
portion of the variations in expenditure for welfare. "^^
6^See footnote 19.
65,
'Glenn W. Fisher, "Determinants of State and Local Govern-
ment Expenditures," National Tax Journal 14 (December, 1961).
66lbid., p. 355.
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using oo.e additional variables and a Joint regression
rather than multiple regression progr™, Ernest Kurnow attempted
check the findings of Fisher's study. His .ajor argument
was that his methodology was capable of eliciting higher regress-
ion coefficients. 67 m examining total general expenditures,
Morss found that total per capita qtpf^ .r.A ^V^i: s ate and local tax collections
"explained" n.ost of the variation in this policy output. 68
A few economists have gone beyond the Fabricant paradigm
in looking for explanations for the variations in state spend-
ing patterns. Sacks and his colleagues found per capita income
to be their strongest independent variable, but by introducing
federal and state aid as additional independent variables the
overall explanatory power of their model was greatly enhanced:
"The proportion of variation explained when both state and federal
aid are included shows quite substantial increases in all cate-
gories (policies) over the results when only the three basic
factors were used."^^ -^^ ^ ^^^^ extensive study of New York
State spending patterns. Sacks et. al. had their preliminary
67Ernest Kurnow, "Determinants of State and Local Expendi-
tures Reexamined," Natj^nal Jo^^ 16 (September, 1963).
68Elliott R. Morss, "Some Thoughts on the Determinants of
1966)
Expenditures," National Tax Journaj. 19 (March,
^^Se>'mour Sacks and Robert Harris, "The Determinants of
State and Local Government Expenditures and Intergovernmental
Flows of Funds," National Tax Journal 17 (March, 1964), p. 82.
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findings corroborated
.
In a study of both levels and changes 1„ total expenditures,
Bahl and Saunders found federal aid to be the crucial variable."
However, when they extracted fifteen high Inco.e-hlgh density
states, they found socioeconomic variables to be of considerably
™re help than federal aid in accounting for spending variations . 72
toong other things, this study raised questions concerning the
viability of assumptions of linearity and unldlmenslonallty in
expenditure models. ''^
Of all the studies conducted by economists, the one most
worthy of note was a later article by Fisher. 7^ Here, Fisher
employed a set of political process measures as independent
variables
- somathing the other economists failed to do.
Further, he divided the independent variables into three groups:
Seymour Sacks, Robert Harris, and John J. Carroll, The
^tate and Local Government.
... The Role of State Aid, cS^^-troller s Studies in Local Finance, Number 3, (New Y^- State
Department of Audit and Control, 1963), especially pp. 120-26.
Roy W. Bahl, Jr. and Robert J. Saunders, "Determinants ofChanges m State and Local Government Expenditures," National
Jp"t-nal 18 (March. 1965). See also Elliott R. MoTis, J. Eric
Fredland and Saul H. Hymans, "Fluctuations in State Expenditures:
An Econometric Analysis," Southern Economic Journal 33 (April
1967). ' V f »
72lbid.
, p. 57.
73on this point see Hofferbert, "State and Community Policy
Studies," pp. 11-15.
^^Glenn W. Fisher, "Interstate Variation in State and Local
Government Expenditure," National Tax Journal 17 (March, 1964).
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political, demographic, and economic. He then utilized a multi-
ple-partial correlation program to test for the relevant
strengths of the' three sets of variables. This study should be
commended both for its theoretical perception and its methodo-
logical astuteness. In addition, his conception of some vari-
ables was rather innovative. For example, one economic variable
is percent of low income families in the state; this measure
would seem to tap a significant dimension of the social structure
In fact, he found this measure to be his single most powerful
independent variable. His most significant findings, though,
emanated from his multiple-partial computer runs. ' Here his
distinctions between demographic and economic variables paid
off, for he found the demographic set to be strongest for some
policies, and the economic set dominant in other policy areas. ^5
The political variables, while showing some reasonably high
coefficients, were found to be less significant than the other
two sets. The way he utilized the multiple-partial program
addressed itself to the problems of linearity and dimensionality
alluded to by Hofferbert and Coulter. Unfortunately, though,
his choice of policy indicators and his conceptualization of
the political process^^ limited the value of this study as a
^^md., pp. 70-73.
76For"a differ ent
,
although somewhat less than successful,
attempt by a pair of economists to incorporate political factors
into expenditure models see Otto Davis and Geoirge Haines, "A
Political Approach to a Theory of Public Expenditures: The Case
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direct test of the Key theorv KM^ 4.y n y. But it was an excellent study
nonetheless.
These econo,„etrlc studies, although technlcaUy sophisti-
cated, provided Uttle of theoretleal Insight Cor politi-
cal scientists. Apparently content at achieving high correla-
tlon coefficients, their analyses left little roo. for the
dynamics Of the political process. Even Plsher's study - „hich
did use (only) one political variable - cannot be taken as a
realistic test of the importance of politics. Also, the choice
of policy indicators in these studies did not address Itself
directly to the Key theory. This is understandable m light of
the different kinds of concerns of economists, but the fact re-
gains that these studies have but marginal bearing on the Key
theory.
The studies discussed in this section taken as a whole ~-
represent the position which claims that to explain variations
in spending patterns it is sufficient merely to isolate the con>
ditions of economic development extant in the states. However, '
Richard Hofferbert has argued, in his analysis of "Ecological
Development and Policy Change in the American States, "77 ^hat
this position is becoming decreasingly useful. In comparing the
of Municipalities," National Tax Journal 19 (September, 1966)
'/Mulwcs_t Journal of Political Science 10 (November, 1966).
states over tl.e in te^s of economic development and support for
public services, he found that on both counts the relative dis-
tance a^ong the states was narrowing. All states were improving,
but the lesser developed states were improving more rapidly,
thereby closing the gap. More importantly, Hofferbert found that
as these gaps have been narrowed over the decades, the ability
of socioeconomic variables to account for variations in policy
among the states has become progressively more limited: "A
further facet of this pattern of increasing similarity is that
the strength of connection between ecology and policy declines
as the overall variance along each dimension is reduced. It
would seem that this decline in the strength of ecology-policy
correlations is evidence of an increase in the potential for
choice in the deliberations of state policy makers. "78
Politics and Policy. This discussion does not reach a point
where the relationships among politics, economics, and policy are
clearly delineated. However, we can estimate the possibilities
for politics as an explanatory variable as evidenced in the
relevant literature.
Malapportionment
; Correlates and Consequences
. Intuitively, it
is reasonable to expect noticeable relationships between various
socioeconomic measures and the degree of malapportionment. Par-
ticularly we would expect the more recently and rapidly urbanized
Ibid.
, pp. 474 and 481.
stntcs to be the least fairly apportioned. And since It Is the
urban centers which are usually „,ost In need of sovorn^ent
support for basle services. It .Ight be hypothesized that „,alap
portlon^ent exerts a depressing effect on covern^ental spending
patterns. These notions have been examined by a fe» political
scientists
.
In Politics, T^<nKmics, and the Public and in an earlier
article vhich focused specifically on malapportionment, Dye
presented evidence which was contrary to both of these hypoth-
eses. In terms of the possible causal relationship between
socioeconomic conditions and malapportionment Dye stated that:
Urban, industrial, high-income states are lesslikely to di.'^crJmlnate against their urban areac;
than rural, low-income agricultural states.
This relationship holds in the non-southern states
as well as in all the fifty states. However,
there is no relationship between economic develop-
ment and malapportionment in the technical sense.
There are no significant correlations between the
index of rcproHentativeness or the apportionment
score and any of the socioeconomic measures. The
legislaturo.<5 of rural f.-irrn states are just as
likely to be unrepresentative in the technical
sense as the legislatures of urban industrial
states. The southern states are no more malap-
portloned than the non
-southern states. ''^
In tcnns of the consequences of malapportionment, Dye was
similarly skeptical of the explanatory value of this factor:
On the whole, the policy choices of malapportlon-
ed legislatures are not noticeable different
from the policy choices of well-apportioned legis-
latures. Most of the policy differences which do
^^ I'oll tics
.
Economics and the Public
, p. 68,
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ar/.e^ers°ir, iL\iT:sV^
product of apporLn:.e;t p^Ltices '
''''''
tZt rr''??' reapportionment will
poUc'iLV"^''^ liberali^ation of welfare
In more recent research, Pulsipher and Weatherby found evi-
dence which challenged both Dye's latter statement above, and
his more general findings concerning the inability of inter-
party competition to explain variations in policy. They stated:
^n/'J\'T'^^^^ '° categoriesfor which both hypotheses (concerning the rela-tionships among the variables) were accepted
comprise some of the more important categories
of state and local expenditure, and the accept-
ance of the hypotheses would seem to suggest
that apportionment patterns and levels of polit-ical competition are more potent influences than
some of the recent literature would lead one tobelieve.
It has been shown that it is possible to accept
the hypotheses that malapportionir.ent tends todepress and party competition tends to elevate
some of the more important categories of state
and local governmental expenditure.^^
The excellent study of state legislatures from a comparative
perspective provided by Wayne Francis tended to corroborate some'
of the findings of Pulsipher and Weatherby. Francis believed
that there was a fairly close relationship between party competi-
80
"Malapportionment and Public Policy in the States," Journal
of Po litics 27 (August, 1965); 599 and 598 respectively.
^lAllan G. Pulsipher and James L. Weatherby, Jr., "Malap-
portionment Party Competition, and the Functional Distribution of
Governmental Expenditures," American Political Sci ence Review 62
(December, 1968): 1218-19.
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"on and apportionment patterns. He constructed a composite
inden of apportionment which moasnred the fairness of apportlon-
-nt (Schubert and Press,, and population stress (the ability
o£ legislatures to adapt apportionment to changes in the popula-
tlon). A four level classification emerged: adaptive, „ell-
apportioned states (high party competition); well-apportioned
states with relatively stable populations (mostly competitive
with a few exceptions)
;
states with malapportionment and high
population stress (10 of U rank low in competition), and states
with stable populations and poor apportionment (little party
conflict). 82 Francis thus believed that there were some rather
subtle though important relationships among socioeconomic vari-
flbles, process measures, and apportionment patterns. And since
he conceptualized apportionment patterns as policy outputs be-
cause they are essentially political decisions, he speculated
that, "policy areas not Involving money will exhibit a closer
relation to political variables. "^3
It is difficult to arbitrate among these studies, except
to concede that the debate over the causes and consequences of
malapportionment is yet to be resolved. The fact that Dye's,
and Pulsipher and Keatherby's studies were roughly similar in
conceptualization and research design yet produced conflicting
82Wayne L. Francis, Lef>islative Issues in the Fifty States-A Comparative Analysis (Chicago: Rand HcNally ^ CompanT;
*
1967) pp. 63-68. ^'
«3ibid., p. 71.
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results leads one to question the viability of this type of
approach to the issues. Perhaps it will take research on things
like bloc voting in state legislatures, role perceptions and
behavior of salient voting blocs, and even so.e case studies.84
^^^^J^^^ojnar^^
^
^^^^^^^^^ scientists
have been reluctant to give up the notion that politics is im-
portant. Fenton was the first to clai. importance for process
variables in this genre of quantitative policy output studies. 85
He has received some help in this regard from others.
Duane Lockard examined the relationships among the three
sets of variables. He like those of the Dye persuasion, found
socioeconomic variables and party competition to be highly re-
lated, nut unlike Dye and Dawson and Robinson, when he isolated
party competition he found that this factor did indeed indepen-
dently influence variations in spending. 86 The fact that these
operations were performed for six welfare policies can be taken
as evidence of support for the Key theory. He concluded that,
"Che influence of party competition is apparent; there appears
On this see Coulter, o£. cit. pp. 42-43. For some note-
worthy endeavors in this regard see, for example, Wayne L.
Francis, "Influence and Interaction in a State Legislative Body "
Air.erica n Political Science Review 56 (December, 1962); and John'
Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and Leroy C. Ferguson,
"American State Legislators' Role Orientations Toward Pressure
Groups " Journal of Politics 22 (May, 1960).
85see footnotes 13 and 16.
Duane Lockard, "State Party Systems and Policy Outputs,"
in Oliver Garceau, ed.
, Political Research and Political Theory
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968).
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to be see grounds for believing that the (Key) hypothesis
has some validity ...87
.oclcard also presented significant evi-
dence fro. his analysis of legislative enactments:
Something further about the political system.
?L ^"f^^-d investigat-
quantifl'b?:''"'^f those'withntifiable payoffs. The have-not elements of
suchT'r^ '^"^^^^ passage ofuch legislation as minimum wage laws, Lidis-crimination statutes, small-loan laws and theabsence of right-to-work laws. As it turns outxn three of the four categories there is a '
significant correlation between competition and
laws
81'"'"'''' exception being small-loan
Tvo skilled methodologists, Cnudde and McCrone, attempted
to focus directly on Key's theory. Their language demonstrated
a sensitivity to some of the ideas Key tried to expound:
Key's status conflict formulation enables us todiscard the simplistic hypothesis that party
competition is important for explaining policym general. We would hypothesize that party
competition would differentially explain policies
as a function of the centrality of the policy
area to the have, have-not struggle. 89
They attempted to test the validity of three expenditure
models: the Dye model (economic development - policy outputs),
'
the Key model (economic development - process variables - policy
outs), and a "hybrid" model. This latter model predicted effects
^o^Mi., pp. 199-200.
Ikid., p. 208.
89charles F. Cnudde and Donald J. McCrone, .'Party Competi-
tion and Welfare Policies in the American States," American
Political Science Review 63 (September, 1969): 859.
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bo.h p„ty ccpoutlon an. e.o„o.l. development „Uh pa..,
ccpetUion's e«e« emanating £™. a developmental sequence
originating 1„ economic development
„ith differential Influence
in various policy area., m addition they were <,ulc. to point
out that party competition scores do not exhaust the field of
political factors which Influence political decisions:
This (hybrid) model states that there are "n"
faro • this model social wel-
both of which originate in socioeconomic devel-opment. One is transmitted through the intlr-vening variable party co.petition'and h o Lrappears as a direct effect of development be-cause we have ignored the additional interven-ing political variables. 50
In a series of rather sophisticated c,rA-i-t<.^^^r-'-^i" i--L«-aK.ca staciitical operations,
they produced evidence which led them to conclude:
Although it is not possible to estimate the
exact magnitude of the impact of party competi-tion if this is the appropriate model, it doesindicate that this political variable does have
an impact Rejection of the spuriousness model
CUye s) then does suggest that even if there
are direct effects from the environment party
competition still serves as an intervening
variable.
As might have been predicted by Key, we tend tohave different models with different policies.
The extent to which we can reject the spurious-
ness model seem to vary as a function of the
centrality of the policy to the struggle between
the haves and have-nots. Our inferences there-
fore are consistent with the theory that given
the advantages possessed by the haves, the
Ibid., p. 860.
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organization, continuity, and visibility of
alternatives provided through inter-party competi-
tion is important for the capacity of have-nots
to attain policies in their own interests.
The factor analytical study of Sharkansky and Hofferbert^^
to a great extent confirmed the conclusions of Cnudde and
McCrone. They discerned two factors — competition- turnout
and professionalism-local relaiance -- which were highly corre-
lated with the affluence and industrialization factors of
Hofferbert's earlier study. In line with Cnudde and McCrone
they stated:
The single most important finding of this article
may be its emphasis upon multidimensionality in
state economics, politics, and public policy.
There is no single answer to the question: "Is
it politics or economics that has the greatest
impact on public policy?" The answer (contrary
to the thrust of much recent research) varies
with the dimensions of each phenomena that are
at issue. ^'^
They found strong relationships between the competition-turnout
and welfare-education factors on the one hand, and between pro-
fessionalism-local reliance and highway-natural resources factors
on the other. Predictably, their factor loadings were higher
than most of the correlation coefficients of single independent
variables which were employed in other studies.
91lbid.
,
p. 865.
92'»Dimensions of State Politics, Economics, and Public
Policv." American Political Science Review 63 (September, 1969).
93iio f ferbert, "Socioeconomic Dimensions of the American
States."
^^Hoffcrbert and Sharkansky, o£. cit . , p. 878.
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These studies are Invaluable not only because of their
general findings, but also because their research designs lend
themselves
.o a direct confrontation of the Key hypothesis, which
they seern to support. Although Sharkansky's study of regional-
i-sm was not so conceived, a major part of his data bears on
the explanatory value of political factors. He found that al»
though economic characteristics existing within regions are
influential determinants of policy outputs, regional non-economic
characteristics are at least as important;
The common denominator of variables showing a
strong dependence on (regional) non-economic
factors is their relative isolation from" nation-
alizing influence. ^°
Economic influence w3s found to be prominent for regional scores
on most highway and public welfare policy measures, and measures
relating to federal-state-local and state-local financial ar-
rangements; non-economic regional attributes were the strongest
determinants of several education policies, and also Aid to
Families with Dependent Children programs.
One might question the inference that the explanatory power
of regional non-economic attributes can be taken as evidence of
the import of political factors. But it can be argued with
some confidence that political styles and habits within regions
95Sharkansky, Regionalism
. See also Sharkansky, "Economic
Development, Regionalism and State Political Systems," Midwest
Journal of Pol itic al Science 12 (February, 1968).
^Regionalism
, p. 122.
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comprise a fair share of what coe^ ^n^on L g s i t the concept or region-
all=™. Reglonalls. ger se is an amorphous concept, and one
which is of marginal value unless the various components of It
are sorted out. Considering particular political „,odes and
n-oods as part of regional mores does not see™ unrealistic^^
New Dimensions of Policy
Political scientists have utilized some of these more
traditional studies as stimuli for new approaches to the study
of state policy. Some of the more interesting advances in this
regard concern the conceptualization of new policy output
measures. A few of these newer studies merit some consideration.
^
b^"-- studies culminating in Spending
in the American States,98 Sharkansky applies some of the
ideas of Wildavsky and Lindblom concerning the politics of in-
cremental budgeting.99 Using only state expenditure data, rather
support for this idea can be gleaned from Kessel, op.
cit., and Wolfinger and Field, o£. cit.. See also the works
cited in footnote 36.
98chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1968. Other works bySharkansky which are relevant in this context include The Politics
££ Il^-iilS £111 Spending (New York: Bobbs
-Merrill Compa^^ 1969) •
—
Environment, Policy, Output and Impact: Problems of Theory and
Method in the Analysis of Public Policy," in Sharkansky, ed
. ,
op.
cit.; Some More Thoughts about the Determinants of Government
Expenditures," NMi^£i Tax Jjournal 20 (June, 1967); "Economic
and Political Correlates of State Government Expenditures: Gen-
eral Tendencies and Deviant Cases," Midwest Journal of Political
Scienc e 11 (May, 1967).
^See, for example Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the
Budgetary Process (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1964)";
Charles E. Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968).
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than the usual combination of state and local figures, Shar.ansUy
found that the best way to predict how .uch a state will spend
in any given year is to determine how much they spent in the
previous year(s). Correlation coefficients of current spending
with previous spending were about twice as high as the co.bina-
tion of a whole set of political and social variables," and con-
trolling for previous expenditures eliminated a good deal of the
explanatory power of this latter group. He concluded:
This chapter has examined statistical relation-
ships among current spending, measures of changpin spending, and 46 measures of governmental,
political, and socio-economic characteristics of
the states.
The principal findings are: (1) Previous ocpendi-
tures continue to show the strongest association
with current spending when considered in controlled
relationships along with numerous other potential
influences on spending. (2) Measures of govern-
mental and socio-economic characteristics, includ-
ing federal aid, taxes, state-local financial rela-
tionships, state employees, population, urbaniza-
tion, and industrialization, show significant rela-
tionships to current spending while controlling
for the influence of previous spending. ^00
It should also be noted that while political variables de- .
monstrated only limited explanatory power with current spending,
their influence on increments of change in spending was considerably
greater.
Policy Impacts
.
Sharkansky has attempted to go beyond simple
^^^Spendlng in the American States
, pp. 76-77.
lOlibld., pp. 73-76.
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Ls
input-output analyses by examining the effects policy outputs
have on the quality of various public services. For example,
per pupil expenditures for education were correlated with things
like drop-out rates and percentage of pupils attending high
school who eventually graduate in an effort to determine wheth.
differential spending patterns make much of a difference. This
is an important theoretical endeavor. For it will be recalled
that the systems paradigm is interested in how political decisions
are made and the effects of these decisions. Most policy studies
have not dealt with impacts (or outcomes), largely because these
notions are difficult to operationalize
. Sharkansky was unable
to find a high association between spending levels and the quality
of public services as he measured them. These findings are pre-
liminary, though, and his quantitative measures of services
tended to be rather crude. His studies should be commended more
for their theoretical intent than for their substantive findings.
The Politics of Redistribution
. Redistributive politics and
policies form the core of the have--have-not struggle, labile
some aspects of these issues pose formidable operational problems,
a few noteworthy though conflicting analyses are available.
Thomas Dye, using a "Lorenz" curve and "Gini coefficients,"
was able to measure the distribution of income within the states.
102
^"^^See the works cited in footnote 93. and also Sharkansky,
"Government Expenditures and Public Services in the American
States," American Political Science Review 61 (December, 1967).
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He found that income inequality is inversely associated with
factors such as low income, ruralism, agriculturalist, lower
adult education levels, low party competition and voter turnout,
and fragmentation of state policy making bodies.
In correlating his Gini coefficients and some one-dimen-
sional socio-economic variables with a series of policy measures
he found, rather surprisingly, that:
While it is tnie that the Gini index correlates
with a large number of policy outcome measures
the coefficients obtained with the Gini index
are usually not as high as those obtained with
specific socio-economic indicators or with
factors reflecting environmental dimensions
.
And in a parallel study which employed regression analysis
to identify the relationships among inequality, social and polit-
ical variables, and civil rights and other policies Dye reached
similar conclusions:
On the whole, inequality in the states appears
to be less influential than levels of economic
development in determining policy outcomes. In-
equality in America is linked to both economic
underdevelopment and the presence of a large
racial minority. The political consequences of
inequality are reflected in public policy, even
in policy fields that are conceptually linked
to inequality -- civil rights, welfare, and law
and order. The only exception to this generali-
zation is in federal anti-poverty grants that
are closely linked to inequality and Negro popula-
tion concentration. But in general, state poli-
cies are more directly linlced to economic develop-
l'-'3"income Inequality and American State Politics,"
American Political Science Review 63 (March 1969): 162.
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ment income, urbanization, adult education
than to inequality or even to voter turnout or
party competition. lO'^
These (and other) studies by Dye encounter serious conceptual
problems. His methodology was impressive, but his linkages are
suspect. For example. Dye claimed considerable explanatory
power for his income variable, but little influence for an in-
come inequality variable which was based on this same gross
income data, l^hile there may be sound methodological and/or
theoretical reasons for this finding, these reasons must be
discussed and analyzed when research results are reported. And
it is precisely this kind of explanation that is lacking in
Dye's work.
In an attempt to go beyond ratio-coaled policy data, McCrone
and Cnudde adopted Guttman scaling techniques in their study of
anti-discrimination legislation in the states. ^'^^ Their exami-
nation of the relationships among concentrations of blacks,
party competition and anti-discrimination legislation produced
evvdence which challenged Dye's study of civil rights policy.
McCrone and Cnudde 's theoretical sensitivity strengthened the
case for their study. They stated:
^^^"Inequality and Civil Rights Policy in the United States,"
Journal of Politics 31 (November, 1969): 1095 and 1097.
I'^^bonald J. McCrone and Charles F. Cnudde, "On Measuring
Public Policy," in Robert E. Crew, Jr.,ed., State Politics (Belmont,
California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1968).
Percent Negro is important in determining thedegree of state support for civil rights through
the enactment of anti-discrimination (legisla-
tion) by its inhibiting effects on the leVel ofparty competition. The direct effect on this
diinension, therefore, is the level of party com-
petition in the state. A political factor inter-
prets the effect of a social variable on policy
formation in state political systems. Our model,
then, constitutes an empirical systems analysis of
some of the relationships between environmental,
political and output variables in state political
systems
.
-i-Ud
Fry and Winters have expressed the belief that previous
policy studies found political variables to be of little impor
tance because of the nature of the policies studied, i.e.,
levels of expenditures. By using distribution as, a policy out
put (the ration of tax burden to expenditure benefit for the
three lowest Income classes in the states)
,
they hypothesized
that political variables would prove to be of some importance.
Their correlation and regression analyses tended to confirm
their hypotheses:
The most interesting and significant finding
in this study concerns the relative importance
of political and socio-economic variables in
determining redistributive fiscal policies in
the states. Previous studies of policy out-
comes in the states have been hard pressed to
find an independent impact for the political
variables considered, and vjhere the relative
impact of political and socio-economic variables
has been examined the socio-economic variables
have predominated. In the present analysis,
these findings are reversed. Not only do the
political variables have an independent impact
on redistributive policies in the states, they
lOf^Ibid., p. 528.
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also account for considerably more of the
variance in redistriution than do socio-economic
variables The relative explanatory power oftne political and socio-economic variables isindicated by the multiple-partial coefficients
of determination. For the 48 states the multi-
ple-partial for political variables controlled
tor the socio-economic variables is .46 while
the multiple-partial for the socio-economic
variables controlled for the political vari-
ables is only .27.^^7
It should be noted, however, that party competition was not
one of the political variables which exhibited significant ex-
planatory power.
Innovatio
_n. A few recent studies have addressed themselves to
the factors surrounding "modernization" and "innovation" in the
fifty states. John Crittenden performed a factor analysis which
allowed him to rank the states according to modernity. His
factors included things like "Metro-Urbanism, " "Integrative
Message Exchange," "Migratory Pull," and "Scope of Government. "108
In a study of Pennsylvania cities, James Clarke correlated
socio-economic and political process variables with the refer-
enda results on v;hether or not to adopt new "reform city
charters. ''^^ He found that socioeconomic variables manifested
relatively weak correlations, with process variables demonstrat-
'Brian R. Fry and Richard F. V/inters , "The Politics of Redis-
tribution," American Political Science Review 64 (June, 1970): 521.
l*^8john Crittenden, "Dimensions of Modernization in the Amer-
ican States," American Political Science Review 61 (December, 1967).
I'^^James W. Clarke, "Environment, Process, and Policy: A
Reconsideration," American Political Science Review 63 (December,
1969).
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ing a rather significant intervening influence. While his
findings are important, the real value of this study lies in
Clarke's co.^ents concerning the conceptualization of political
process variables:
It is probable, and certainly worthy of further
research, that the explanatory importance of
socio-economic and political process variables
will vary with the type of policy being con-
sidered. \^en noneconomic policies are con-
sidered, a stronger association is revealed
between political process variables and, in
this case, referenda outcomes. These process
variables reflect the attitudinal and behavior-
al dimensions of city politics to a greater
degree than the socioeconomic variables.
Another explanation for these differences is
that perhaps too much consideration is being
given to the relative availability of political
data rather than the theoretical relevance of
these data to the problem being examined. The
result is that political variables are usually
defined operationally in structural rather than
behavioral or interactional terms. To this
extent^ the behavioral dimension of politics
is being ignored, not assessed, in the policy
output studies and the results may be simply a
product of the methodology.
\^Jhat this analysis has demonstrated is not that
environmental variables are unimportant, but
rather that their importance must be assessed in
combination with relevant and meaningful political
variables; that is, political process variables
which are often recognized but rarely included in
comparative urban research.
In a similar vein, Andrew Cowart dealt with factors which
might possibly influence the adoption of certain Office of
110Ibid., pp. 1181-82.
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Economic Opportunity (OEO) programs. This is interesting parti-
cularly because these programs are clearly class-related
. His
technique was multiple-partial correlation analysis with three
groups of independent variables - socioeconomic, political,
and levels of expenditures for on-going and established welfare
programs (e.g., ADC). This latter set of variables was included
via the hypothesis that since these programs are crima facie
evidence of support for antipoverty efforts, they would predis-
pose the states who had adopted them to utilize some of the
opportunities provided by the newer OEO programs (which are,
of course, now defunct). Indeed, his hypothesis was confirmed,
for this latter group evoked substantially higher measures of
association than did either political or economic factors.
Cowart's discussion, though, raised a few significant questions.
For example it is difficult to say v.ith much confidence that
welfare expenditures are influential and political and social
variables are not when he has not fully isolated the interrela-
tionships among these sets of variables. This critique is par-
ticularly compelling when one recalls a whole body of literature
which finds relationships among Cowart's three sets of inde-
pendent variables.
Perhaps the most rigorous of these innovation studies was
that of Jack Walker. Employing the ideas of emulation and
^^^Jack L. Walker, "The Diffusion of Innovations Among the
American States," American Political Science Review 63 (September,
diffusion in a decision-.aking context to account for the
spread of innovations across the states, Walker examined 86
progr..s i. different policy areas which were enacted by at
least 20 state legislatures prior to 1965. He found fairly
strong correlations between indices of wealth and industrial-
ization and his innovation score. He also found some signifi-
cant simple correlations between competition and innovation,
and, rather surprisingly, a strong association between innova-
tion and David and Eisenberg's malapportionment measure. That
the correlation between apportionment and innovation even with-
stood controls for socio-economic variables indicates that al-
though apportionment may not be important in determining levels
of support for particular policies, it may be influential in
setting the scope of political activity. This finding is furth<
strengthened due to the fact that these correlations were
stronger in the 1930-1966 period than in the 1900-1929 period,
reflecting the increased degrees of malapportionment in the
latter period. He also found that the pattern of the diffusion
of innovations among the states was essentially a regional
phenomenon, following the rationale offered by Sharkansky
,
1969). See also Walker, "Innovation in State Politics," in
Jacob and Vines, second edition, 1971.
^^^Sharkansky, Regionalism in American Politics.
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Conclusion
The above discussion enco,=,passes the major works which
bear on an examination of the comparative study of state pubU,
policy. The chapters which follow concern themselves with the
substantive findings of the present research enterprise.
CHAPTER III
THE MEy^.SURE:-^'T OF INTER-PARTY
.
COMPETITION IN THE STATES
Introduction
The study of political parties has been refined consider-
ably in recent years. One set of tools which has proved useful
in crystallizing thinking about parties is the various classi-
ficatory sche:.es of state party systems. Ranney and Kendall
alluded to the potential of these endeavors when they wrote:
Distributing "raw" data among types or classes
IS a necessary and illuminating part of the
process of research and discovery in any "science
particularly in the early states of the latter's'
development. But it produces fruitful results
only if Che types or classes make sense, vrhich
they will just to the extent that, inter alia,
the variables we fix upon in defining then are
the significant ones, and that the classes
a) exhaust the phenomena under consideration,
and b) do not overlap.^
Accordingly, this chapter begins by reviewing several typologies
of state party systems. Next, a new approach to measuring
state political party strength is presented, an approach
-.vhich
relies upon a different kind of data base. Finally, some of
the theoretical implications and hypotheses flowing from this
new schema are discussed at the end of the chapter.
Austin Ranney and willm>oore Kendall, "The /u?.erican Party
Systems," r^.mcrican Political Science Review 43 (June, 1954): 477.
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V.O. Key-s Southern Poimes2 ,,,, ^^^^^.^^^
in^ point. Key found that the traditional language of inter-
party conflict did not apply to the South. He felt that it was
nore useful to discuss different variants of one-party systems,
i.e., one-party bi-factional and raulti-factional systems. These
t'.o forms of party, both existing under the Democratic label,
produced different styles of politics vhich led to different
political consequences. In fact, bi-factional one-party poli-
tics exhibited many of the sane features obsei-vable in coripet-
itive two-party states. Multi-factionalisn, on the other hand,
yielded a fragmented, disorganized, and even "dysfunctional"
brand of politics.
^ Although an excellent an.^lysis of the char-
acter of Southern state party systems, Key's regionally-based
classificatory scheme is of only marginal value to a more general
comparison of state political party strength.
Fenton has attempted to refine Key's typology so that it
could include non-Southara states. He retained Key's two cate-
gories of one-partyism, and divided two-party systems into "issu.-
ented" and "job-oriented."''^ Fenton m.ade these distinctionsor
^(Kev; York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949).
See ibid
. ,
Chapter 14; also the relevant parts of Chapter
One of this study.
^John II. Fenton, People and Parties in Politics (Glenvicw,
Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1966).
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-ong state pa.ty
..ste.s p.i.arily on the basis of the styles
and goals of the parties, their eff..cs on governmental
.erfor-
-nee, and the parties' relationships to interest groups and
public opinion.
3 And in his .ajor work on stace polities gener-
ally, Key presented a typology of state party competition which
focused on two factors: the .ean Democratic percentage of the
general election vote, and the Democratic primary vote as a per-
centage of the Republican prirr.ary vote (1903-52). 6 ^e then
placed the states in one of four categories-^strong Republican,
less-strong Republican, competitive, and leaning Democratic. The
value of Key's work, though, is weakened by the fact that he con-
centrated solely on the governorship, vn.ile competition for
Lhis major state office is an important cue to the general char-
acter of state party systems, it omits too many other signifi-
cant party conflict situations.
Ranney and Kendall utilized election results from 1914-1952
for President, U.S. Senator, and Governor in categorizing the
'
states according to the degree of inter-party competition. ^ There
were two steps in their method. First they determined the per-
centage of victories in all elections for the second party in
each state, and ranked the states along this line. They found
that in 22 states the second party had won less than 257„ of ail
^Ibid.
,
Chapters 3-5.
^V.O. Key, Jr., /merican State Politics; An Introduction
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1936), p. 99.
2£-
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elections. They tnen tried to .ake distinctions a.ong these 22
according to how close these elections wore despite the fact that
the second parties usually lost. This procedure led the. to define
":.odified one-party states" as those in which the second party,
v/nile winning less than 25% of all elections, had won over 307.
of the vote in over 70% of all elections and had won over 40%
of the vote in over 30% of all elections. By the sa.e token, "onc-
party stales" were defined as those in which the second party had
won less than 25% of all elections, and had also won over 30% of
the vote in less than 70% of all elections and had won over 40%
of the vote in less than 30% of all elections. 8 Their data yield-
ed five categories-two party, ir.odified one-party Den.ocratic and
Republican, and one-party Der.ocratic and Republican. Rannoy and
Kendall»s
-measure, particularly in the way it distinguished be-
tween the less co.7.petitive states, goes a step beyond Key. How-
ever, their reliance upon state-wide elections says little about
competition for other offices which have a bearing on state
poiicy--like the state legislatures.
After studying election results during a fifteen year period
(covering the late 30's to the early 50's), Golembiewski devised
a schema consisting of three cellG--onc-party
,
tv;o-party, and
For a fuller explanation of this procedure see ibid.,
pp. 482-85.
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woo. „,ino.i.y.pa«y.5
^^^^^^^
Pcrco„.as= Of l.^islotivo seats ,,eU,
3en.t3. =„d control o£ the covc^orsMp at three points in t^.e-
19.U,
,„ile his categories are rather va^e.
Gole.bio.ski-s case v,as strcnothened by his inclusion oi state
legislative contests.
Considering gubernatorial elections fron. 1870 to 1950,
Schlesinger introduced a new and provocative concept into the
st:udy of state party strength. 10 Schlesinger accepted the notion
that one way of determining the existence of a competitive situa-
tion is to examine the division in party control of a particular
office over a given time period. But he ventured that this
method would tell only part of the story:
There is a second dimension which nmst be consideredin the concept of political competition, and thisIS the rapidity with which the parties alternate intheir control of an office. Perhaps the rate of
alternation is even more in.portant in giving the
participants a sense of competition than is the
overall division of victories. For exaniple, in
national presidential politics since 1872 tho overalldivision of victories has given the Republicans 12
elections and the Dc.aocrats pine. The two parties,
are, thus, highly corapetitive in respect to the over-
all din.ension. But as is ij.imed lately apparent, therehas been a low rate of alternation between the parties,
i-or there have been periods of as long as 20 years,
or an entire political generation, in which cither'
^"A Taxononiic Approach to State Political Party Stren 'th "
.%i;-t c rn icaj. Quarterly 1 1 ( S ep t eiub e r , 1 9 58 ) . "
*
Two-Dimensional Schcr.ic for Classifying States According
--o
the Degree of Inter-Party Competition," Air.crican Political Scicnre
iieviow 50 (Decer.iber, 1935).
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the Repu.lxcn.s or the Ce:r.ocrats have had coa~txnuous control of the presidency. Co.oetitLnhas been sporadic. The nea.ure of such' periodsoi one-party control, or the rate of party alt;>-natxon, we shall call the cyclical diLnsion.U^
In his competition sche.a, Schlesin^er used the traditional approach
(overall), and his new .cthod (cyclical). His data yielded five
categories, and it is worth describing them in soro.e detail.
' ^^^^^ states the i^inority partyhas continuously provided a serious challenge for thecontrol of the governorship and the periods of ore-party doninance have been relatively few and brief.
2^__£^:cH£aU^^^
- Those states which are con-petitxve in respect to the overall dimension, but whichhave had long periods of dorr.ination by a single party.
^^-^o^rLv^lcli^ . Those states in which one partvha. overall a ciear predominance in number of victories;but in which a ninority party has been able to win shortponods of control, usually as many as two or throc^ con-
secutive victories.
A.__Jlno-PnrtAOir(:.d^^
- These states are siirilar to
the one-party cyclical states in tenas of the overall
dimension of competition. They differ in that the
minority parties fail to succeed themselves very often
although they win single victories. The distinction
between the one-party predominant and the one-party
cyclical states lies in the position of the ninority
party. In the fonr.er states, the lesser oarty gives
every evidence of becoming frag-mentary and weak'^in
organization. When it wins, it is most likely to be
purely ^by default, due to some sudden vulnerability of
the majority party, a major national trend, or a split
v;ithin the major party. The electorate is not irrevoc-
ably wedded to the dominant party; a majority of the
voters can bring themselves to vote for the opposite
party. But the minority organization is so weak that
it IS unable to follow up its momentary advantage, fre-
87
qucntly because of its in.;tractive and capableCnd?''.''^ '° P^^^^-t at-
t-tos do show so.e wiu2: :.r;7^^^>' P-dcinant'lesser party makes then tvnnt • ""^^^ ^hethe on.»party states '^'P^^^S^^^ally different fro..
li__One-Partv
- Th^i^^
minority^ .3 inabiu'^i'"' "^^•^^'^^^^ristic is the
governorship. 12 "^^"^^^^^y, up to 1950, to win the
The najor drawback of this study is •IS, ODVlOUslv x:
-'ly 8ubcr.=torial elections
^^-^ Problen in a foliow-un piece in H .
h--s -.Vip
' extendedlaeas to other contests.
In this later studv q^ui
include
..ost st^ta M -
°- considered
''UoL Sua e-v;ide elpr<--;r^,-.o ^icc.xons ror state officials. 1^ Sch-
-
i'i,v... mteresced prim-^-riv. n-
st..e racher than dete™i„i„,
comparative
positions of the st-^.-o- -^ caLCs xn terrr.s of ovpv-neiall competitiveness. He
s tated
:
neasure. Ko'- if „
-en-..^ of a aniiinear
«1 dtaensio;.. It ""-'y '° ^-"^ ->-H-
==-petltio„
„lthin a
-oa^tClyi't:;"," ""•^^"'"S
range fro.-, one offree* to another 15
J:l]2ii., pp. 1124-26.
S-tes;;^^|^l-^"P-j^^- in ^he ^erican
Cc..,resst..t^":l"e'e^:ctel°:r"°^"VT -^-'-"r, u.s
er-r, Secretary o St'ate Attortv r --"^^t'co;.'and Co,,ptroilcr. ' ^"°'^"=y General, Auditor, Treasurer.
'^IPli-. p. 201.
88
Schlesingor measured competition.txon-xn overall and cyclical teiT.s-for each office, which taken together H t •L ^ i delimited the "ran-- of
ccnpetitica" for each state H^ii, .t:e. Ll.Ue Schlesinger s approach was
certainly innovative, its applicability for a co^-^y r cor.parative analysis
of state public policy is United. Th"t is H• ^"'^^ ^ , the "range of
ccpe.iUon" scores, „hUo sx,.UHeant poU.ical
--tsF^j-j-Lxcai reacts, are not
as useful as composite party competition scores.
Kofforbert anpioyed Schlcsinser^ s cyclical
.-...d ovc-ail
<ii-nsio„s i. .is analysis of cleccioos for President. U.S. Sen-
ator, and Governor for the years 1932-62 ^, . ^^^J^ oz. The r.-.ajor differ-
Hofferbert ultimately ranU-ordercd the states on the basis of
their composite competition scores for the three offices, it
Should be noted that Hofferbert did not include state legislative
races, which are important cues to the competitive situations
within the states, m a later study, Kefferbert used his rank-
ordering as an independent variable against a series of state
policy outputs. ^'^
Of Poli:?;:\="(.=:":?.\\t4r'''" '^"^i/^^ P.elationship between Public Policy ard Sore q^r^^r-M^.^ana environmental Variables in the A:aerican States,"!; e ca^
'
?2l±t^cja Science Review 60 (March, 1966). v;hy Hof ferTelrf^so^^ ^-dto a ran. order classification when his composite scor'; u'o'whicn he based his ordering) were ratio-scaled figures "s a bit
?::n vtt '1 '^"^^ ^^^^ -^'^ rcheL'^oreome ao'c to advanced statistical operations.
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s..-..= leg.:sla.u..3, a„a
.He sco.es
„e.e i„
.He .o„. o£ .aUo-
•"i,^ cent of tne poDulrr vnt-o
2^ -nri •^^ 4-« i^^-Je-nacorial candidates
the f a rh'"'"^' °f ^
^) the per cent of all tPT^^^
cp-^n*-., , u
cexTns ^or governor.
Excellent as i.
..ands. Raaney's measure would have profited
fro. a refinement of the fourth aspee. of the inde.. Por example.
while the number of te^^s the Democrats controlled the entire
govermaent is an ivr^ortanr fnrr ; i ^ -,i-^port t iacc, it woula also be useful to know
the frequency and consequences of one nart- co-r-^n.- <
ozecutive and the other the legislature.
Lockard found the earlier measures inadequate "because none
of then takes into account the extent of party voting in legis-
latures, or .he character of factions within those states in
which one party predominates. arranged groupings of states
Po1.^^??-'''h
'
-"^
Politics," in Jacob and Vines, eds.,
fiif-— -~— ^^^l^ii-n
State£ (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
ed p!l'^-''/r''^ '^f'""' ^'"'^ ''^^-'"^ Outputs," in Oliver Garceau,f :> K(^:^ll£:n nnd P^^ (Car.bridge: HarvardUniversity Press, 1968), p. 193^
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according to the closeneq-^ nF ^ .iosene.. of party con.potiticu on five factors:
voting for president and ooveraorn i, party representation in
legislatures, the de'^rpp •
^ P'^^y ^°^i"S cohesion in legislative
roll calls, and th^ pv^<^..^ u-^1- exte t of b.- or i.ulti- factional ali^nn-.ent
in Che Us. co.,e.UU.e s.a.es.^O
^ ^^^^^
are suggesavo. although see aspects of his ina.: are not easll,
very rellable-probler,s which he himself conceded. Further, his
d.ta did not alio-., hi™ to go beyond
.erely placing the states
into categories, and the distinctions —
.nrc th.
-
•.xauLxc o.aong these various groups
lack precision.
A number of explicitly policy output studies have employed
various ipc measures as independent variables. Stuaies by Dawson
and Robinson, Dye, and Fenton are typical.^l au of these authors
used indices comprised of the popular vote for goven-.or, and the
distribution of legislative seats between the parties. There are,
though, soi^e conceptual proble^ns with these indices. For exa,nple,
^^
Ibicl
.
, p. 195.
^^'^ ^"^^^ A. Robinson,
-Inter-Party Com-
^"^^ ^^^^^^^^ PoUcies in the /4ricanStates," Journal or Fomics 23 (May, 1963); Thor.as R. Dye,
Z2.1l£i£S, Econonn^, £nd the Public (Chicago: Rand McNally andCoz.pany, 1966); Jonn H. Fenton, op. cit. A useful su::iinary dis-
cussion ol these and other relevant studies is contained in John
H. x-enton ana Donald VJ. ChaiT.berlayne
, "The Literature Dealing wi-litne Relatxonsnips between Political Processes, Socioeconomic^Con-ditions ana Public Policies in the iW.erican States: A Biblio-graphical Essay," Polity 1 (Snrin?, 3 969)
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Dawson r.nd Robinson rank ordered tho .^ ^ao c e states on the three dinen-
sions, and then averaged these three rank nr-A <ii£-ee u orderings for a final
rank orderirc- mi • .
.h.s f.,o-stcp „„k ordering
.ay havo obscured
SCO subuo bu. i.por.anc di=u„«io„s a^ong the data „hieh
™lSht .ave been revealed had the data been presented in intor-.al
fora. Although Dye arranged his political data in interval
fashion, SCO problems regained. p„r „ne thing, his political
data v.-ere for the vear^; lOSA-';/. - -l ..c rs J.954-04, ana his policy data were i^ostly
for the years 1961-64 Tf- nc ^.-c-- ,It is difrxcult to discern the linkage
between 1954 political data and 1961 (or 19fiA^,oi iyb^-) policy measures.
To be sure, the budgetary process admits so.e "lag" in the
appropriations process, i.e.. 1964 expenditure decisions vcre
iT.ada rr.cst"!" toco in^o
'
—
is it realistic to assume
that political conditions extant in 1954 .ill have affected how
-ch ..oney was spent in 1961 or 1964? It .ay be, but the nature
of this linkage should have been explained in some detail. Failure
to do so quite naturally raises some conceptual questions. These
issues were unexplored in Dye's study.
Mark Stern proposed as a measure of party competition one
which had predictive capability and also was consistent with the
perceptions of the actors in the political system under examina-
99.
""It Should be noted that Dawson and Robinson also includedSchxesmger-like cyclical factors in their index, but those also
were rank orderings.
2^500 p. 49.
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11'tion. ' This measure consi >-- ^,.tc. o.t the mean percentase of the
vote obtained by the candidates of thr. • •- t e niajori.ty party (1949-67)
c.sions of s..to p3«y s.^cguh because only one county of one
State was studied.
one of the
.ore a..*itioua treatments of this topic was pre-
seated by Davi'-' PfpTffor. ii J.vi. P.ei.fer, who attempted to devise a measure of
systemic stability
.hich was an out.ro.th of his party competi-
tion schema.2= Pfeiffer gathered data for all state-wide general
elections for the years 19A0-64. „e then calculated the arith-
metic mean of the percentages for the base period for the Demo-
crats, Republicans, and third parties. The states u-ere catego-
rized on the basis of their composite scores as One-Party Demo-
cratic through One-Party Republican Kith five intervening categc-
hea.'juring Interparty Coir.petiticn
: A Prooo-al
-^ml . t..vof a Method,.. Journal of Politics 34 (August, ^7
^n a d"?ferent study Casstevens and PresI used the S hlesin^or 1055;R.nney and Kendall, and Key ipc measures in their study':^
^'
.ac.ors xn.iuencins welfare policy, l.rhiie they claimed ^^-^t
wUrcaution''?''"'
-l-::ion.hip their statements should"'be read
die \ statistical operations wore perfomed. Theyr w their inferences raerely through a visual inspection ofgraphical presentations of the data; they attempted neither toimprove upon nor irierge the three ipc nieasures. See "The Context
o. DciT^.ocratic Conipetition in Araerican State Politics,- A:aerican:^nal or Sociology 68 (March, 1963). For a critique ZTtCvTr
stuay sec Phillips Outright, "Casstevens and Press," Arr.erican
::iOurnal £| S 69 (Novenber, 1963); see also th~'^i^nder"
v;hich follo'.vs.
^-^ssurement of Inter-Party Competition and Systemic
otability, American Political Sci£nc£_Ileyixw 61 (June, 1967).
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rics. HI. rather in.enlcus
.o.sure of systa„i. stability was
measured as follov;s:
non-oi''''^
^"'''''''^ the scale aceordiag to its.al con-.petxtive behavior. Then the totll^Zhe'of i.oves xt could r.ake on the scale toward the two:party cate-ory was deten^.ined For ^v-,^ i
ly two-party state could na^e'.er ™^whh: T^'"party state could n.ake three moves. The S.'ure^ foTall the states were added ^i,rin<y -hr. ^^^^^^^ ^""^
on the scale n^c^s'-^^v fn. ^ " i "'''"'^^
'^^'^^
electinn \v r coiTipleteiy coiapetitiveo . Next, each state was categorized accordir.
TotlTZTj'''^ ^!^^^-^i^-^-y in that year and th^''t ta nu:..Der o. snxfts ir.ade by all states in thatelection was figured, if a state B.oved awav fron thetwo-party catesory the moves were rated ne^/at^-velyTne sum of the moves in the particular Presidentiai
election was then divided by the sum of all Possible
-oves to give the Index of Two-Party Chan.e for thatelection m that year. The stability scaTe isidentical to the two-party change scale. 26
The Studies Critici zed
Several coram.ents are in order concerning these various classi-
fieatory schemes taken as a whole. It should be noted in^.ediately
,
though, that while there are some criticisms which apply to these
studies generally, each should be evaluated in the context of
the overall objectives of the research enterprise of which it
is a part. Hofrerbert has stated this point succinctly:
Ko system of classification may be evaluated
without regard for the purposes it is to serve.
Classification is a tool of analysis rather
than an objective in its own right.
Hofferbort then added that there is a limitation to this position:
opioid . , pp. 464-65.
Op . cit
. , p. 550.
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OL oclioiars are dealing with tlio sai»o or s<ni1n^pnenc;n=na, albeit v;il:h various ends in vie,; on-sioeraole advantage oo^r,«j i c
it is advantageous fL pur^^^o^'ort
. ^Ku^^r'fxnd.nss and tac consequent growth of a cu-.ilatLebody of knowledge. Furthermore, as the Uter'tureon .Vmerxcan party systems well dernonstra es ^onccnua regularity could .ake for considerab 'e Snonyin the reporting of research results. If thcre.reacceptable systems fo- cl -i^c;-; r^,.;
-l- Lu^rc ai
of 1 fir^iri
.^^'^s i . C assifying the najor variablesa eld or inquiry, each scholar need not tan hi^
iTl^ul^^' -.plaining at length the technique^oi classification employed in his specific project. 2S
Since the purpose of this study is to examine various factors
which influence state policy choices, the relevant literature is
discussed in the context of how well the various competition
measures are conducive to this task.
Dawson and Rob5nson stated that there are three najor prob-
lem areas in designing an index of political conpetition:
1) which tijr.e period should be considered
2) which offices should be included
3) which of several v.'ays of looking at ccn-
petitivcnoss, within the context of the
two preceding factors^ most accurately
measures competition. ^5
These three points are useful in organizing the present discussion.
Many scholars have claimed that the selection of the years
which comprise the base periods is arbitrary. This is, of
?"PJ2.- p. 271.
-^OSco, for example, Golembiewski
,
o£. ci_t
.
, and Pfciffer,
op
. cit
.
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course, one point for which th. purposes of the study are decisive.
If the purpose is .erely to classify, this point is a relatively
n^inor one. But if the competition index is to be utilised as
an independent variable in studying state policy choices, this
criticis. acquires
.ore force. As stated above, Dye used politi-
cal data frou the 50's to study policy decisions of the 60's.
Here, the selection of the ti.e period is both arbitrary and in-
correct. There is another,
.ore subtle aspect
.hlch deals with
the selection of an appropriate tir..e period:
Not only is the choice of the base period arb^'trary
It may also be quite misleading. "Long" base"periods
nay include one or ncrc secular movements in the d-^ta
vnich make aggregate figures meaningless averages
f
snort base periods nay focus on 'Wps" on a smooth
curve or party strength which give quite an erroneousimpression on the curve itself. -^J-
This problem is more difficult to deal with, and perhaps is not
capable of resolution. Maybe all that can be done is to assure
that caution is exercised in the reading of research results.
Problems concerning v;hich offices to include in the index
are also forraidable, and again reference must be made to the pur-
poses of the study. It is unreliable to concentrate on only
one office, as did Key, and Schlcsinger in his earlier study.
If one is interested in dctemining the degree of state com.pcti-
tion in overall terms, then use of races for the Presidency and
the U.S. Senate are acceptable. But if a comparative study of
~*-'-Colembicwski, o£. ci t.
,
o. 498.
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wn^lo fo-..,
....ould deny Lhe faportance of f,o st-to 1. ,
these contests are typically excluded in the v^r.'o-^s m , • •LiiL ari u cornpetition
indiees. I,e
.eseareh
-.cpo.ted by Schlcslnger, Pfelf£er, and
Hofferbert are notable examples.
The third area of criticis. relates to ho. the firsn two
factors (ti^ae periods and offices) are employed. The
.ajor prob-
l.n in this regard concerns the methods of classification. Most
of the studies have placed the states into various categories,
and so.e have resorted to the technique of rank ordering. In
-any cases the categories are too crude. That is. categories such
as two-party and one-party Democratic and Republican ofcen obscure
suotle but important differences among the states in any given
category. There is also sorae question about the logical distinc
tivaness of the various categories. For example, where do you
draw the line between, say, modified two-party and modified one-
party Republican or Democratic? The technique of rank ordering
'
^Iso presents some problems. Ranking the states from 1 to n can
be misleading if the data happen to fall in clusters. For example,
states 7 and 8 may be very close to one another in terms of com-
petitiveness, while there m.ay be a considerable gap between
states 3 and 9. Rani; ordering will obscure these subtle, but none-
theless important conditions. Perhaps more significant is the
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fact that data which are ranl< ordered" are not susceptible to
complex statistical operations. The fact that such
.ethod-
olo,y has achieved such a prominent position in the comparative
study of state policy underscores the importance of this criti-
cism. Political data must be arranged in interval fon. to
take advantage of these technological advances.
Several authors (e.g., Schlesinger) have endeavored to in-
corporate some notion of the pendulum effect, i.e., alterations
in office into their competition indices. These efforts, though^
encounter some serious problem.. As they are presented, the
pendulu. measures indicate alternations in office over a parti-
culcr base period, but do not usually indicate trends. Pfeiffer
has described a more serious limit to this pendulum notion:
The major criticism (of the pendulum concent) has
to GO witn Its interpretation and convenience
Regarding interpretation, one loss out of five
elections m.eans a 20.0% turnover. if these fWe
elections arc Presidential elections, they span
iO years.
.
Ir they are U.S. Senatorial elections,
they span either 20 or 30 years de-oending on
whether you treat the offices as separate. Two
losses out of cen elections would also give a
20.07. figure, but now over spans of AO and 60
years respectively. Caution' is necessary to
avoid misinterpretation of such results,^ but even
if caution is obsor\'ed, such a measure can give
the appearance of arbitrariness.
Regarding convenience, this researcher is compelled
to process his raw data three tii^es in different v^ays
each ta.me. First, he m.ust obtain uhe "overall" dimen-
sion, tb.at is, percent of elections v;cn. Second, he
must calculate the percent of turnover. Third--to
distinguish cycles, if ony--he m.ust determine how
long it is between alternations. This process m.ust
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also bo repeated for each office. 32
Zody and Luttbe^ have trier]o n iied to determine the di.. tinctive-
ness of several measures of inter-party competition. 33 Usin^ a
Spea^an r, they tested for the inter^cor.elation a.on, five^
ineasurcs-those of Dawsoa and Robin-nn -- D Uoo , ixanney, and Ranney and
Kendall (2), and Ilofferbcrt. The Spear-^-^n r'b r.. s arr.ong the r,:easures
ranged frora
.80 to .99 which 1-'J, .JUich led them to conclude that:
1) the measures arc considerably n^ore sivailarthan aissirailar;
^eL"^o°^''''''T'' -^-----^^s em t lie m subjective rather th-n
empirical considerations; and finally
o) the argument for methodological individualism
appearsweak as there is significant corre-
"
lation Detveen the measures regardless of the
orticcs or time period considered. -^^
Caution sliould be exerc-^c'pri ^^^,,^•u rc erc._ec , tuough, for perhaps Zody and Luttbeg
have overstated their case. For example, they considered only
five measures, and the ones excluded could be expected to tap
different aspects of party competition. The indices of Schle-
singer and Pfeiffer imxaediately com.e to mind in this regard.
Furthen..ore, the measures they examined all used the rank order-
ing technique. The dangers inherent in this method neccsssarily
'
detract from the forcefulness of the three points of Zody and
32
...l^ff^iffcr,
_oD, cit.
, pp. A60-61.
^-^"Aa Evaluation of Various Measures of State Party Com.peti-
tion,^^ Western PoUtical Quarterly 21 ^December, 1968).'
Ibid.
, p. 724.
Lutfibeg which were eniLTierated above.
It has been
.stated many tire- in ^-rr^ ..eo, m many different ways, by
many different authn-— m,-*-o,., th.. a ueasure of inter-party competition
must be evaluated on the basi- nf t. •o o o how well it conforr;:3 to the
Objectives of the overall research enterprise. Xt is the purpose
of this study to deter..ine which of several factors are .ost in-
fluential in explaining variations in state expenditure patterns.
Implicit in this orientation is the belief that the states should
be treated as relatively autonomous decision-.aking units. And
although it is difficult to state this clai. with .uch confidence
Siven the nature of govern.-nental activity at all levels in the
united States, this vie. is a sine oua non if we are to .ake any
attempt at all at unravelling che roles and processes of state
governn^ental decision-making. Flowing fro,n this orientation is
the contention that when studying the influence of political com-
petition on state decision-making, only state offices should be
'
considered. Again, while it is uncontestable that the work done
•
in Washington by Presidents, Senators, and Congressmen has im-
portant consequences for state governi-nent, and while it is also
true that these national political actors often have direct in-
fluence on state political and governmental machinery, theoretical
precision requires that these offices not be included in state
party competition indices. The several measures which did include
100
non-state offices in theirno calculations are therefore Inadequate
for the purposes of this study, however useful they nay be fo-
o^her tasws. ,Uso.
.any of the attempts at classifying the states
have fitted contests for the state legislatures. Since every
state decision
.ust be dealt
.ith to so.e extent by these bodies
(or at least all expenditure decisions), competition ueasures
.*lch exclude the. are therefore deficient, at least for the pur-
poses of this study.
Of all the .casurec which have been examined in this chapter,
only those of Ranney, Dawson and Robinson, Fenton, and Lockard
pass these two preliminary tests. Even these do not pass
.uster
when a .ore stringent requirement is erected. Pfeiffer alluded
to this test when he stated that, "Percentage of elections won
and percentage of seats held (or ten.s) both are functions of
percentage of vote in aln^ost every case. "35 r,,, p.^^^,
phasized here is that the distribution of legislative seats between
the parties is a cue to the character of competition for those •
offices-but that is all. This argument should be dissected
further.
It is a major contention of this paper that legislative com-
petition iT.easures which rely on the distribution of scats within
those bodies can obscure more than they reveal. Using this kind
of approach, a legislative body composed of, say, 100 seats, can
bo divided equally between Republicans and Democrats. This would
be a situation of "perfect" two-party competition. However, it is
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v;ere uncon-
if not
uere are
at least logically possible that all of these seats
tested by one of the parties in the election. Admittedly this
example is a bit extrene.36 however, in each state several
all legislative elections are in fact uncontested, and tl
na^erous instances in which one candidate will receive 70%, 80%,
90% of the vote. These kinds of contests
.re by no neans atypical
Using a
-distribution of seats"
..asure, contests in which the
vote is 100%-0% or 80^-20%, are assigned the sa.e score as elec-
tions where the vote is 60%-40% or 51%-49%. The ordinary dis-
course of the ten. "political competition" indicates that there
is soraething different about these various kinds ox coir.petitive
situations. A distribution of seats ir.easure is not capable of
revealing these subtle but crucial distinctions; in fact it total-
ly obliterates thcva.
Two lines of response to this argument can be anticipated.
The first concerns the availability of alternate data and the con-
venience of its en-.ployment. T,ji,iie this is a respectable and real-
istic response, it should not be allowed to overrule the require-
ments of logical and theoretical precision. The secor.d line of
response is theoretical in nature. It would include the argument
36An excellent discussion of uncontested state lec^islative
elections (and sta^e legislative elections generally) is contained
in Malcolm E. Jewell, Th£ ^'^^^te Legis lature, Politics and
Practice (New York: Random House, 1962), especially clTapter 2.
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that the task is explaining policy
.nd i-h. .o 1 i , ,,nJ the relevant political
i-o..aUo. ues
.„ .K.
,,,,,
^^^^
"ve) o.Hc,.l3. r„e
,,,,
^^^^^^.^^^^^^
Of sca.s a:™„g poUtlcal ac.„s who co.p.ise (IcgU.a.ive)
policy-making body T'm<- c/. ina. xs, we must observe the character and
consequences of different competitive ci,,.,,, . , .F Lx. s tuations within the body
-U„, actual d.eUio„.-..„a.
^^^^
a...
.aK=. Place. i.pUcU 1„ .Ms
..oUon, U c,,e c.al.
that legislative parcios -roP^ e
. e conesive units, behave as cohesive
units and can be evaluated as such A lo^^ ,n. logical extension of this
argument is that what wa have in state 8cve™,o„ts are a.a.ples
of "tha responsible parties
.odel". i „o.ld arcue that this is
not the case. ;.n-'ile tho-vf^ -fc
" ~ Cilrtu State
legislative parties approach this „-,oael „ore than does our nation-
al lesislaturc, neither could accurately be termed a responsible
parties situation.37
, ,„
^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^
measures are not valid. Gurr has stated that: "A .ensure or in-
dicator is valid if it is an adequate measure of what it is sup-
posed to represent."38
^ ,,,, attempted to illustrate that the
'
.nfj""- dealing with the responsible oarties r„odel
?:n~?hi'l:r he
""'^ '"'^"^^^
' discussL, too
ofXt It " purpose. Perhaps the classic discussion
sister "
contained in "Toward a More Responsible Two--p!"tySy n." American l^ilitical Science Review 44 (September 195^
Cei^a dT'^'ro "^"''"'^
"=oate.poWTnalysis' is conL
ait aI':-^° ' f " »'='=PO"=iW<^ Iwo-Party Syster.,?Uha , Aga^n? \ jo_i;rnra of PoUtj£s 33 (to^^^ l<j7n
Prenticl!Hau!\"c?ri^,tfft=^ ^^"^^^'^^ Cliffs/New dersey:
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previous
.casuros are not valid HiecUel^ because they do not
add.ess the.selvc. to the .ey
..pect of
.oUtical competition in
states. Xf ..e theoretical construct (.odel) docs not aopi,
^l-n the
.easu.e loses its appUcahili.,. previous
.easures
in a sense are "conceptual reductions "^5 ^Lxu , vMich measure partisan
divisions in legislatures but no^
-:nter-D'.ri-v -r.nc pa ty competition in
state elections.
To su..,ari.e. none of th. tour measures of party competition
which passed the two prclininary tests are adequate because all
of them implicitly are wedded to a „,odal of state party politics
v*ich does not apply to the realities of state political competi-
tion. Until an adequate alternative measure vAich'meets these
problems is devised, no claims co^-ar---—
-•.L.^,,f^ xi.ipOi. ,.i.uce oz party
corr^petition as an explanatory tool in the comparative study of
39
^
"''^
conceptual reduction approach to the validity problerr.
c ai^s'trb^
^ical distance between what the'po'uL'"'icianiai.as to be measurins nna what he is in fact measuring." Ibid.'
crit:erio^'';^'^'°i^'f''^''^
an e,:eellent discussion of the technicalerioa o. 'reliability- (ibid., pp. 49-59). Reliability does'no. pose as many problems for the previous n-.easures as does
validity, ihere is, however, soma cause for caution in th'-'s re-gard, lor all of the previous measures were cut essentially fromtne_saine fabric yet the different results obtained with these
various measures were not always consistent v.ith one another ItIS ^possible, though, that different base periods, offices con-
sieered, etc., accounted for much of this variation
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PoUc,
..,e „Uh ,.ch co'aUdeuc.. e«ec.. „o
until it is rueasured adequately.
A ne„ ™thod Of
.oasuring In.or-p,,.., competition Is prose...
h=« as
.„ atte.pt to .eet this proMe... The.e a.e thtce c^-
ponents to this new n-.casure:
1. 1 minus the percentase of the vote received
eL'io^sr^"' Cube.nato.iaf'
of"th"v''^ candidatese victorxous party in the elections forthe upper nouse; and
3. 1 minus the average vote of all candidates
of the victorious party in the elections forthe lower house.
The arithmetic mean of these three components is che composite
ipc score for a given state for a given year. Computation of the
governor score is similar to the methods of, for example. Dye
and Dawson and Robinson. The major difference lies in measuring
legislative con:petition. Instead of using percentage of seats,
percentage of vote is emphasised. That is. the percentage of the
vote each of the n.ajor parties received in each legislative race
for the house and the senate was deterr.ined. Tne arith:r,etic
mean for each of the parties in all of the races for both houses
was then computed. The mean of these two, and the governor vote,
were then cor.bined to produce a composite competition score for
that year. This procedure was performed for all elections which
took place between the years 1958-68.
Perhaps the major problems with this new approach are the
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ccnv=nier.« and availability of the data ^ ,ett.-u.iu<.. A l er requesting
the relevant eloc'-nroi ^i-t-^c c.or.l a„ta ™s sent to the secretary of state
of each of the fifty states. FolWup
,»tter- and „„j--LLc_ro a numerous
phone calls were also raade to trv r.^ .r-o y
.o obtain some of the data v.hich
did not follow the orio-inal ^ot^n^ co .. .c .er. Some staces responded that
the, did not have the resources to duplicate the relevant material,
but it could be obtained in person. This alternative was im-
possible. Other states said that the relevant data were collected
by the individual counties, with no central repository. Several
others said that they had no data which pre-dated their new ap-
portlonment schemes imple..ented around 1962. Other states stated
flat-out that they sL.ply did not keep such records. And, of
course, there were a few that simply did not respond at all. I
was able to assemble complete sets of data for 19 states. The
test of this new i.c m.easure, therefore, is necessarily of an
e>q.loratory nature. Since data collection at the state level is
becoming more complete and efficient, it should be possible to
cot these data for all the states in the not too distant future.
In addition to the availability problem, the computations
necessary for this new measure are considerably more time consuming.
For the distribution of seats measures, it was necessary merely
to compute the pcrcentase of seats for each party in each house.
It took only two days to perfora these operations for the 10 year
period. The newer method involves considerably more time, for
the percentages of the parties for each election, in each house.
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for occh year
.ust be dctemincd. Then
.11 o-me aii the contests must
averaged to obtain t^c copDot-^^.•
-
...petition score for one house for one
year, v;:iich is then corabiaed with thn i-" e two other aspects of the
-easurc to get the conpos-fte indr-P -^-tc mde.. for that year. This point
should be further emphasized. For exa-.ole f^-^ampi , i one were to cal-
culate a "distribution of so-it-" c .ocats score for the lower house of the
Massachusetts le'?islatn-r> <.i Lu.c, wouid ,„orcly represent the per cent
the se.ts eaeh party hel., i.e..
.,the..at.c.l operation
on the ne,., measure, one would have to determine the percent of
the vote for eaeh of the parties for 200 districts, and than
S2t the arlth,i,etlc mean of all of these race-i-i.eoc s. Since these data
-St be re-eheckod, the entire process Is rather t'l.e eo„su.,,ing.
>-ilo It took two days to eo.pnte the older measure. It took over
si. months to complete the computations to obtain the nev, measure.
Had all fifty states been Included, it would have talcen well over
=
year to co.-.pute one variable! This is certainly a problem,
given the ti.e and budsetary constraints facing ,tost social sci-
entists. However, if this new measure demonstrates considerable
e...nlanatory power and if it in fact better reflects the relaities
of state politics than do the other measures, than it is a
problem which will have to be dealt with.
This new measure does, however, encounter some problems in
addition to those of data availability and length of time com-
putins the index as noted above. Two problems concern the relia-
bility of the index. On the one hand, the accuracy of the elec-
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ca. be ,„c,sUo„ea. On the othe. h.,„.. ^ineo several thousand
-.putations would te
.e.ui.ed for a ten year co.,osite inde.
of .he arty states, the „ar,i„ for error is inereased eon.ensur-
ably. unless the ne„ noasure she.s constderably
.ore poteatlal
than the Older ones, these technical prohlea,s will loo. partic-
ularly large.
Neither the old nor the now measures have
.uch applicabiU.y
for states vhich are heavily one-parcy oriented. For in these
states (e.g., the southern states) the important political cor.-
petition is in the primaries, with general elections being usual-
ly anti-clin.actic, often perfunctory, m addition, none of the
K^easures are addressed to other important kinds of political
cou.petition, for example: inter-party and inter-factional (intra-
pnrty) con;petition within the legislature, party cor.petition be-
tween the executive and legislature under conditions of single
party control, divided party control, etc.
Finally, even at the legislative election level only, all
quantitative measures obscure some of the richness and rany of the
nuances of particular political campaigns. -1 On the other hand,
though, while case studies can capture these phenomena they neces-
sarily sacrifice rigcr and are not readily susceptible to ccir-
41-,
-"O^ interesting endeavor in this regard sec Jcrorr.e M.
Mileur and George T. Sul^ner, Campaigning for the Massachusetts
(^"^r-herst: University of llassachusctts Press, 1974)";
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parative analyses.
The nineteen states fo. which the relevant data .e.e avail,
able are listed on this pa^e along with their composite ipc
scores for the 1953-63 base period.
State
New York
Illinois
New Jersey
Colorado
Kansas
Oregon
Connecticut
T.T
Alaska
Rl'iode Island
Hawaii
West Virginia
Nevada
Co-.posite ipc score
47
47
Indiana
California
45
45
45
44
South Dakota 44
yoi^"'-ng 44
43
43
42
42
41
Massachusetts 40
Missouri 40
Arizona 33
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It has been stated several tir-oc t-ui .es throughout this chapter
^na. a co.p..i.„„
.
^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^^^
Of .ho dU=^„e„..s in .ase pe.ioa.. efUc.s studied, «c. Kono-
f.elos.. s.andi., of .ho s..ees on sovoral of the.o
.ea...es
ca. be found in Che appendix to this chapter. Po. iUu.trative
purposes, the chart
...,hich appeared on the previous pages lists
the nineteen states which were u-ed in M.-io . ^. . a m this study, and indicates
their positions for er-rh r,f- .cn of tne various measures of ipc. The
second to last column is labeled
-standard". It is similar in
design to the Dye and Fenton measures, but since the latter two
used different base periods than that spanned by the new measure,
a comparable index was assembled for the relevant 'years
. This
was necessary since a comparison betx/een th-
..ore conventional distribution of seats measures is an ivnportaut
concern of this study.
Conclusion
This chapter has endeavored to accoraplish two objectives:
a) to present the ;.ajor attenpts at classifying the states accord-
ing to the degree of inter-party competition; and b) to present
a new measure that overcomes some of the problems encountered
by the others. Again it must be emphasized that the utility
of any such measure can only be evaluated" in the context of the
research objective it is designed to serve, provided, of course.
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thn. they
..e v.Ua rcUa.lo,
=.pi.ieolly. « xhe no-,
.e.su.o
is. hopofuuy. a tool «icU is useful xu cloriEylu, our think-
ir.S about state political competition
.„C explaining variations
in state policy choices. For other purposes it .ay have only
li..ited applicability, for still others none at all. Ihe chapter
"hich follows presents substantive data which bear on the
inter-relationships among both measures of the political process.
sociocconor...ic conditions, and policy outputs in the states.
"Sec the discussion of these terns on pa^o 21 and in
footnotes 38-40.
Appendix
Classifications of the A:aerican State Party Systems
I113
-^^""cy £ni Kendall
Two
-
party
uS!::"£:i:;aSft^^^na ^^°^^--> Nevada,
Wisconsin, Mi^hCrM^sso :i'^?J??;.^f ^f^^^West Virginia, Maryland De^^'a^rT ^ ^"^'^^^^^^ Ohio,
Connecticut, Rhode'lsla^d!t::::^^ ^-^>
L!od_ificd Ono-Party Dcnjocratic
Oklaho:.a, Tennessee, North Carolina, Kentucky
Modified One-?artv Re^ublj^
Oreson North Dakota, South Dakota, Kansas IowaPennsylvania, Maine, New Harapshire ' '
One " Party Di^cratic
loS^hV^^^T^'v^-""^''^"^' Mississippi, Alabama, Geovgi-,b utn Carolina, Virginia, Florida ^- ^gic,
One-Party Republican
Verraont
from: •'The American Party Systems," American Political S-^ienceRevicj^ 48 (June, 1954): 485,
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Joseph A. Schlcsinc^er
Cyclically Conipetiti^
New YodTTu^^ Delaware, West Virg inia
One-Partv Cyclical
Republi^^^;ebraska, North Dakota, Rhode Island
Massachusetts, Minnesota
Democratic: New Jersey, Arizona, New Mexi(-CO
prie-Par_t_^ Prcdoir.inant
Republican: Illinois, California. Michigan, Kansas, Main.,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, New Hampshire,
Wisconsin, iov7a
Democratic
:
impsn
,
Kentucky, Montana, Mis sour, Maryland,
Tennessee, North Carolina
One-Partv
Republican: Vermont
Democratic: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas,
Virginia
from
;
"A Tv:o
-Dimensional Scheme for Classifying States
According to the Degree of Intcr-Partv Ccmoetition,
"
Arncrican Political Science Review 50 (December, r;33)
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V.O. Key, Ji
Strono; Rcp-ablican
Les_s
-Strong Republican
Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Kansas
Ccripetitive
Massachusetts, Illinois, New Jersey, Wyomins, Ohio
Leaning Deniocratic
Colorado, West Virginia, Idaho, Missouri, Nevada
fron: Ar^erican State Politics ; A.n Introductio n (Hew York-
Alfred A, Knopf, Tp^
,
^Qsr^•^ 7-, oo
.121
^'ohert Golcnibiewski
One Partly
AlabaT.a, Arizona, Arkansas, Flo-ida Ppovo-; t • •
Maine. Mississippi, North ^aroU
'o. Z 'Carolina, Texas, Venr.ont, Virginia '
Weak Minority Party
Iowa Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, New Mexico NorthDakota, Oregon, South Dakota Tennc-.p^ !
°
West Virginia, Wisconsin
^^^^^^^^ ^ Washington,
TvjQ Party
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Illi-nois Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mis ouri, Mon aLNevada New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohi<;,
*
Pennsylvania, Rl-ode Island, VJyoning
from: '-A Taxonomic Approach to State Political Party Stren^^th "Western .Polity 11 (Septerr.ber, 1953).
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Joseph A. Schlesin-^er
The Range of Con^.petitiou-Based upon the Degree of Spreadcnong the Offices of a State
^^i^^ec . b
I. Narrov;ly
_
focused states-n.aximum horizontal spread of
^->/o, r.iaximum vertical spread of 207
Riiode Island, New llarr.pshire, Ma^ne, Ver.)ont, Ucah,
Pennsylvania, North Dakota, South Dakota, NebraskaNew Mexico '
II Cyclically elongated states-raaxL^aun horizontal spread
of IbU, mmirnun vertical spread of 25%
Connecticut, New York, Delaware, Indiana, West
Virgxnia, Kentucky, Illinois, Missouri, Iowa,
Kansas, Idaho, Colorado, Oregon
III. Mediurr.-broad focus
-approxiir.ately 30% spread alor-both axes
Massachusetts, Michigan, Wisconsin, Arizona, New
Jersey
IV. No focus--nore than 40% spread along both axes
Ohio, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, WyoiTiing,
Washington, California '
froni: "The Structure of Con^petition for Office in the A:::erican
States," Behavioral Sci ence, 5 (July, I960): 206.
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icnard Horferbert
Rank Ordering
1
1. Delaware
oZ
. ^vyor.iing
J
. Pennsylvania
/ Colorado
c
D
. Connecticut
/
. Ohio
Qo. Nev7 Jersey
Q Massachusetts
iU
. Michigan
1 1X i
. Indiana
1 9 Idano
i-5 . Maryland
xowa
15. New York
16. Minnesota
17. California
18. Wisconsin
19. Washington
20. Utah
21. Oregon
22. Mew Mexico
23. Montana
24. Kentucky
25. Ncvad
1
A 1 ^ V V,^
26. Mis sour""
27. West VTT'>-Jm*'i
28. South ^•->l-o^-^
29. North n-iVo'-n
30. Nebrask;n
31. Arizona
32. New f ? PTT^n ch Y-i
33. Rliode Islnrri^ * »-* *^ Ju O i ti I j i,l
34. Oklahoraa
35. Maine
36. Kansas
37. Tennessee
38
.
Texas
39. Virginia
40. Florida
41. Vemont
42. North Carolina
43. Louisiana
44. Arkansas
45. Alabama
46. South Carolina
47. Georgia
4S, Mississippi
"Classification of i\mcrican State Party Systers " Jou-P-i
of Politics 25 (August, 1964). ' ^""^
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Aust in Rannay
One
-Party Dcuiocratic
South Carolina, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, TexasAiaoaraa, Arkansas, Florida ^---as.
Modified PjiG-Part;^. Dcrnocratic
Virginia, North Caroli^, Tennessee, Oklahoma, KentuckyArizona, West Virginia, Maryland, New Mexico
Two -Party
Alaska, Missouri, lihode Island, Washington, Delaware
Nevada, Massachusetts, h'awaii, Colorado, Montana
Minnesota, Utah, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, California
Nebraska, Illinois, Idaho, Michigan, New Jersey, Indiana.
Oregon, Ohio, VJyoming, Hew York
Modified One-Party Republican
Wisconsin, New Hanipshire, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, South
Dakota, North Dakota, Vermont
from: "Parties in State Politics," in Jacob and Vines, cds..
Politics in the American St_a_tcs (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1965)", p. 65.
Two-Zilt;^ Issue
-Oriented
Michigan, U^.scons'in, Minnesota
Tv^-Porty Job-Oriented
Ohio Indiana, Illinois, Kentucky, Missouri We^tVirginia, Maryland, Massachusetts
Bi-Factional On^-Party
Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina, Tennessee
Mul^t i - Fa c t i o na 1 Cno-Party
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Mississippi, Texas,South Carolina '
(These were the only states discussed and classified.)
from: people an_d Parties in. Politics (Glenvicw, lUino
Scott, i'oresrnan and Company, 1966), Chapters 3-5
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David Pfeiffar
One-Part^ Dcmoc
r
atio
Alabama Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Texas,hississippi, South Carolina '
Modified One-Party Derr.ocrati c
Korth Carolina, Tennesse"c, Virginia
H££li Tv?o-PartY Leaning Toward the Democrats
Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, Oklahc:;;a, IXtiode Island
Tv;o
-Party
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland Massa-*
chusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, Washington,
V/est Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming
^''''^'"''^ T\v^o -Psrtv Leaning Toward the Republicans
Kansas, Maine, Nebraska^ North Dakota, South Dakota
Modified One-Party Republica n
Verruont "
~"
One -Party Republican
N'one
from: David G. Pfeiffer, "The Measurement of Inter-Party
Competition and Systemic Stability," Air.orican Political
Science Review 61 (June, 19G7) : 464.
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Du^^ne Lccknrd
I. Cornpctitive Parties, r.uch party votins in legisl^^ure^Connecticut, Massachusetts Mlchi^.n tl rNew York ' i ga , New Jersey,
II. ;.oi.pe_txtive parties, considerable party votin. inlegislatures, but not as much as in grLIDelaware, Indiana, Ohio, Peansylvani;
, P.hode Island
m. Competitive parties,
.oderate party voting in legis-
.
Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Montana, Wisconsin
IV. Competitive D^rtioq 1 it-Mo
~
"Aln^-k. • , ° P'^'^y
^otj.no m legislaturesa.Ka, Calixornxa, Maryland, Minnesota, Washington
V. Son..e competition, little party voting in legislatu-es
Arizona, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Wyoming
VI. Little competition, little party voting in legislatures
Idaho, Kentucky, Missouri, Utah, West Vir-:inia
Vlli One party domination, parry voting rare
Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Oklahoma" New Har-pshire
VIII. One party domination, more than in Group VII, and pr-ty
voting equally rare
Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee
Verm.ont '
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Lockard (continued)
Ko practical coiiipetition in intra-state politics,
bi-factional division frequent
'
Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina, South Carolina
Virginia *
No practical competition, multi-factional division fre-
quent
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Texas, Mississippi
"State Party Systems and Policy Outputs," in Oliver
Garccau, ed
. ,
Political Rsscarch and Folicical Theory
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968^, pp. 194-95
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C H A P T E R IV
THE DATA ANALYZED
It is the purpose of this chapter to present and analyse the
results of several correlation and regression analyses. They sug-.'.
gest associations among the variables and aid in testing the
hypotheses which are explained below.
Variables
Two types of independent variables were employed-socioeconomic
(SES), and political. The position of each of the nineteen states
along five socioeconomic dimensions yields this first group of in-
dependent variables:
1. Wealth - median money income of families.
I'
Pop"^ation Density - population per square mile.
^' Ad^_Education
- median school year completed for persons
25 years of age and older.
4. Urb anisation
- percent of population living in urban areas(according to U.S. Census definition of "urban area")
5. Ind£strialJ^^^^ ~ percent of labor force employed in
occupations other than agriculture, fishing, and mining.
The method and rationale behind the new measure of inter-
party competition was explained in detail in the previous chapter'.
To test the viability of this new measure, its explanatory utility
is compared with that of the older method of measuring political
competition in the states. In Chapter Three, this latter method
was labeled "standard." These two measures are the political
variables used in this study:
6. Standard Method - composite Ipc index for the relevant years
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7. Now Method
-
composite ipc index for the relevant years.
The dependent variables are five policy output measures.
As indicated in Chapter One, the choice of output measures was in-
fluenced by the desire to provide an empirical test of Lowi's
policy typology.
^' Total General Expenditures
- per capita, for the relevant
years
.
9. PoUc^Pjotection
- number of police per 10,000 civilian
population, for the relevant years.
10. Education
- per pupil expenditures for those in average
daily attendance, for the relevant years.
11. Public Welfare - per capita expenditures, for the rele-
vant years.
Aid to Families with Dependent Children - average monthly
payment per family for the relevant years.
Since there is usually a two year budgetary "lag,"'" the
effects of political competition in a given year--if important--
will be reflected in output measures tvjo years hence. This lag
factor is taken into account. For exfrniple, 1958 political data
were run against 1960 output data, 1964 political data against
1966 output data, etc. It should be noted also that "since com-
'
plete census data are produced only every ten years, the socio-
economic variables are from 1960 and 1970 census data. Output
variables from 1960 - 67 were correlated with socioeconomic data
taken from the 1960 census; output data from 1968-71 vith data
^This idea was discussed more fully in Chapter One.
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from the 1970 census.
The output measures for the relevant years are the combined
expenditures of state and local governments for the policies under
consideration. Several scholars have contended that the proper
units of analysis should be the states or the localities rather
than the combination of the two. Sharkansky has stated:
The fusion of state and local government activities
confuses the efforts of politically distinct units
The state-plus-local aggregate is artificial, and
not the arena in which policymakers decide about
the size of their budgets, the allocation of funds,
or any other of numerous policy choices.
2
Fry and Uinters added that "there is a potential ecological prob-
lem in analyzing state-wide political, social, and" economic indi-
cators in relation to local output measures.^
In commenting on Dye's use of state-plus-local data^ Ilofferbert
argued that:
The political system variables (e.g., apportion-
ment or party systems) that have been studied and
2 Ira Sharkansky, "Environment, Policy, Output and Impact:
Problems of Theory and Method in the Analysis of Public Policy,"
in Sharkansky, ed., Policy Analysis In Political Science (Chicago:
Markham Publishing Company, 1970), p. 63. This and other similar
arguments are reiterated throughout Sharkansky's Spending in the
/-erican S tates (Chicago: Rand HcNaUy, 1968).
^Brian R. Fry and Richard F. VJinters, "The Politics of
Redistribution," American Politica l Science Review 64 (June,
1970): 512.
''^Sce Thomas R. Dye, Politics
,
Economics
, and the Public
(Chicago: Rand McNal'ly, 1966).
132
found inconsequential for policv are all based
on gubernatorial and legislative election returns
state legislative apportionment, etc. and yet suchfindings as Dye's or some which I have reported
elsewhere use these indicators and compare them
to policy measures which are substantially af-
fected by aggregations of local decisions. And
no indicators of local political system variables
have been included in these analyses of state
and local policy.-*
One line of response to these arguments is that "if the
policy nakers
- at whatever level - are perceived as operating
within an environment of finite demands and supports, it would
follow that provision of services by local governments would alter
the inputs into the state system."^
It v.'ould seem that, on balance, the arguments for using
state (only) expenditure data as output measures weigh more
heavily. State-plus-local data were employed in this study none-
theless. The reason for this strategem is that the' primary issue
under consideration here is the viability of various measures of
inter-party competition--spcci fically the "distribution of seats"
m.easure and the measure proposed in the preceding chapter. The
best way to compare the tv;o would be to use both in empirical
analyses v;hile controlling for other variables. Since most of
the other studies used state-plus-local expenditure data, that
Richard I. Hoffcrbert, "Elite Influence in State Policy
Formation," Polity 2 (Spring, 1970): 323.
^Idcri.
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tactic was employed here also despite the fact that the use of
state-only data is, theoretically, preferable. It should be
emphasized that the utilization of state-plus-local data was em-
ployed for the purpose of comparison.''
Hypotheses
Four major hypotheses have guided this research.
Hypothesis One ; State financial effort in most policy
areas is primarily a function of the
economic development of the state.
This hypothesis is based on the findings of Dye and others^
who have found consistent positive relationships between economic
development and state policy outputs. The extent^ and level of
government services will vary according to how much a state can
afford to spend as indicated by objective socioeconomic conditions
Hypothesis Tv;o : For those issues which bear on the
have--have-not struggle, inter-party
competition will exert an intervening
independent influence between economic
development and policy outputs.
''I'his rationale applies to some of the other vaiTiables as
well. For example, median family income indicates the income
distributions extant in the states. However, measures such as
the per cent of people belov; the poverty line might reveal more
subtle aspects of the social structures of the states. The former
measure v;as selected, again, so as to narrow the differences be-
tween this and other studies to the different measures of ipc.
^See the discussion of these studies which is contained in
Chapter Two.
^Some rather interesting analyses of patterns and factors
involved in "innovation" in state policy can be found in Andrew
Cowart, "Anti-Poverty Expenditures in the American States: A
Comparative Analysis," Mid\.>cst Journal o_f Political Science 13
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This hypothesis provides a test of the Key theory. 10 Polit-
ical competition moderates the effects of economic development
on policy, but only on redistributive issues. Since Aid to Families
with Dependent Children and Public Welfare were selected as the '
redistributive issues for this study, it is on these policies
that the effects of inter-party competition will be scrutinized
most closely.
Hypothesis Three : The "new" measure of inter-party
competition will exhibit stron.'^er
levels of association on the redis-
tributive issues than will the
"standard" measure.
In the preceding chapter it was argued that the theoretical
basis of the new measure more adequately reflects the realities
of policies in the states than do the more conventional measures.
If this is true, and if the politics--policy linkage is a viable
one, then the new measure should produce stronger levels of
association with the policy variables than the older measure.
Hypothesis Four : The influence of the different inde-
pendent variables will not be uniform
across all categories of policy.
This hypothesis is addressed to the policy typology . ^ The
(May, 1969) ; Jack L. Walker, "The Diffusion of Innovations Among
the y\inerican States," American Political Science Rcvicv/ 63
(September, 1969); Virginia Gray, "Innovation in the States: A
Diffusion Study," American Political Science Rcviev; 67 (December,
1973). See also Walker's "Cormaent" and Gray's "Rejoinder," ibid .
lOSce Chapter One.
Ha discussion of the policy typology for this study and its
underlying rationale was provided in Chapter One.
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policy-mnkinc system can host be understood as an amal^ of policy
sub-systems, each havinc its distinctive set of demand patterns,
stakes, institutional foci, decisional methods, etc. It is reason-
able to expect, therefore, that the influence of each independent
variable in this study will vary from policy to policy. If such
is found to be the case, the precise nature of the various policy
sub-systems will be examined in some detail.
Methodoloj2Z
All seven independent variables were run against each of the
five policy measures (dependent variables). Tlie design here was
to test for the relative explanatory power of each of the variables,
and all of them taken together. In another set of runs the two
political variables only were run against the policy variables.
The idea here was for a comparative tost of each of the measures
of ipc (inter-party competition). In a different series of runs
each of the two ipc measures with the five SES variables were
run against the policy variables. It was expected that this
would provide some indication of how well the political' variables--
each taken separately--woald fare against the economic develop-
ment measures in explaining variations in state spending patterns.
Correlation and regression analyses were used to "describe
the degree and direction of linear association between tv;o vari-
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ables, each ot which is expressed in an interval scale. "^^
necessary in this analysis, however, to isolate the influence of
each of the independent variables. For this purpose, the two
programs yield different measures of association: the correla-
tion program produces a partial correlation coefficient, and the
regression program produces a beta weight. Blalock has explained
the distinction:
Since the beta weights and partial coefficients rep-
resent somewhat different types of measures of as-
sociation, they will not give exactly the same result
although usually they will rank variables in the same
order of importance. The partial correlation is a
measure of the amount of variation explained by one
independent variable after the others have explained
all they could. The beta weights, on the other hand,
indicate how much change in the dependent variable
is produced by a standardized change in one of the
independent variables when the others are controlled
.
In other words, the partial indicates the amount of unexplained
(by the other independent variables) variation explained by the
isolated independent variable; the beta weight indicates the pro-
portion of change in the dependent produced by an increment of
one standard deviation unit of the independent variable. Stated
very loosely: with a beta weight each independent variable gets
an even chance, while the partial gives the isolated independent
variable the opportunity to explain what is left over after the
1 9Linton C. Freeman, Elementary Applied Statistics (New
York: John Wiley and Sons", Inc., 1965), p. 89.
l^Hubert M. Blalock, Jr. Social Sta tistics, second edition
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1972), p. 453.
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other independent variables have already taken their turns.
Peters has stated that "this (the use of beta weights) gives
a better measure of the effects of competing explanatory vari-
ables than does the use of partial correlations. -1^^ Support for
this position can be found elsewhere. 1^ ^hen considering the
relative importance of the independent variables, therefore,
reliance is placed upon the beta weights. Partial correlation
coefficients also were obtained, however, primarily because these
were used in most of the other state policy output research.
Data Analysis
Qualifying Factors. The primary concern in the pages which fol-
low is to isolate the effect exerted by the independent vari-
ables on the dependent variables. But first it is necessary to
examine the relationships which exist among the independent vari-
ables themselves. Should patterns exist among them, these pat-
terns will clarify - and perhaps qualify - the relationships
among the independent and dependent variables. Three of these
relationships are explored below: the intercorrelation among
^^B. Guy Peters, "Economic and Political Effects on the
Development of Social Expenditures in France, Sweden and the
United Kingdom," Midwest Journal of Political Science 16
(May, 1972): 231.
15see, for example, Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Causal Infer-
ences in Nonexperimontal Research (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1964), pp. 50-51.
^'^For some of the reasons v;hy partials rather than beta
weights are usually employed see ibid
. , pp. 50-52.
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the SES variables, among the SES and ipc variables, and between
the two measures of ipc. A fourth concern, that of "incremental-
ism," is also considered below. Although this issue is addressed
to the relationships among the dependent rather than the inde-
pendent variables, it is dealt with here because it also acts as '
a qualifying factor in relation to the data analysis presented
below.
The relationships among the five SES variables are depicted
in Table 4.1. Generally, the relationships between the 1960 and
1970 data are similar. Income tends to be higher in the more
industrialized areas. Population density, urbanization and in-
dustrialization are also positively associated with one another,
although income is highly associated with only one of these three.
Education is associated only with income, and only moderately so.
\-7hile several of these correlation coefficients are quite
high, it is somewhat surprising that they are not higher. It is
plausible to suggest at this preliminary juncture that for the
most part each is tapping a different dimension of the economic
development concept.
The correlation coefficients for the SES and ipc variables
are listed in Table 4.2 Dye-'-'^ and others^^ have contended that
^•^Politic s , Economics , and the Public (Chicago: Rand McNally
and Company, 1966).
^^See, for example, Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson,
"Inter-Party Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies
in the American States," Journal o^ Politics 25 (May, 1963).
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Correlation Coefficients; Standard and New Measures
of IPC, and SES Variables
• Standard IPC Measure
Income Density Educa. Urbanization Indus
.
-
. 17 .29 -.30
.10 -.11
1960 .17 .14 .15 .02 1
1
. 1 J.
1962 .56 .37 .18 .40 5Q
1964 -.14 -.23
.24 - .05 - 30
1966 .30 -.33 .42 .41
.
32
1968 .47 -.21 .21 .22 .43
New IPC Measure
Density Educa
,
Urbanization Indus
.
1958 -.12 .30 -.40 -.06 -.06
1960 -.11 .14 -.05 -.14 -.07
1962 .21 .44 -.19 .16 .30
1964 -.27 -.19 .05 -.07 -.25
1966 .20 -.38 .27 .03 .07
1968 .40 -.05 .09 .26 .46
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these rolauo„shlp3
..e
.od.ceC c^stlcaUy
.hen SES fac.o.s
a.e held constant. The fo^er as.oolatlons
,
they a.g.ed. a.e
-re statistical artifacts of the relationships a^^ong SES and
IPC Political variables have high simple r's only because
-they
are highly associated with the SES variables. No support for
this finding can bo gleaned fro. the data presented here. Host
Of the Simple r's are quite low. and several are negative. The
relationship between ipc and SES is moderately high only for the
1962 standard measure, and only for the Income and industriali-
nation variables. The relationships between SES and the new
measure are even weaker
- all the simple r's are low, and half
are negative. It would seem, therefore, that the SES and ipc
variables are two distinct sets.
The correlation coefficients for the two ipc variables are
presented in Table 4.3 l^he simple r's are quite high for three
of the first four years, but drop off soinewhat toward the end.
It will be recalled fror. the preceding chapter that competition
for the governorship was computed identically for both measures.
While this to some extent explains the high levels of association
in the early years, it makes it more difficult to account for
the drop-off in the later years. An inspection of the election
statistics, however, reveals an interesting trend in these latter
years. It appears that competition in the individual races has
increased somewhat, though not quite enough to affect significantly
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the outcomes of the races and hence th.
,
,
'^'^ distribution of seatsin the state legislatures. There are f.
,
^"""^ uncontested elections
and fewer lopsided election^, k ^tions, but the minority parties have yetto acquire enough support to alter the actual .un outcomes of the
elections. Thi<;
-tr ^ „a very s.gniHcant trend. Unfortunatel/ the
political data presented here span only , .f sij. points in time within
a ^en year interval and. therefore, do not per.lt conclusions
-
*is trend to
.0 .ade with ™ch conHdence. it does see.
»o«ever. that the states are heco.m,
„ore competitive
^enerluy.
And It should be noted thfl^ t-h^uuc a cnat the new but not the ct-,n,inv^cuK bca aard measure
was capable Of revealing this apparent trend.l.
..„etheless It
is important to he aware of the strong relationship hetween the
two ip= measures
,
and its significance for the data analysis
presented below.
Table 4.3 Correlation Coefficients a .
of Inter-Party Competition '''^'^'^^
Year
^
^^^S
.94
1960 52
1962 73
1964
1968
,62
19-
It will be recalled from Chapter Three Mint- f-T.«
among the states was snaller for the new .e"u e T Is co"uld bea reflection of some of the Ideas presented abov^.
"
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Table 4.4 Correlation Coefficients • v
year ^h Z^'^^'^"^^- Expenditures for onewit expenditures for the nnvt- rrcn ext ( Xncrcmentalism)
1960-61
1962-63
1964-65
1966-67
1968-69
1970-71
Total
General
Expends
.
Police Educa.
Protection tion
Public ADC
Welfare Payments
.94
.97
.96
.99
.96
.98
.97
.96
.98
.98
.98
-.16
.14
-.03
-.09
.95
.99
.97
.95
.98
.98
.99
.95
.90
.96
.83
.99
.94
.85
.97
The final qualifying factor to bo considered here concerns
"incr^entalls.." Sharkansky has argued persuasively that the
-ost important clue as to how ™uch a state will spend for a
governmental service next year Is how „uch It has spent (or appro-
priated) this year. 20 s,,,,^
^^^^^^ Incrementally fron, a-
base point, with current expenditures differing fro™ past In only
=™aU units (or increments). Table 4.4 presents the correlation
coefficients tor the expenditure levels of the five policies. 21
20c c
Stares Tchirl7 ""T^^";
^""^ Sharkansky, Spend tnp, in the Aniericanl^a^ (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company ,^6"8t-Thi7 l^^i±Irrelated works were discussed in sone detail in Chapter Two
diff.r.n^ f .^^^
apparent that results for 1965 are radicallye e t from other years. This year produced anomolous results
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There U
...pie
..ppo« fo. Shar.ans.,.. Hypothesis In .hose data
the incremental phenomenon sets the broad par.„oters within
which the independent variables e.crt their influence.
The four sets of relationships discussed above do not neces-
sarily detract fro. the analysis presented below. They were
included to pinpoint see of the subtleties in the data which
should be borne i„ „ind when ex^ining the ^ajor findings of
this study.
mojLlin^: Before the data analysis is undertaken, a word
is in order concerning the sample size. Since, as has boon noted
previously, political data could be assembled for only nineteen
states, the .a:nple size is rather small. The results of this
study, therefore, are necessarily of an exploratory nature. Be-
cause of the sr..all sample size, measures of association had to
be quite high for them to pass the usual significance test (.05).
In this report, emphasis is placed upon apparent patterns and
trends in the data, rather than on significance tests. Should
the new measure of ipc reveal itself to be a potentially useful
explanatory tool, more stringent statistical tests will be im-
posed upon it in future research.
throughout the data. It was, therefore, excluded from the data
analysis since there was no apparent (political) reason for this
occurrence.
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.eveau
.Ha. aU
..ven l„.epe„.e„. va.UMea-.a.en
.o,e«..-
account To. „,ueH.of
.He variation In state
£or tHls poucy. THe coe«iele„ts of deton„lnation ate. witH
one exception (19n,.
.33 ot Hettet. XH.,
.eans tHat („ltH one
exception) tHo Independent variables explain at least 70. of tHe
variation on tHls policy variable. It would see.. tHen. that
the independent variables chosen for this analysis contain
.any
of the major factors affecting state spending patterns.
Table 4.5 also lists the correlation coefficients for the
seven Independent variables. Education Is the strongest variable
here. Although the Influence of this variable decreased fron,
195S onward, fro. 1960-1967 its simple r's were quite high. The
Simple r's in the earlier years, moreover, are all significant
at the
.05 level, unfile the highest scores for median family
income are not as high as those for education, they are more con-
sistent. All but two are significant at .05. Ataost all of
'
the scores for the other three SES variables are low negative.
Both Ipc variables exhibit an increasingly positive trend, al-
though the simple r's for both are quite low.
Table 4.6 presents the beta weights tor the seven Independent
variables. Interestingly, educatlon-whlch showed the highest
simple r's-exhlblts beta weights which are quite low. The highest
beta weight was only
.46. Income remained quite high; indeed,
its beta weights are even more Impressive. The range Is from 1.22
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acul.os l„p„„,„.,
^^^^^^ U..anl.aac„
lndus..i.u.a.ion show a few
.a.ho. higK negaUv. be.a weights
They exhibit no apparent trend, however, and since their other
scores are ,o„ one =o,.lc, only speculate on the slgnlfleance of
the high negative scores. Of the inr vnv-ioKiur cn pc variables, only the standard
-asure produces high positive scores-although not consistently
so. There was a weak pattern of progressively larger positive
scores for the standard measure, although this trend is reversed
in the final two years. The new ipc measure, with the exception
of one fairly high negative, did not do well at all.
The question ari.es immediately as to why the scores for
the political variables are so different when they are so highly
correlated with one another. It appears that when both are in
the same equation, their effects are depressed by each other.
The new measure suffers more than this "reciprocal effect" be-
'
cause my variable list was set up such that the computer always
read the standard measure first. This effect can be seen through-
out the data. To compensate for this "technical" effect, each
of the ipc variables was run separately with the SES variables
(see Tables 4.7-8). This strategem, however, did not alter
either the simple r's or the beta weights for either ipc variable
to any great extent.
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Table ^.9 Correlation coefficients: standard and new ipc
measures against total general expenditures
Year Standard Nev; R r2
ipc ipc
i960
-.20
-.30
.37 Ik
1961
-.27
-.29
.29 07
1962 -.01
-.19
.20
1963 -.01
-.18
.20
196^
.05
-.17
.31 .10
1965
-.18
.32 .11
1966 .12
.03
.33 ,11
1967 .01
-.05
.13 .02
1968 .25 .20
.25
.07
1969 .29 .16
.29
.09
1970 .^8 .16
.32 .27
1971 .36
.13
.39 .15
To estimate the comparative power of each of the .ipc
measures
,
runs were made with only these two variables in the
equation (see Table 4.9). The range of the R^'s was from .27
in 1970 to ,09 in 1961. Apparently, the two ipc variables do
not go very far in accounting for changes in the dependent
variables. The data suggest that the standard measure works
better, although its simple r's are still quite low. The beta
wei ghts are a bit more revealing (see Table 4.10). With one
152
exccpuon, all the standard measure's score, are positive, while
those for the new measure are negative-once again the recipro-
cal effect seens to be at work. 1„ so.e years the standard
measure's scores are higher; In other years the new measure's
scores are higher (forgetting the "direction" of th^ for the
time being), u seer„s that the two measures are associated with
Table 4.10 Beta weights: standard and new measures of Ipcagainst total general expenditures
Year Standard ipc New ipc
1960
.65
1961
.05
-.34
1.04
-1.14
1963 1.02
-1.13
1964
.39
-.47
196 5
.41
-.48
1966
.78
-.73
1967
.28
-.30
1968
.21
.06
1969
.33
-.06
1970
.63
-.24
1971
.46
-.16
153
one another to such an extent here that it is not possible to
decide which one works better. "^^
Police Pro_tection. Table 4.11 indicates that the cumulative
effects of the seven independent variables explain most of the
variation in the policy variables. As much as 82% (1967) of
this variation can be attributed to the independent variables.
The lowest is .64 in 1963, and this is still moderately
high. 23
The correlation coefficients for the seven independent
variables are depicted in Table 4.11. The correlation coefficients
are fairly high for all of the SES variables except education. Of
these, urbanization clearly is the strongest. The highest r was
.84 (i960), the lowest being .71 (1967). Further, all of these
are significant at the .05 level. Industrialization is also
quite high, although the scores here are a bit lower toward the
end (nine are significant at the .05 level). Median income
again does rather well, but not as well as the first two. Popu-
lation density shows some moderately high positive scores at
the beginning, but scores for the later years drop off somewhat.
There is a progressively upward trend for education, although
^^The relationships indicated by the partial correlation
coefficients here do not alter what has been stated above. The
discussion is based on the beta weights, for the reasons given
above
.
^^See footnote 21 for the reasons for excluding data for
1965 from this analysis.
154
O
O
-P-
CD
4^-
ON
0\
CO
O
ON
NO NO
CJN On
ON
4^
fV)
o
fV)
o
o In:)
-N3
4^
-X) o On
-n3
On
-P
00 NO
4^
On
4^
NO
00 CO
On
00 NO NO
o
IN)
NO
On
-P-
o
o
NO
ON
0»
o
00
jn:>
NO NO
On On
fN) M
JV)
O
0\
ON
o Ox
M
NO
OnO
O
ON
O
O
NO
-P-
->0 P-
-p- 0^ NO On
On 4^
-P-
ONO Ux On NO On
NO
00O 00o 00 NOo
ro
CO
ta
Q
M
o
o
3
CD
fD
)./.
O C
O
1
<+ cr
O
N
P
1
H" M
N ^3
C+ C
H- CI
c+
P'M
1
11 c:>
o
O >i
c+ 1-1
CO CO
o M
H-
O H-
O
O
o
CD
Hj
H-
O
H-
CD
3
c+
05
155
the highest score is still only .37 (1971). Neither political
variable does as well as the SES variables (except education),
but the scores for the standard measure for the last four
years are all significant at the ,05 level.
The beta weights overrule these preliminary statements
(see Table 4.12). The standard ipc measure shows the highest
beta weights, three of these being very high (1961, 1966,
1967). The beta weights are not, however, consistently high
throughout--in fact, three of them are quite low. At this point
there would seem to be no explanation for these conflicting
tendencies. Urbanization once again is the strongest SES vari-
able on this policy, VJhile none of the beta weights here is
as high as the highest for the standard ipc measure, and while
there are a few lower scores, urbanization would seem to be
the most consistently high independent variable for police pro-
tection. Median family income does moderately well, although
much loss so than urbanization and the standard measure. The
beta weights for industrialization differ substantially from
the correlation coefficients. Wliile the simple r's were quite
high, the beta weights are mostly all negative, some of these
negative being moderately strong. This could be due to the
high correlation of industrialization with urbanization (.69).
The beta weights for population density are all low (positive
and negative), in contrast to its higher simple r's. Density
is also correlated highly with urbanization (.61). The beta
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weights for education are all i„ ^lo„ (negative)
. as were the staple
r's. The hetn eights for the ne„ ,.pe measure are all negative
and see are ,u,te high. An examination of Table 4.12 reveals
Chat the reciprocal effect between the two Ipe measures Is at
work here
- the higher (or lower) the beta weight for the
'
standard measure the higher (or lower) the beta weight for the
new measure, except the direction Is positive for the standard
measure and negative for the new measure.
Notice (Table 4.13-14) that when the two ipc variables are
-n one at a time with the SES variables against policy, there
are some significant changes In the beta weights. The scores
for the new ipc measure remain low, and the beta weights for
the standard measure are reduced considerably. Simultaneously,
the beta weights for urbanization are a bit higher; changes
in the other variables are insignificant. Since all of the beta
weights for urbanization are significant at the .05 level, it
is plausible to conclude - given the conflicting scores for
'
the standard measure on these two runs - that urbanization is
— T
the key variable for explaining variations in policy protection.
Wlien only the two ipc variables are entered in the equation,
the R 's are reduced considerably (see Table 4.15). With all
seven independent variables in the equation the range was from
.82 to .64, with only the two political variables the range is
now from
.38 to .15. Once again the standard measure exhibits
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Table ^.15 Correlation coefficients: standard and new
ipc
measures against police protection
Year Standard
ipc
Nevf
ipc
R
lyou -.22
.'+0 .16
-.13 -.25 .39 .15
xyOC .23 .05 .^7
.22
.08 M .21
iyoM- .3^+ ,10
M .17
1 oA c: -.23 -.23 .26 .07
19bo .02
.60 .36
1967
-.05 .62
1968. .50 .12
.58 .33'
1969 .53
.11 .62 .38
1970
,2k ,k9
1971 .48
.20 ,2k
higher correlation coolflclents.
*lle the sl.ple r's for both
are mostly lo«. there is an
upward trend £or both in the last
four years. This pattern is
evident particularly for the
standard measure, with these last
four scores all bein, signifi-
cant at the .05 level. Once
again, a so.ewhat different
pattern
emerges fro™ an exanination of
the beta weights (see Table
161
4.16). Here, the reciprocal effect is again at vr7ork--beta
weights for the standard measure being positive, and negative
for the new measure. It should be reiterated that this must
be a technical effect, since the two measures are highly corre-
lated with one another. If the direction of association is
ignored for the time being, it can be seen that for some years
Table 4.16 Beta weights: standard and new ipc measures against
police protection
Year Standard ipc New ipc
1960 .95 -1.11
1961 .84 -1.03
1962 1 . 19 -1.04
1963 1.14 -.97
1964 .59 -.34
1965 -.10 -.17
1966 1.40 -1.29
1967 1.44 -1.35
1968 .75 -.37
1969 • .81 -.42
1970 .55 -.11
1971 .57 -.16
162
the standard measure is stronger, the new measure being stronger
in others, with the standard measure holding a slight edge.
For the two policies considered to this point, the effects
of the SES variables are clearly superior, with the standard
measure being the stronger of the two ipc variables.
Education . The explanatory power exerted by the seven inde-
pendent variables on per pupil expenditures for education,
while weaker than for the first two policies, is still quite
strong. The range of the ' s is from .70 (1971) to .58
(1960). VJhile the highest and lowest R 's are for the last
and first year respectively, no discernible trend exists (see
Table 4.17).
The correlation coefficients listed in Table 4.17 show
income to be clearly the strongest variable for this
policy.
The simple r's range from .76 (1961) to .62 (1970),
and all are
significant at the .05 level. The small range
indicates the
consistency of income's effect on education. With
eight scores
passing the .05 significance test,
industrialization^also does
consistently well although at levels lower than
those for income
(.50 to .40). Somewhat surprisingly
education as an independent
variable is not at all highly associated
with education as a
dependent variable-the highest simple r
between the two is
(1961). The standard ipc measure does
moderately well half
the time, very poorly the other
half. With one exception, the
scores for the new ipc measure are
quite low.
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Several of the beta weights for median family income
are quite high (see Table 4.18); it is perhaps the strongest
variable for this policy. However, the beta weights are not
high throughout— the scores decrease considerably for the last
four years. The scores for population density are very low
for the years 1960-1967, but are very high for the final four
years. It could be that income and density are part of some
larger factor which manifests itself through the income vari-
able for some years and the density variable in others. It
will be recalled, however, that the correlation between these
two was only .28 for the 1960 data, and .38 for the 1970 set.
The 1970 data wore used for the last four years, and these
were the years for v;!iich high scores for density were obtained.
Still, a .38 simple r is not that high. Perhaps it is best
to defer judgment on this possible relationship until the other
policies are exar.iined.
There is considerable range in the beta weights for urbani-
zation (+.4-^6 -- .809). Although only a few of the beta weights
are of any magnitude, it may be significant that these all fall
toward the end and are negative in direction. It would be
dangerous to generalize on the basis of these fevj scores, how-
ever, since the others are quite low. Industrialization, which
had rather high simple r's, shows mostly low negative beta
weights. Apparently, the high correlation coefficients were
merely a product of the high correlation of this variable with
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the other SES measures. It will be recalled that the correla-
tion between industrialization and income was .72 for the 1960
data and .72 for the 1970 set also. The education variable
produced low positive and negative beta weights, which parallels
its scores for the correlation coefficients.
The beta weights for the ipc variables are somewhat con-
fusing. The reciprocal effect is again apparent, although this
time the standard measure benefits from it in some years,
and the new measure benefits in other years. For example, in
1961 the beta vjeights for the standard and new measures are
-1.19 and +1.38, But in 1966 they are +1.05 for the standard
measure and -.73 for the new measure. Taken together, the
ipc variables show the highest and lowest beta weights. To
complicate the picture further, the beta vjeights are not con-
sistently high positive or negative; there are several low
scores also. It would seem that some relationship is at v;ork
here; the precise nature of it defies explanation at this juncture.
Wlien only one ipc variable at a time is run with the SES
variables against the policy measures, a somewhat clearer pattern
emerges (see Tables 4.19-20). The standard measure appears to
work better on this policy. Although considerably lower than
income and density, it is the strongest variable after these
two. The highest beta weights for the standard measure occur
in the last four years, a pattern similar to that for density.
While this suggests high correlation between the two, an inspec-
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Table k,2.1 Correlation coefficients: standard and new ipc
measures against education
Year Standard f^ew R R'
ipc ipc
i960 ~.04 .02 .17 .03
1961 .01 .08 .20 .04
1962 .50 .31 .63 .40
1963 .32 .57 .33
1964 .63 .54 .64 .41
1965 -.03 -.23 .31 .10
1966 .07 -.06 .31 .10
1967 .10 -.05 .35 .12.
1968 .17 .11 .17 .03
1969 .15 .12 .15 .02
1970 .53 .33 .53 .28
1971 .46 .34 .47 .22
tion of Table 4.20 shows that such an inference is unwarranted,
for the correlation between these two variables is quite
low from +.365 to -.328. The new measure does not fare well
on this run either. While three of the scores are moderately
high, the rest are quite low.
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The two political variables are not able to account for
much of the variation in expenditures for education when only
they are entered in tVie equation (see Table 4,21). IThile
all seven independent variables were able to account for as
much as 707o of the policy variation, the highest R for the
two ipc measures is .41. l-Thile this higher extreme is compara-
tively strong the lower extremity drops to .02, in contrast to
the .58 obtained when all seven independent variables are in
the equation (see Table 4.17). The correlation coefficients
reveal the standard measure to be the stronger of the tv;o once
again,
l-Jhen the beta weights are scrutinized (see Table 4.22),
the reciprocal effect is again cbscr^^ed. And once again., the
standard measure shows the higher scores. The beta weights,
however, form no clear pattern--several are quite high, but a
few are rather low. The range is from +1.42 to -.53. Generally
the scores for the standard measure are higher (disregarding •
direction). It would seem that for the first three policies
considered, the standard measure of political competition is a
more useful tool for explaining variations in state policy
choices. This statement must be qualified, however,
in light of
the high level of association between the two ipc
measures.
Public Welfare . The seven independent variables are
least suc-
cessful in explaining state variations in spending
for public
171
Table 4.22 Beta weights: standard and new ipc measures against
education
Year Standard ipc New ipc
1960 -.47 .47
1961 -.53 .57
1962 1.42 -1.00
1963 1.21 -.79
1964 .51 .16
1965 .33 -.47
1966 .70 -.70
1967 .80 -.78
1968 .17 -.00
1 acq
JL y yj J .13 .03
1970 .53 .00
1971 .41 .09
welfare. Table 4.23 shows that for no year are the variables
able to account for even half the variation in this policy.
O
For the first three policies the R'^'s were usually at least
•J
.60 and inost were considerably higher; the highest R attained
2
for public welfare was .48. And the mean of the R 's is .31,
which is rather low. The lowest R^ is .21 in 1971.
The correlation coefficients from Table 4.23 reveal a
slight progressively upward positive trend for all the SES var
ables except education. It can be observed also, however,
tha
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for the mosL part these simple r's never reach very high levels
so speculation on a possible trend here must be made with care.
Urbanization shov;s the highest correlation coefficients. Its
scores are not very high in the early years, but they do get
stronger toward the end. The same pattern is discernible for
density, income, and industrialization. This possible trend is
scrutinized more closely in the discussion of the beta weights
below. Somewhat surprisingly, median income shows the lowest
simple r's of all five SES variables except education. \Jliile its
scores are consistent with the trend for the other variables,
only one score is above .30. The scores for 1960-1964 are,
moreover, negative. This is in marked contrast to the compara-
tively high explanatory pov7er of this variable vjhich was seen
for the first three policies. Neither ipc variable produced high
simple r's, the scores being rather low positive and negative.
The apparent upward trend for the SES variables disappears
when the more powerful beta weights are examined (see Table
4.24). The education and density variables show all low
positive
and negative scores. Urbanization does only a little better.
There is something of a trend for the income variable,
but it
differs considerably from the one manifested by its
correlation
coefficients. The beta weights for the income variable
are
very high in the early years, and the strength of
this negative
polarity decreases. Per capita expenditures for
public welfare
were clearly associated negatively in the
beginning, but this
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Table ^.23 Correlation coefficients: standard and new ipc
measures against public welfare
Year Standard New R
ipc ipc
1 Qf^Cixyuu Of
"Or
1962 .27 .30 ,30 .09
1963 .18 .19 .19 .0^
196^ -.03 .00 .03 .00
1965 , In -.30 .^1 .17
1966 ,0^ .00
1967' .08 .05 .10 .01
1968 .19 ".06 .32 .10
1969 -.3'+ .^8 .23
1970 .18 .03 .21 .03
1971 .15 .02 .18 . .03
relationship disappears for 1967 onward. It is a general comment
on the explanatory power of all the Independent variables for
this policy when they are only a few high beta weights, and
these arc negative. Industrialization exerts the strongest
positive influence, but only sporadically. Beta weights for 1962-
176
1964 are
.70, .62, and .84 respectively. The rest of the scores
are lower positive with two low negatives.
Neither political variable does well, each producing low
positive and negative beta weights. These results are not
altered significantly when only one of the ipc variables is* run
alternately with the SES variables against the dependent variable.
I^men the two ipc variables are run together, they can
account for little of the variation in the dependent variable.
Table 4.25 shows that the highest R^' is .23 (1969), the smallest
being a rather insignificant
.001 (1966). The correlation co-
efficients are all quite low positive and negative, with the
new measure having a slightly larger range standard: +.27 --
-.28; new:
.37 -- ».37). The beta weights (see Table 4.26)
once again reveal the reciprocal effect. Disregarding direction
for the tiir.e being, it can be seen that the beta weights for
the new measure are comparatively higher. However the mixture
of positive and negative, and low and high scores makes any in-'
ference based on these scores very tenuous. The low R^'s here
serve to emphasize this statement.
It is on this public welfare policy that the seven inde-
pendent variables have perfomed worst. The explanation for state
variations in spending for this policy must be sought elsewhere.
Aid to Families with Dependent Children
. The seven independent
variables are rather successful in explaining variations in this
177
Table 4.26 Bet. weights: standard a.d new Ipc.easures
against public welfare
Year Standard ioc New ipc
1960
.54
-.87
1961
.67
-1.00
1962
-.02
.31
1963
.02
.17
1964
-.07
.06
1965
-.42
.02
1966
.02
.02
1967
.21
-.14
1968
.42
-.34
1S69
.46
-.64
1970
.27
-.14
1971
.23
-.12
no
policy. Table 4.27 lists the relevant R's and R^'s. In
case do the independent variables account for less than 617„
of the variation in the dependent variables. The highest
is .82.
The correlation coefficients (see Table 4.27) show the
SES variables to be quite strong for this policy (once again,
except education). Population density, for which the simple
r's range from .71 to .55, is clearly the strongest variable.
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All of thcr.o scores are significant at the .05 level. It is
also worth nothing that although the simple r's are high
throughout, they are a bit higher in the later years. Urbaniza-
tion is the next strongest variable, v;ith industrialization
doing quite well also. Although the scores for these latter
two variables arc high throughout, they are a bit lower in the
later years, perhaps reflecting to some extent the rather high
correlation between the two (.69 for both 1960 and 1970).
Median faraily income also exhibits rather strong correlation co-
efficients. \7ith the exception of education, the SES variables
generally are very high. The scores for the tpc variables are
somewhat mixed. VJliile each produces a fev; moderately high
simple r's, most of thorn are rather low and several are low
negatives
.
The more powerful beta weights presented in Table 4.28
modify the above relationships considerably. Median family in-
come emerges as the strongest variable. The beta weights range,
from .91 (1971) to .38 (1969), but for the most part they are
rather high. Density and urbanization produced correlation co-
efficients liigher than those for income, but the same is not
true for the beta weights. Urbanization yields a few moderately
high scores, but the rest of the beta weights are low positives.
The same is true for the population density variable. It is
worth noting that high scores for density fall toward the end,
with the reverse being the case for urbanization. It is possibl
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th.t the phenomenon being tapped manifests itseU so.eti.e.
through one of these variables, other-tl„os through the other
Industrialization shows all negative beta weights, only a few
of these being of any magnitude. Education produces positive -
and negative scores which are quite low.
The beta weights for the political variables do not reveal
any patterns as clear as those exhibited for the SES variables.
The standard measure produces the highest single beta weight
obtained for any of the variables - H-1.14 i„ 1961. The next
highest score is
.55 (1960). followed by .U (1966). since the
rest of the beta weiehtq ^rn ri^t-u ^gncs a e with one exception (.08-1967) low
negative, the high score for 1961 appears to be something of an
anomoly. The new measure produces one moderately high positive
and one rather high negative, but the other beta weights are
quite low in both directions. V/hen only one ipc variable at a
time is run with the SES variables against the dependent variable,
both the simple r's and the beta weights for the ipc variables
are higher (see Tables 4.29-. 31). The changes are only marginal,
however, and they do not alter the position of the political
variables in relation to the SES variables. It would seem that
the SES variables are clearly superior to the political variables
in accounting for variations in ADC payments among the states.
Once again when only the two political variables are entered
in the equation, the r2's are quite low. For all seven independent
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Table ^.32 Correlation coefficients: standard and new ipcmeasures against ADC payments
Year standard
ipc
New
ipc
R
i960
.53
.56
.32
1961
.30 .^6
.21
1962
.21
.08
.36
.13
1963 .22
.12
.30
.09
196^
.52 M
.53 .28
1965 -.03
.16
.27 .07
1966
.13
.01
.27
.07
1967 .05 -.06
.23 .06'
1968 -.13 ',05
.02
1969 -.16
-.09
.16
.03
1970 -.02
.19
.25 .06
1971 .07 .20
.21
.0^ -
variables the polar figures for the 2R measure wore .82 and .61.
For the two political variables the corresponding figures are
.32 and .02, as listed in Table 4.32:. The correlation coeffi-
cicnts are also quite low. Two of the simple r's for the
standard measure are significant at the .05 level, but the rest
186
are very low and in both directions. The scores for the new
measure are analogous, but lower--usually about .10. The beta
weights (see Table 4.33) also show the standard measure to be
stronger. If the direction of association is ignored for the
time being (because of the reciprocal effect), it can be seen
that in all but three cases the standard measure does better.
Table 4.33 Beta vjeights : standard and new ipc measures
against ADC payments
Year otancicirQ ipc iNew ipc
1960 1.01 -.51
1961 .98 -.62
1962 .89 -,75
1963 .71 -.53
1964 .41 .15
1965 -.33 .41
1966 .63 -.56
1967 .53 -.53
1968 -.17 .06
1969 -.18 .02
1970 -.22 .32
1971 -.10 .26
Further, the higher the score the Inr., la ger the distance between
the two
.
hiShe. levels o£
.ssoCaUon
.han
.o
.He poUacal va.laMes
and Of the
.„o poliUcal variable.
.,e standard measure pro-
duces levels of association higher than those for the new
measure.
S^S-^^licrTvEolosv. The data presented In this study are
not capable of providing a conclusive test of the viability of
Lowi's policy typology, it „in be recalled fro. the first
chapter that the categories of th^ ^, ^t the typology were organized
around factors such as demand structure, decisional units,
pattern of output disaggregation, etc. A quantitative cnalysis
of the nature undertaken here is not oriented toward these
kinds of distinctions. It was thought however that if, for
example, SES variables (one or several) were highly associated
with, say, distributive policies while political variables were
highly associated with, say, redistributive policies, then the
typology could serve as a useful tool in state policy research.
Such a finding would not only clarify thinking about the various
possible patterns of state policy-making, but also generate
hypotheses for future research. It would, for instance, be a
significant research enterprise to explore in depth the precise
nature of the interaction between politics and welfare. Such
a study would offer a great opportunity to meld quantitative
188
a.d case analyses in the examination of various policy sub-
aystems. While such concerns retain their importance, the
data presented in this study do not. unfortunately, shed any
additional light on these possible linkages.
Conclusions
The four hypotheses described earlier in this chapter
should now be re-examined in terms of the data which has been
presented above. Once again the small sample size should be
emphasized, for this factor necessarily limits the confidence
with which these conclusions can be made.
It is a significant finding of this study that the SES
variables are intercorrelated to a lesser degree than might
have been expected. Taking .60 to be the "dividing line" for
the simple r's between the SES variables (a rather "weak" test),
only income and industrialization, population density and urban-
ization, and urbanization and industrialization were highly
associated with one another (1960 data). On the 1970 data, only
income and industrialization, and urbanization and irfdustrial-
ization passed the test.
Perhaps of more significance is the fact that the ipc and
SES variables were not highly correlated. Using
.
50 as a test,
the standard measure for 1962 was associated with the income and
industrialization variables. No other composite standard scores
and none of the composite scores for the new ipc measure passed
189
this test.
The findings of this study and others of this genre must
be qualified by the notion termed "incrementalism. " Of thirty
cases of the relationship betv;een one year's expenditures and
those of the next year, the simple r's were .9 or above in
twenty-seven, .8 or above in the other three.
The data presented in this study tend to confirm the first
hypothesis. Total general expenditures per capita was found
to be most highly associated with median family income. This
association--consistently high throughout--was stronger in the
later years spanned by this study. While the standard ipc
measure produced a few high beta weights, its explanatory power
was rather sporadic. This same pattern is obser^/able for
educa-
tion and police protection. It appears that wealth is
indeed
the crucial determinant for how much a state spends
generally.
Urbanization clearly exerted the most influence on the
police
protection policy (number of police per 10,000 civilian
popula-
tion) : the more urbanized the state tlie more
police-officers
are required to maintain public order. Median
family income was
the strongest variable on education, although
its beta weights
were somewhat smaller for the last four
years. Population
density, which showed low beta weights for
1960-1967, was the
strongest variable for the last four years.
NO support for the second h^^othesis
can be found in the
data. The two redistributive
policies-public welfare and ADC
190
payTnents--exhibit no noticeably stronger relationships toward
the ipc variables. None of the independent variables is cap-
able of accounting for much of the variation in public welfare.
Median family income shows a few moderately high negative beta
weights and industrialization three moderately high positives,
but no consistent relationships were manifested. The R^'s for
all seven independent variables taken together for this policy
were quite low. The SE3 variables do considerably better on
ADC, but such is not the case for either political variable.
Median family income here is once again the strongest variable.
Urbanization shows some fairly strong positive beta weights
for the earlier years, as does population density in the later
years. Once again, iihe ipc variables are not highly associated
with this (theoretically) very important policy.
The failure of the political variables on these latter two
policies calls into question the Key theory. It could be that
this theory, formulated by Key in the Forties and early Fifties
to organize his discussion of state party politics in the South,
does not apply to the contemporary politics of the American
states
generally. At any rate, none of the data presented in
this study
24
can be taken as support for the Key theory.
The third hypothesis must be rejected on the basis of the
^'^Several scholars have claimed that the type
of output
measure employed in large part determines how
useful an explana-
tory tool ipc (and other political variables)
will be. That is.
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relationships found. The converse of the hypothesis, however,
also cannot be accepted. In the majority of the cases where
one measure did better than the other, it was the standard ipc
variable. The differences, though, were by no means consider-
able. VJhile the new measure did not prove unmistakably superior
to the standard measure, neither did the standard measure to
the new one. The high intercorrelation between the two
should
once again be emphasized. Perhaps the only statement
which
can be made with much confidence in this regard is
that the
two are similar statistical constructs.
Two final points concerning the viability of
the two
measures should be noted. The simple r's
between the measures
were .90 and above for the earlier years
spanned by this study.
The two lowest correlation coefficients
were for the last two
points in time-. 66 in 1966, and .62 in 1968.
It seems that
one of the variables was changing in
some way. In all proba-
bility it was the new measure. The
point was made previously
that the election statistics showed
individual races becoming
more competitive in later years
but not quite enough in most
cases to change the party outcomes,
apparently because the
ipc
cisions are considered. inx.. i 4^ the Fiftv States ;
Wayne . Francis in ifg^.ig^^^iTl^^nrcSSp^
A Comparative Analysis {_^ai.<^^h^
-
1967).
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minority parties had not yet had enough "time to
overcoTT^e rather
large disadvantages. It ip.ust be emphasized that
this situation
v;as detectable onl^ with the new measure.
Such apparent trends
are of enormous interest to students of
state politics, and
this situation would seem to commend the
new ipc measure.
The last point is the most fundamental
and perhaps least
defensible. It was argued in the previous
chapter that the
older measures of ipc are implicated
in a model of political
parties which does not apply to the
realities of American state
politics, and that the new measure
represents an attempt to
overcome this theoretical problem.
Without belaboring it, it
is worth reiterating that
point here.
..e fourth hypothesis can be
neither accepted nor rejected
The data presented in this
study and/or perhaps this mode
of
analysis generally were not
conducive to providing an important
test for the Lowi typology.
The next and final chapter
is an essa,- on the
c.pa.ative
study oi: state public policy
.hich Indicates pctentiallv
fruit
directions for future research.
CHAPTER V
THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF STATE PUBLIC
POLICY:
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Introduction
The research reported In the preceding
chapter Is in the
tradition o£ the "conventional" approach
to the comparative study
o£ state public policy. It is
£air to say that the present study
and those analyzed in Chapter Two
are significant steps toward
answering the perennial question o£
politics: "«.at maUes things
happenV vmile this £ra„ework for
analysis will most llhely con-
tinue to contribute fruitful
explanations to the phenomenon o£
public choice issues, it is perhaps
ti™e to undertake a considera-
Uion o£ alternative paths
which .ight be of assistance in
unravel-
ling the complexities of
state policy Eolation. Accordingly,
it
,3 the purpose of this final
chapter to reconsider the
relevant
literature in an atte.pt to
focus upon the Und o£ research which
.... be undertaken if we are
to achieve a clearer and
fuller ex-
planation of public policy at
the state level.
V.ile_there are
innumerable aspects of state
politics and policy which
.erlt
^
..h attention is focused here
on Ideas which bear
further researc ,
directly on the state policy
output studies.
Th^Envoron^^
pe. .ould deny t.at the
social arrangements extant
in a
•
, Mo influence over the personal
and poUtxcal
society have considerable
t c
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relationships in that society. Several problems are encountered
in examining this relationship, not the least of which are those
of conceptualization and measurement. These issues are particu-
larly intractable for students of comparative state policy who "
traditionally have attempted to capture this highly theoretical
'
concept in a series of objective socioeconomic indicators.
It is the objective of this latter approach to select those
variables which tap the significant aspects of the social structure,
Sufficient care has not always been exercised, however, in speci-
fying the precise content and boundaries of the theoretical con-
struct to which the socioeconomic variables are addressed.
Further, such terms as "social structure," "environment," "economic
development," "social characteristics," etc. are often bandied
about rather carelessly, but these terms are not necessarily syn-
onomous with one another. Theoretical explanation cannot be
very precise unless the terms of its discourse are unambiguous.
The point is that we must strive to pin down precisely which
concept we are attempting to measure, how the variables selected
address themselves to that dimension, and what is the nature of
the theoretical linkage which gives these efforts legitimacy in
the first place. These conceptual issues are particularly im-
portant since a large body of literature attributes considerable
explanatory importance to the environment--policy linkage.
In Chapter Two, studies by, for example, Young and Moreno,
Ilofferbert and Sharkansky, Elliott, Hofferbert, and Dye were dis-
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cussed. Taken as a whole, these represent an attempt to devise
new ideas and procedures for the identification and measurement
of the social setting. These multi-dimensional approaches should
be pursued. One rather provocative development in this regard
concerns the attention now being devoted to the notion of "the
quality of life" in the states and cities.^- \-n\ilG the feasibility
of such undertakings is open to question, it is an exarr.ple of the
kind of innovating thinking required in this regard.
The Political Process
It is perhaps the institutions of state government and other
aspects of the political process where the most effort should
be expended in the future. It is ratVier ironic that in the state
output studies, political scientists have not gone very far toward
conceptualizing that component of the model which is their "natural"
domain. This fact can be attributed to the difficulties inherent
in quantifying political activity so that it can be utilized within
the framework of contemporary state policy analysis. It seems that
reliance upon inter-party competition data is a natural" outgrowth
of the inability to conceptualize and measure institutional behavior.
Perhaps it is time to undertake research which might shed some
•"See for example, Quality of Life in the States (Kansas City,
Kansas: Midwest Research Institute, 1972). The notion of the
"quality of life" in urban settings is presently being investigated
at the Center for International Studies, Emory University, Atlanta,
Georgia, with the support of a Ford Foundation Grant.
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light on the influence of political activity on state policy.
No claim to overcoming these problems is made here, but
perhaps
a few suggestions as to possibly fruitful future research
con-
siderations are in order.
The State Legislatures . There are several directions
which re-
search might take toward identifying the influence of
state legis-
lative bodies over policy choices. At a very basic
level, the
"professionalism" of state legislators would seem to
exert some
influence over policy. ^ This variable might
include factors such
as, inter alia, professional backgrounds,
staff assistance, com-
pensation, and length of legislative sessions.
States which are
able to attract and maintain better
potential candidates (pro-
fessional backgrounds, and com.pensation) ,
devote more time to
policy consideration (longer sessions),
and aid their officials
in their deliberations (staff
assistance), .ill probably be better
equipped to produce more and better
policy than their less favor-
ably situated counterparts. The
differences between the U. S.
congress and state legislatures
on these factors are suggestive.
The fact that public policy-making
at all levels of government .
is concerned increasingly with
technical and scientific considera-
"
2 A r^^^rln Clark have done some work
in describ-
^John Grurun and Calvm n . 31^5^.. of various
ing some different elements
or
^'^^J^/^^f ^^islators in the Fiftx
state legislators. See
»isatx —
^
States (Kansas City, Mrssourr:
Citizens
Legislatures, 1966).
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tions^ adds further weirht to ^T •
^^^Port.nce of professionalise.
These ideas should be pur.,,.^ •P-sued
.n subsequent research with an
eye toward determining the nature of their infl^•^^i^ luence on state
policy choices.^
Another potentially fruitful direction for further research
"
^3 -role studies... indeed a defensible hypothesis that
legislators' perceptions of things such as the proper role of
interest groups in the polit-ir-.ilit cal process, the functions and
PO«e.
^^^^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^^^^^^
-tM„ :e,.sUUve
....es.
^^^^^^^^
"legitimate" political issues o-n i • n, will influence to some extent the
play beLween scienca/cochnoliJv
^^rf
concerned with the Inter-
has arisen in the last 'everafve^f
governmentnl decision-making
the theory and practice of pul lL r-''-"""'""'^ " °"Don K. Price. The Scie^t^-i Est'te fNc'v","""- '''' ""^ ^--Pl = >1970); Daniel sTcT^S^A^^r'^T^ ; ' '"""""'^
New
.taerican Librai^, 1967S'
-l^r^^rS—,-— <«™
£i2nS2 Era (Santa iL-b! a cLt«orn*!''cc
' t^^^^F^ ^Denocratic Institutions 197o5 """"^ ""^
pubuc^"oiifrs.i;,:a"sr:nf„:f?e"h::ti'"rr"°^^=^' ^--^
isrn/Local Reliance" fac'tor «s strnn'f ^ "Professlenal-
dustriali^ation" factor Ih; profe,MonaV°"f''
variables such a.; c„™„ Z
i oiessionalism factor Included
troduced and legi v
"
^rv"-"
legislators, number of bills i„-
.ation factor includeo alue^dd^dT° I-'^'^^triali-
Ployed in nanufac urin. ! /ac "°"f
f'^'^^' f^^^^S^ -
See Ira Sharkansky a„d°Rich r t rbert ™ ll^""''State Polities, Economics, and Public Polled" f.SSience Revlev, 63 (Septenber V^g] rl)\ ^ I JS^xc^ 7<^litj^furthc^ e">51I7ations of th ="8Ecsts that
variable aL Us poLib' 4"ts" ""k^" °' P™f--onalism
ly f^itful future r^e^rcrconcL::;^ ""'"'^^ ''"'=""^1-
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activities and orientations in those bodies. ^ The effects of
these role perceptions on subsequent public policy is an espe-
cially ripe area for eir.pirical inquiry.^
Research on legislative professionalism and role perceptions
toward various political objects will be of but marginal value
unless it is integrated properly with behavioral analyses of
state legislative activity. The value of the behavioral focus
is attested to by the plethora of such research conducted on our
national legislature.^ The thrust of this literature reveals
several subtle but important patterns of activity going on with-
in the legislature. Until similar efforts are made at the state
level, many of the crucial dimensions of state legislative activ-
ity v;ill escape students of state public policy.
^For examples of these studies see John Wahlke, ct al
,
"Amer-
ican State Legislators' T.ole Orientations Toward Pressure Groups,'
Journa 1 of Politi cs 22 (2^ay, 1950); Wayne L. Francis, "Influence
and Interaction in a" State Legislative Body," American Political
Science Review 56 (December, 1962)
.
oHeinz Eulau and his associates are presently conducting
this type of research in the San Francisco Bay Area. Their gen-
eral research focus was reported in Heinz Eulau and Rob'ert Eye-
stcne, "Policy I'aps of City Councils and Policy Outcomes: A Deve
lopmontal Analysis," American Political Science Reviev; 62 (i:arch,
1968). One of the m.ajor analyses emanating from this research is
that of Robert Eyes tone, The Threads of Public Policy ; A Study
in Policy Leadership (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company,
Inc., 1971).
''This body of literature is too voluminous to report on
fully. One of the better recent examples is Richard F. Fenno's
Congressmen in Corrmitteos (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1973).
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" patten, of XoslsU-
-ve ncuvi.,, con3l.,.aM.e
„„.k is needoa i„
legislative conmittees Thr. u ,«^es. = r.ch body of literature on uotional
lesl.lative co™,i.tees has not been answered by students of -
state politics. Ira Shar.ansky has conducted so.o rather Interest:
ing research which sup^ests nnq<.-;hiogoGo possible avenues for future endeavors
in this regard.^
The inter-play between the legislature and the governor's
Office suggests another influence on state policy, no observer
of politics can deny that the conflict and discourse between
these two branches exerts an important effect over the eventual
shape of policy. Sharkansky has again pioneered in this area.9
The problems of measurement and data availability are formidable
ones here but, once again, these problems should not deflect re-
search from its overriding goal of providing comprehensive ex-
planations of public choice issues.
Considerable effort has been devoted to measuring the extent
of malapportioment in the states and its policy consequences
.
10.
See Ira Sharkansky, "Four Agencies and an Appropriations
JournT -'T'"''"^ ''"'^ ^^^Set Strategies," Midwestjii^ of Poj^t_ical Science 9 (August, 1965), and Sharkanlk^^^An Appropriations Subcommittee and Its Client Agencies," Amekcan
i°LiiJ^J£ili Sc a^P^^^ (September, 1965).
. 1 V f^^?''
Sharkansky, "Agency Requests, Gubernatorial Support,and Budget Success in State Legislatures," American Political|£icnc^ Re^ 62 (December, 1968), and Shad^^^and Augustus
M
budget-Making in Georgia and Wisconsin: A Test of
a Model Midwest Journal of Political Science 13 (November, 1969).See the works cited and discussed in Chapter Two.
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This latter issue has been dealt with by correlating the extent
of Tnalapportion:nent with a series of expenditure policies. Malap-
portionnent as a key explanatory variable typically is discounted
in these studies. The hypothesis undergirding this approach is -
that it is the cities with their intense social problems wh^ are
most in need of governinental services. Malapportioned states
will manifest a bias against the cities as evidenced in the de-
pressive effect malapportionment will exert on the production
of services. But perhaps this is not the optimum method for
measuring either the extent of urban-rural cleavage or the conse-
quences of that cleavage. The utilization of roll call analysis
as an alternative method for studying this and other behavioral
aspects of state politics is a potentially fruitful strategy.-^
'-'-Derge has done just this in his examination of 19,041 roll
call votes in the Illinois and Missouri legislatures (1959-57).
He found that: a) non-metropolitan legislators seldom voted to-
gether with high cohesion against metropolitan legislators; b)
metropolitan legislators usually did not vote together with high
cohesion; and c) metropolitan legislators were usually on the
prevailing side when they did vote together with high cohesion.
The major conclusion which emerged from his analysis~was that
party division was far more significant than the urban-rural fac-
tional cleavage in identifying voting patterns in these two states
In fact, while there was a limited amount of urban-rural conflict,
there v;cre more cases of intra-metropolitan party competition,
central city--suburban conflict, and factionalism within the met-
ropolital majority party. See David R. Dergo, "Metropolitan and
Outstate Alignments in Illinois and Missouri Legislative Dele-
gations," Am.erican Political Sci ence Review 52 (December, 1958).
It should be noted, ho'.;ever, that the data base in this study was
all roll call votes taken in those two legislatures for the rele-
vant time period. My hypothesis is that different patterns might
have emerged had he considered only those issues which bore on
the urban-rural cleavage.
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^•or example i r „„„ . ,»"-^'-> one wishes tr, ri^.-
"vc, of each
P«tor„., of
,:cprc=onta-
' °" i--^="=s vAlch boar „„ ,,
—P.o...o._. — t ™oa.„3 .
..ubsoquenc poUcy decision, u • , ,also aUo„ for dl„e„«a«o„ het„eo„ p.,..-
,
^
" '° ''"^ "rtan-rural cleavage
r •
-"^C-lcs Of oxpe„,Uures
„hlch to
areas e,
^""^~
vc.g. ducation).
Research conducLcd by Ouncnn M. v •y JJunca MacRae illin<-rnf-r..i
How roll c.ll . 1 .
-LJ-u.Lrated generally
^ ii a analysis mU-ht rn,,^ i
leg.nlat.ve perfo^ance
„hlch have a h.arin. o ,
Exa^r,!,,!-- ... . . .
n
.subsequent policy.
-o -n.
.e.a.io„,s,np boewocn roll call vof^ .,
,
clcs ,-n fj, , <:on,.;tU„en-i i Lhc lower house of M,
"---.>.
= o.ts legislature he found
ropresentatlv,.,,
„ho c,»e fro. districts
„,ost tv • ,
P-tlos tended to exhibit the , ,""^ P.-,rty loyalty on rol, caU
- —~ Of their partiestended to croq- n-,,-*- i- ^l g
"
i s. party Imcs more often oiir.c . He also found that those
;
""^^^
— their votes
.ore closely
With Wider
.ar^ins. which was consistent with the
'-o«,esis that legislators with anxieties about reelection tend
to be
.ore sensitive to the wishes of the eons ti tuencies
.
^^"Iho aolation between Roll Call Votes and Constituencies in
202
Two other areas of legislative activity shov; promise of
contributing to our understanding of state policy formation; both
are suggested by Wayne L. Francis. The first of these concerns
the differential treatment received by various issues in the
legislative arena. Francis found, for example, that different
issue areas exhibited different types of legislative conflict,
and these various conflict situations led to different degrees of
actual and perceived success. Inter-play conflict was manifested
in the areas of elections, administration, taxes, finances and
social welfare. Intra-party competition occurred in areas like
liquor licensing, Constitutional revision, civil rights and ap-
portioni^.ent. There were also differences in regional conflict
and pressure group conflict. In addition, Francis found that
legislators developed perceptions of what the important issues
were, and that they expected that some sort of legislation had
to be developed to settle these issues, at least tentatively. The
point here is that Francis' findings suggest that the policy
model must be refined in vjays which allow for consideration of
some of the more subtle aspects of the policy systerr.. The above
findings also imply that different substantive issue areas exhibit
different policy-making sub-structures which can only be described
the Massachusetts House of Representatives," American Political
Science Rev lev; 46 (December, 1952)
.
r?l,egl slative Issues in the Fifty States : A Comparative
Analys is (Chicago: Rand KcNally & Company, 1967).
203
by e.plo,i„,„
^„ ^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^^
A-.h=.
^„
^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^
no.io„ coaU..o„-B„uai„,
,,,,,
^^^^^
,
"cont.or. a.„ngc.„e„.s in state legislatures: those In'
vhich cont.01 of the poUc,..a.i., machine., Is au.ae.. those 1„
which one party is al.ost totally dominant, and those in „hich
there is party competition aUhough the legislature is controlled
by one party. „e found policy success (which Francis defined
as getting laws passed) to he highest in the third group, lowest
under the condition of divided party control, but also ,uite low
in the one-partv '^fai-pQ 1^ c ^,P t:> .t les. Since these different control arrange-
vaent. affect evenuuai policy outcon.es, they
.us t be incorporated
in son^e way into policy n^odels if we are to obtain clearer ex-
planations of state policy choices.
^h-_I^^S}^. The literature on the executive branch of the
state govern:.ents is not oriented toward a
-policy focus." This
'
is particularly unfortunate since executive establishments typical-
ly exert the predoi^inant influence on substantive public policy.
Schlesinger, Beyle and others have concentrated on the governors'
For his discussion of coalition-building, Francis relied
mTu7 ir^M '-'^^/^t^iled analysis of coalitions provided byWiUaam H. Riker in The Thoori. of Political Coalitions (New HavenYale University Press, 1962). ^lavc ,
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£o™.l po„or=a3
^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^
has given a .ore dotallod account of tho. office of the governor,
but in addition to being out-dated his analysis is not readily
generali.able to non-southern states. Moreover, neither approach-
explicitly relates its descriptions to the effects of the gover-
'
nors' offices on the nature of substantive public policy. HcCallyl?
and SharkanskylS
-whose works have been discussed previously-
have taken steps in that direction, but even this work „,ust be
characterizGd as preliminary.
Two areas of executive activity are particularly ripe for
research endeavors-the influence of executive staff, and the state
bureaucracies. These areas show promise due to the paucity of
research on then: and because of Lheir obvious iraportance to state
policy. The importance of the president's staff is now coi^on
knowledge. 19 The increased demands being made on the president
These works were discussed in Chapter Two.
l^coleman B. Ransone, Jr., The Office of Governor in the
IJ^iited States (University: University of Alabama Pres~s~1956)
See also Ransone, "Political Leadership in the Governors' Office "
Journal of Politics 26 (February, 1964).
'
l/'Sarah P. HcCally, "The Governor and His Legislative Party,"
^G^^can Political Science Review 60 (December, 1966). See the
discussion of this study which is contained in Chapter Two.
'^Sce footnote 6.
l^Perhaps the best contemporary discussion of the consequences
of the increased role of the presidential advisory system can be
found in George Reedy, The Twilight of the Presidency (New York:
World Publishing Company, 1970). See also the symposium on the*
"Ajr.crican Presidency," Public Administration Review 29 (September/
October, 1969).
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have given rise to .he concomitant growth and importance of his
advisors. It is reasonable to expect a similar phenomenon at
t:he state level. A side effect of the rise of the administra-
tive state has been an increased policy-making role for the
bureaucracy, v/hile considerable effort has been devoted t^ the
"
federal bureaucracy , 20 the study of the state executive has lag-
ged behind. 21 ,rhile there are no doubt similar forces at work
on both levels, much could be gained by focusing directly on the
bureaucracies of the states. A thorough consideration of both
of these areas is necessary if v;e are to achieve more compre-
hensive explanations of state policy.
Political Parties. The conceptualization and measurement of
party competition was the subject of the third chapter; one other
point deser^rGs mention here. This concerns the notion of party
organization as an important political variable. There are at
least tv;o specif ic -dimensions to this variable-- the party in
20The literature on the federal bureaucracy abounds. A re-
cent overview can be found in Lewis C. Mainzer, Political Bureau -
'^^acy (Glenview, Illinois: Scott Foresman and Company, 1973) . ^A
collection of readings which illustrates nicely many of the
"debates" surrounding the study of public administration v;as
edited by Alan A. Altshuler, The Politics of the Federal Bureau -
cracy (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1968).
2ione fairly good overview of the importance of state bureau-
cracies is provided by Ira Sharkansky in "State Administrators
in the Political Process," in Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines,
eds., Po litics i_n the American States
,
second edition (Boston:
Little, Brown and Com.pany, 1971). Deil Wright, based upon a
survey of state administrators, has reported research v;hich should
provide a stimulus for further work in this area. Wright found,
i nter alia: the legislature, rather than the governor, was viewed
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,
" ^"^y "sanitation might load ^
^-cntlal govot„.o„t pc.fo^anco ,
^
t to d.r-
leSiUnt.ve
arraneements
, party cohosion
P^nciplos, and dlfforont h
"'"^
-entual p.od.ot.
Samel Elder.vold's study of p„tv
EPSLed tno importance of partu „v •P^Ly organization-as it relates to Hcit..en.-y-as a politieal variable A
• """"S his note slsnirioant
.....lags were: contact
,,ith party
.orders i
and intero-t
, ,
—
— and decisional in-
volvement (of party worker-1
. ,
,
. 23 and satisfac-
-^-=c findings i.„ply ,,,,
^^^^^^^^^^^^
.
l^sv^r^t^t-L-rth-r:.:-^ i::tit;t"n:fr^""-"^' -progran, goals in the oface 'f the ""^ ="PP°"insulation of portions of state 1 governor; the structural
missions l,ad produced der oL "tblTLT".""'" ^"""^ ^"^ -m-state administrators. See liis "JL f attitudes a^ng
-^;--auo„,.. ^d^^ pSir^^iS^rciihir
^t^^^'^^:^^i:^^^'^:;4^^y;'l^^'^ Role Of Political(September, 1956). ' ^^^^^^ ZalLtical (^u^^
A-lz27c.:Lio:",l":=^^^,f?i^ A Behavioralu Kcma r.cNaliy and Company, 1964)7 ~
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.Ho
.l^s
^
tHa. co„£Uc..-^
,Ho
.„pac. o, pa«, o.,ani.aUon on vo.o.
turnou. and l„.o.os.. Ho.,o.e.. pa.Uculaay s„,,o3.1v3. To.
any faoeo. capaHlo of alexin,
.Ho a..on.io„ or cHo pooplo
.o
the ac.lvuy of .Ho
.ovo^on. a„a
.Ho.eHy a^oo.ins tHe ao.an.
struc.u.o conr.on.ing
.Ho govo^on. and
.He o.poc.a.lons of
.He
ciUzens
.owa.d
.Hoi. govo^on. „.3. oo„alnly Ho ooun.od as a
Significant political variable Tho lini. k ^iriG nk between the people
and .hoi. gove^on. is .Ho very cr.. „f do.ocraoy. and „Ha.evo.
influoncos
.ha. UnKago is wor.h exploring. Hofie.ber. Has
Stated: "There is strong evidence ^bo^ , ,h tivxuen that
... mass behavior may
effect elite behavior and policy directly. .25 (e.phasis added)
The possible importance of party organization as a tool which
'
night aid us in deriving more comprehensive explanations of policy
^:n efforts ?o o .V
'''' ^^trategic premises involved
conLined in r r ; , °u
P^i^^^i^^"" Political conflict is
O-L Yor ^ 1,^ ^ Senu-Sovereign PeoHle
Chaptfrs^ and 3.' 1960)7^^^7^117^
25_^i^- Ilofferbert, "Elite Influence in State PoUcyrormation," Polity ? (S-crincr \qin\. t^i t x., • ^ .ic
I
—iii-l .^^prmg, iJ/0): 3J1. In this context,
nofferbert went on to say: "Mass political behavior may affecte.ite decisions or governmental institutions independently fromsocioeconomic deten-.ination. " Ibid., pp. 328-29.
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^^^^
^^^^^^^^^^
-^ionax p„H«..,
^^^^
of "3Utc behavior" Is a prl.o exa.pl..
Il3£_Igortance_of "Elites"
. PerhaDs fl,„ i >r map the least explored of all
*e factors
,.,hieh e.ert inn.enoe on state poUc, fo^ation'is
"
that Of elite behavior. Analyses of this „otio„ have been con-
Hned largely to the ™ode of case studies. Por the „,ost part.
methodological probleris have inhihi>nH •b ted the incorporation of
elite studies into the larger bod, of comparative policy analyses.
>«>ile these problems are fo.,idable indeed, comprehensive policy
explanations cannot be obtained without taking this factor into
account, for at the simplest IpvpI. i •-.'pj-est le el: Human beings have to act
for there to ^ 'r^^n^,, ii,27
The "Dye method" of policy analysis is a fruitful path.
^•'Soaa of the problems which are encountered in ntil,v<„„
c"irrThlair^Dvf"„T^^^"T '-"^^ °-P"- arfs^^i^cd^-Liy in inom s R. ye, Understanding Public Polirv c,r^rr.r.r^
pp. 308-10 Perhaps the classic discussion of the ^ole and
ll^vTrlt 'T%:ir"a '"-^ """""^^ icc^^ained
Alfred 'a ,Lpf"lfr^9|?f~^ ^^^^^^ 2H!2C£SCZ (New York.
„„„ ^-
'^""Pi> inc., iJbl). For some empirical evidence whichquestions the viability of this linkage see. inter alia Warren
P«ss "'L:: """p'?-': 'f*^^^'
"Ccnstituen^y^u^'in con-
cha -As
Ealili£al Science Revi^ 57 (March, 1963). andC ilo K Cnudde and Donald J. McCrone, "The Linkape between
?:riMc:rS'if"'f" -^congressional Voting Behf:ic""Xricani-2ii:^^££l ^.^^ncci Review 60 (March, 1966) '
27ibid.
, p. 317:
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This approach, however, has not been able to account for even
onc-haif the variation in state expenditure patterns. Hofferbcrt
introduced an ir.teresting perspective on the function of these
social deterministic studies:
In one sense, the aggregate studies of policy
deterr.ination nay be viewed as efforts to account
for the "context of decision" within v;hich poli-
cies are fomulated.
The benefit of studying external resources and
constraints, then, is to provide a specification
of the ranges and conditions within which parti-
cular and successive groups of decisionnakers
operate. Social and political factors linit the
magnitude and form of the outputs that any parti-
cular policymalcers can devise and produce. -'^
There is. then, a considerable "residual" of unexplained variance
29
to v;hic:: the iniluence of elite behavior may apply.
^?vichard I. Eofferbert, "State and Community Policy Studies:
A Revie-.; of Comparative Input--Gutput Analyses," ih'jam.es A.
Robinson, ed., Political Science Annual , III (Indianapolis:
Eobbs-.lerrill Ccmpany, Inc., 1972), pp. 59 and 61. Hofferbert
also included as a "constraint" those patterns of action sun-
m.arized by the term. "" incrementalism. " The import of this notion
as it relates to state spending patterns was discussed in the
context of SharV.ansky ' s research in this regard; see Chapter Two,
-^'This position is reiterated by Heinz Eulau and Robert
Eyestcne, oo. :it . They stated: "The systematic study of public
policv cannot content '.;ith correlating indicators of environ-
mental challenges or indicators of resource capability to policy
outccm.es. Rather it was our presumption that policy development
is greatly influenced by the predilections, preferences, orienta-
tions and expectations of policy-maicers--in short, by the politi-
cal process itself." p. 143.
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In addition, the study of eli,-
policy phenomena-
The study of elites ic, n
-der to expand th^ a"ou,r:?''^'^ in ~
'
policy outputs for whTch we P^^li-^l^o in order to specify th T f^^°"^t, but
^ount for the variance ^ . ^'"'^^^es ^^^ich ac-
^-tors. Thus th th' c'h'f --°econo.icof comparative state pol/^l ^^^^^^^tone hand, we
.vast accoun J \'
^wo-fold. On the
relationships between
.o.- ^7^' °f the
-hich have Uen dLcov d\'v':^\'°^\^^^ PoUcyor Dawson and Robinson scholars as Dye
to account for the varianf T^' ^^"'^ attei.pt
Plained by that particui" .1"'/' ''''
cannot at this tLe offe' " °' '"^"^^y- ^defend the assertion but T ^^^f findings toboth of these tasks wii^ , T""^"^ P^°P°^^ thatc-t extent onc:t
^ 'a L'to''''^ ^ ^^2"^-^^-comparative studies of elit' ^y^ter.aticstates. 30 es within and between
Hoffcrbert went nn i-r. co Lo suggest how these two r.r. i
^^dto.ieldamore
comprehensive style of policy
analysis; ^
It is my argument that there aretechnical guidelines in both the f ^^^^^^^^^^^ ^"^ndstudies and in the loci eft grcgate-state
legitimately and fruit uUv 1' '""f ^'^'^^^^
study of policy processes inT comparativeis a necessity for question there
the role of elites in no ^^'^^^Pt-ali^ation of
^'et at the same time thrr"''"' ''''' ^^^^^^ studies
-lovance of socL^^^l^^.^^^-^-^^f J
f
laccors to policy patterns
30Hofforbert "Pl-f'-/^ t n
££• £it., p. 322.
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suggests equally strongly that a full explica-tion of environmental constraints and resourcesIS essential to aid illumination of the behaviorof policy
..aking elites. Interactional analysis(a la the co:y.nuaity studies) is insufficient with-out a specification of the external boundaries
«hich define, to a greater or lesser extent, the
range of possible behaviors by those doin- theinteracting. These boundaries are specifLble in
'
part by means of comparative aggregate analysis.
Elite activity, then, is the catalytic agent in the political
system. Elites are the forces which transport political demands
through the various stages of the policy process. This movement,
however, is particularly important at certain key points in the
process. It is at these points where elite activity provides the
stim.ulus for the movement of issue-demands from one cell in the
systems m.odel to the next. In systems' language, these inter-
cell movements are termed "conversion processes."
Conversion Processes
"Conversion processes" relate to the manner by which factors
such as median income and urbanization are translated into tang-
ible policy outputs. The iraportance of elite behavior to this
_
-r
exchange was discussed above. This section concerns itself with
the theoretical precision of the systems model as applied to state
policy outputs, and especially with the nature of the Dye linkage
for explaining policy.
Addressing themselves to this latter question, Jacob and
^^Ibid.
, pp. 317-18.
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Lipsky indicar.Gcl the "intuitive" problem with the Dye linkage:
The first problem with this operationalizcd model
is that income, urbanization, industrialization
and education are not in themselves inputs. The
measures have little substantive relationship to
the phenomena they are supposed to represent. We
might conceive of them as environmental factors
which may lead to the articulation of demands and'
support and their communication to political
authorities. Demands are verbalizations or be-
havioral articulations of satisfaction or dissatis-
faction with the status quo. The relationship be-
tween demand-behavior and environment may in some
circumstances be high but it is certainly neither
1:1 nor constant.
Dye also leaves unexplored the nature of the link-
ages he asserts exist between economic develop-
ment and programmatic outputs. We conclude from
reading his analysis that by some magic a high
level of economic development becomes transformed
into high levels of e>qDenditure. The processes by
which this transformation takes place remain in
the shadows although it has been the traditional
cask c;f political scicntist.o to illum.inate them."*
Policy explanations, then, require more than the m.ere demon-
stration of high levels of statistical association. In fact,
revelation of high correlation is the beginning rather than the
end of the analysis. UTiy is, for example, median family income
associated with per capita expenditures for education? Dow does
objective socioeconom.ic condition reflect itself in policy de-
cisions, that is, v;hat is the nature of the linkage?
Dyson and St. Angelo have conducted research which brings a
new perspective to bear on this issue. Their analysis merits con
^^Ilerbert Jacob and Michael Lipsky, "Outputs, Structure,
and Power: An Assessment of Changes in the Study of State and
Local Politics," Journal of Politics 30 (May, 1968): 514 and 516.
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siderable attention.
It is our position thif- »-t
;-ially holds that spewing" "1"'."""^'^^' ^^^^"^"^—
a state's socioecono,.?? Zl^llnlT ^-temUnedthen changes in this onviJoL^Int
.T"i Z"^" ''^'^sy.stematic spending chanJes ^ accompanied by
-hxp, a change in the an?ec;del ^""^/"^^-^ent relation'that which it detcr^iines In
,
/ " "^^^^So. in
distinguishable from a c^-variaMo' ^^l^tionship istwo variables merely co-va^ ^ ' relationship, if
changes in one will noJ bHv ^ ' '"'^^ '"S^^^^' ^^^^^
changes in the other The T ^"^'^'^^-^^y followed by
curring onlv if the ^.rlabler"'"' T'^ j^^^-^^Vgether a^^hrassocIatJon. directly linked to-
ables were not di;^^^^ nJd 7 ^^'T^' " ^-i"
a lag between the changes in ''f ''''''' be
other. If the associaSon 1 ''f ''^'"Sos in thein one variable wouW be ' ^^^"Ses
other variable. accompanied by changes in the
hetwLn'rr:;;,:::::;,^-/:/ considerable difference
an argument aSout a co-v r^^nr
relationship and
facet of the difference i^^^ relationship. But one
tcntion to cu„cc.ns hI too little at-
cletenninate reuiion.i • ^"T ^^^P^^^ation. In a
^^^^ -
-il.
Uslns "difference scores" to specify the U^d of relationship
between c„viro™,ent and policy, they correlated the tOo' sets of
'
variables at difterent points in tine The,',- f,- ^L m . Ihon findings were indeed
persuasive.
Although per capita personal income maintained a con.,.
a't o^f"'rf^'f T^^^^ therfa^e^ n rc x ns of a lack or stability in the associations. The
Problen ?n . .
^°^2las St. Angelo, "A Methodologicalm m the Socio-Economic Interpretation of State Snendinr"
l^^llSl ^1=}^:^ Jcmrj^ 2 (V/inter, 1974)- 131-32 ^^P^ ing,
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chnnge in the degree of association indicates in-
stability in the co-varying relationships. \^icn
variables co-vary differently at different points
in time their connection is either spurious or con-
trolled by an exogenous lag factor. In correlating
change there was a definite dearth of correlation^
above .40. Thus, changes in the environment are in-
frequently related to changes in outputs. The unvela-
tedness of environmental changes and output changes
indicates that the static but persistent relationship
of industrialisation and per capita personal income
with the dependent variables is not reflecting a
causal or functional relationship. Simply put,
correl-
lations like the ones discussed above merely
indicate
that a state's position on one dimension is
occasional-
ly too frequently congruent with that
state s position
on the other dJjr.ension as long as the amount
of change
in the variable sets is ignored.
In the context of the present
discussion of conversion processes
they concluded, interestingly •
The data presented here suggest that
there B,ay be no
real b-.3i= asserting that taxing
and spending
^
policies a« a function of a state's ^'""""f
Lviron^^ent. A change in the environment
of ies.
privileged states may not lead to
=™P«hensxole
changes in relative levels o spending, f^ ^H^^
did the enviroKCnt dcEinitely account
Coi 10 P^-^^^"^
: the variance in spending.
Hard evidence suppo ing
*j™irre"v:'r;"irarrrerisi:ra:i:g^:orrr;ion
fn ^;ultur:i Jueu inflience the
translation o£ environ-
mental changes into policies in
signiiicant_ ways.
There is another, more subtle,
yet similarly under-developed
aspect ol conversion processes
,,hich relates to the comparative
study of state policy. The
above discussion addressed
itself
to how objective onvirot..ental
conditions are trans£on.cd into
3^Xbj,d.
,
pp. 133-34.
^^Ibid.
,
p. 135.
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political demands and how these are transported throughout the
political system until they eventually are reflected in policy
decisions. A different question concerns the mechanisr.s by
which some rather than other political demands are allowed entry
into the political system. It is one thing to devise convincing
explanations as to who exercised superior political power in
given policy decisions. It is quite another task to deterr.ine
which individuals and groups were dominant in setting the policy
agenda. Bachrach and Baratz have argued persuasively that
there is a second face of power which controls the
area of
-nondecisions."^^ Their claim is that while in the search
for
"power" those who exercise eventual decision power
are certainly
powerful, there may be another group which has
equal but dis-
similar power. It is of course an important
power consideration
that a group be successful in achieving
its issue dem.ands in
the political process. But a preliminary
step is to get your
demands placed on the political agenda
in the first place. For
36peter Bachrach and llorton Baratz
"Two Paces o Jo-r,
/..erican Political Science lleview_36 (^^^-f-^/.f, ;,';r,::,ork,
^^^^^'/^^•^iicL^c ;;:v ;p.t:btr seeAmerican Political Science .xCMew 3/ ^ j O'-ford Univ-ili^hT^dT^Barat. Power 6, (^^^
.^,,3
ersity Press, 1970). Any f e1 chattschneider,
subject would surely include r^'lan S-all Town in Kass
op. cit.; Arthur J. Vidich ^^'^^ k^s^ihe
and Society 1 (Winter, 1971).
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you cannot get your way if your demands are not even brought
up. For example in the mid-sixties it was arguable that anti-
civil rights forces in Congress had lost some of their power
as evidenced by the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and the Voting Rights Act of the following year. Someone fo'cus-
ing on the other face of pov;er might argue, however, that the
anti-civil rights forces had not at all lost most of their
power. And he too could point to convincing evidence-- the
fact that these two bills were the only two occasions in the
era v;here civil rights was a "hot" issue in the Congress.
Hofferbcrt made the point succinctly:
The re are elaborate and intricate mechanisms for
filtering issues prior to their being scheduled
for consideration by legitimate policy bodies. And
there may be a "mobilization of bias" in the system
which prevents the articulation of particular types
of issues and the interests they embody. 'Of the
infinitude of issues v;hich could be considered in
any period of time a political system or set of
systems deals with only a tiny portion. Particular
elites--for whatever motivations--may be suppressing
some types of issues. Or those whose interests might
be served by the scheduling of particular new issues
may be sufficiently "duped" or socialized so that
they do not perceive their ovm interests. -The poten-
tial beneficiaries of a policy may not perceive the
relevance of political mechanisms for the fulfillment
of their needs.-"'
Thus if attention is directed exclusively at either face
of power, only partial explanations are possible; comprehensive
-^^Hof ferbert, "Elite Influence in State Policy Formation,"
op
.
ci_t
.
,
pp. 340-41.
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policy explanations require both. At this juncture, a method
for incorporating this other face of power into the comparative
study of state policy is not available. NonethelcGS, vje must
be avjare of the limitations of our approach, and make some am-
bitious efforts toward having our theory once again conform to
actual practice. Perhaps in the preliminary stages of this en-
deavor we might be well-served by "a circumspect return to the
use of case studies."
Policy Indicators
It is perhaps in this area that there is the most latitude
for imaginative endeavors by political scientists. _ Jacob and
Lipsky pointed to some of the problems in traditional conceptu-
alizations of "policy":
Considerable further work needs to be done in con-
ceptualizing the dimensions of policy. Most of
the analyses we have cited use measures of several
dimensions indiscriminately without showing an
awareness that more than one dimension is involved.
Most frequently used are measures of the level of
expenditure, program quality, and program impact.
In addition, we can identify at least one other
dimension: the distribution of benefits among a
population. The distribution of benefits or sanctions
is perhaps the most significant output dimension for
political scientists, since must of the conflict pre-
ceding adoption of a program is not about whether it
should be embarked upon but who will pay and who
will benefit. Even programs that apparently benefit
most of the population— such as education and high-
way construction--havc a variable incidence of
benefits
.
^"Philip B. Coulter, "Comparative Community Politi
Public Policy," Polity 3 (Fall, 1970),
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Measures of distribution unfortunately are rarelv
data cannot deter political scientists fro:r. in-V s..g,,,
,,,,
^^^^ important d Ln-
sar' ?o soii7 "J'"''- ^^"^^ —
abou^ vn • r Scnerato data. otms oehavior, it is necessary to allocateresources to collect data about the distribution
of program benefits. ^9 '
This quote suggests the range of options open to political
scientists for further conceptualisations of public policy.
Most of the policy studies have not gone beyond the employ-
ment of expenditure data as measures of public policy. It must
be recalled, though, that the significant variable in this re-
gard concerns hov; the political system preserves itself by
providing policy v,-hich satisfies its citizens, or at least
placates the.u so they eschew forms of political activity v/hich
might threaten the system. ^'^ What we should concern ourselves
x.'ith, then, are the impacts that programs have on their target
groups. Expenditure data are useful only to the extent that
they can be taken as reliable indicators of impacts—which are
far more difficult to define and measure. If this linkage is
in fact not plausible, the use of expenditure data as output
measures is not tenable. ^'^ That Sharkansky has found little
39Jacob and Lipsky, op. cit
. , pp. 515-16.
^Osce David Easton, A Framework for Political Amlvsis
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Kali, Inc., 1955),
especially Chapter 7.
^^lAlthough, of course, it will always be useful to know
and understand why som;e states spend more than others for
various governmental services.
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correlation between expenditure and service levels throws greater
suspicion on this .ode of analysis,^^ and further emphasises
the need for better policy measures.
Several of the studies discussed in Chapter T.o-particularly-
those by Walker and Cowart-are suggestive in terms of possible
'
policy indicators which go beyond unidimensional expenditure
data. There are many other systemic outputs which cannot pos-
sibly be tapped by the use of expenditure data. The ever-growing
extent of governmental regulation of various aspects of the
society is but one example. Another idea was advanced by Elinor
Ostrom, who has opted for the development of multiple indicators
of the outputs of public agencies:
Policy analysts can fall into the trap of reliance
upon single (policy) indicators. Far too many
articles examining factors affecting the output
of public agencies have utilized as their' sole
measure of output an absolute or relative input
quantity such as total public expenditures or per
capita public expenditures.
Such methodological traps can be mitigated by con-
scious development and reliance on multiple indicators
of policy derived wherever possible from multiple
modes of data col lection. '^^
— r
She added that the analysis of multi-dimensional output measures
should go hand-in-hand with an "extensive analysis of the rela-
"Ira Sharkansky, "Government Expenditures and Public Ser-
vices in the American States," Air.erican Political Sc ience Review
61 (December 1967),
'^^^Elinor Ostrom, "The Need for Multiple Indicators in
Measuring the Output of Public Agencies," Policy Studies Journal
2 (Winter, 1973): 88.
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tionships amonp, indicators . "^'-^^
Perhaps 1. Is useful at chls juncture to rolntroCuee
two studies whieh were dlseussed in eonslderably
.ore detail
m the second chapter.^ m e.a.lnlng several possible rela-
tionships anong polities, economics and public policy. Cnudde
and HcCrone found a si<>pificnnf- T.',^^^v.i^ioniricant patLorn among these variable
groupinss. To be more snorifir c , ,i pcc i c, they found that in some policy
"sub-systems" party competition played an intervening role
between economics and policy, while in others it did not. And
Sharkansky and Hofferberfs factor analytical study also re-
vealed the existence of different policy sub-syst.ms, each
with its own set of key explanatory variables. Reflecting
upon this latter study, Hofferbert has stated that their annly-
sis demonstrated:
1) the multidimensionality of political structure
and policy and
2) the differential structures of determination
for particular policies.
In short, public policy is a multi-dimensional phenomenon,,
— r
for to understand fully the process and content of public
44
^^
Ibid
.
. p. 89.
^Charles F. Cnudde and Donald J. McCrone, "Party Competi-
tion and Welfare Policies in the American States," American
Political_ S cience Review 63 (September 1969); Ira ShTdlli^y
and Richard I. Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State Policy, Economics
and Public Policy" American Political Science Review 63
(September, 1969). ~ ~
"^^"Statc and Coirjnunity Policy Studies," 0£. cit
.
, p. 50.
221
policy the erplo>-ir.ent of not one but several rriodcls is neces-
sary. This in turn invc'tes a discussion of several proposed
policy typologies.
Policy Typologies
At several points in this chapter it has been argued that
policy r.ust he treated as a multi-facetcd phenomenon, or set
of phcnoaena. Hofferb'irt has succinctly stated a central
reason for the construction of policy typologies:
The distribution of relative impact betv;cen sectors
of the model is likely to vary between policies.
We vould also e:-rpect the stability and complexity
of sub-structures to be different for different
policies ."^^^
\-Jhat is clear and yet often ignored is that the
process of detemination di f f ers fron one set of
policies to -Tir.other. l-fnat consLlLutes a "set" of
policies is still vague, but there are patterns of
covariance that distinguish some prograi.'is from
others. ^8
The essential point here is that at any stage where
generalizations about the policy processes are
possible, we should be attuned to the likelihood of
variance in che "fit" of the generalizations from
49
one class of colicy to another.^-'
^^:iof ferb-rt, "Elite Influence in State Policy Formation,"
op . cit
. , p . 221
.
^>^Hof ferbert, "State and Community Policy Studies," o^.
cit., p. 63. In making this point, Hofferbert cited Sharkansky
Ti^'Hofferbert, on. clI.; Hofferbert, "Elite Influence in State
Policy Formation," op. , and; Andrew Cowart, "Anti-Poverty
Expenditures in the ^-.erican States: A Comparative Analysis,"
Midv.es t Journal of_ Political Science 13 (May, 1969) .
^'--Hof f aroert discussed these points in "State and Com-
munity Policy Studies," oo. cit., pp. 62-64. See also the dis-
cussion in Chapter On-j of this work.
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A r.ain function of these typologies is to design empirically
constructed categories of policy derived by means of indicator
covariance according to co,™on structures of determination. ^0
Properly conceived, a policy typology indicates different patterns
of. relationship between policy processes and contents for various
'
policy sub-sets. In this manner, the multi-dimensional features
of policy hopefully v;ill be revealed. Properly conceived, typolo-
gies also can help to organize and refine thinking about policy,
and servo as guides to future research.
Perhaps the most noted of these typologies was proposed by
Lowi. It was discussed in the first chapter and has been utilized
in this research. Several others merit some attention.
Froman proposed a ciassif icatory schema of city policies con-
sisting of two catogories--"areal" and "segmental."-''^ Areal poli-
cies were those "affecting the total population, sir.iultaneously,
CO
and with a single action." Segmental policies were those "affect-
ing only a small proportion of the population, affecting different
people at different times, and involving continuous programs.""^
Drawing upon the research conducted by others on public policies
in cities he found that these studies did "fit" into one or the
^^Hof ferbert, "Elite Influence in State Policy Formation,"
op . cit
.
, p . 339
,
^iLGwis A. Froman, Jr., "An Analysis of Public Policies in
Cities " Journa l o_f Politics 29 (February, 1967).
5^Ibid.
,
p. 108.
^^Idem.
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other of a= catcgoxloo.
«a th3n interpreted the economic
and
social correlates c£ these
policies in ter^s o£ the ho^ogeneity-
heteroBeneity within co^unities.
The following two hypotheses
\ ^o^t-;i11v tested and confirmed:
were designed, and par ialis
u u ^
1 ^^n^n<^ fraana-^er-council, nonpartisan
1. coopera-
:-^r"nu;rrdation a;d educational services)
tenS'to be asfociated vith
homogeneous commu-
nities (lo. social and economic
diversxty)
,
nnlicDes (urban renewal, per
capita
2. Segmental po x x V associated with
expenditures, "^^^^"^^ social and eco-
heterogeneous communxtxes
(hxgn
nomic diversity).
n^^V,nn^h it encounters some
Froman's approach i=
provocatrve. althoug
prohle.s. nrst, while
the typology see.s to
wor. for citres.
,t is .estionahle whether
it co.ld he applicahle
at the national
SC.. not defeating, however,
or even state level.
This crxtxcxsm x.
, onlv city policies
would have considerable
for a useful typology
of y x
..1 that there are too
few cate-
utility. second, it
might be argued
^t- differentiation among
various polxcxes.
gories to permi xtt.ci
^
,
. t-uot Froman has not de
.
• third problem, vxz.,
tnac l
line with this xs the
x a p
.
'
^^^^^^^^^
......
-
^r. public policies has
been offered y
Another taxonomy o.
x p
. .n Lhev too developed
two cate
^ ^55 -r iUe r reman, tn y
Eulau and Eyes tone.
Lxic
5'^Idem.
-it.55^u and Eyestone, on- ex
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gories--in thir, case "adaptive" and "control":
The measure used as an indicator of an adaptive
policy is the percentage of total government ex-
penses spent for health, libraries, parks and re-
creation. These r.-.ajor accounting categories used
to report expenditures presumably include the major
amenities offered by cities. A "high amenities"
city differs from a city with a traditional services
orientation in that it spends less of city income
for fire and police services or public v;orks.
The mieasure used to indicate a city's control policy
is the percentage of all general governm^ent expenses
spent by the planning commission. General govern-
ment expenses include essentially all administrative
expenses and salaries not included under fire,
police or recreation categories, and so on.-^"^
Perhaps the most provocative of the several typologies is that
advanced by Salisbury and Heinz. With Lowi, they argued that
there are three fundamental typos of policy--dis tributive
,
regulatory and redistributive . The three types are distinguish-
able primarily according to "the degree of disaggregation of the
treatment the policy in question provides to those groups it
affects; and that there is sor.e sort of developmental sequence
^^Ibid., p. 127. Their amenities measure relied-lieavily
upon th^^scussion of that notion contained in Oliver P. '.•/illiam
and Charles R. Adrian, Four Cities: A Scud^ in Co^p aratiye
Po^
Making (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, Ub^),
especially pp. 198-225. ^ _ , .
37,^obert U. Salisbury and John P., Heinz, "A Theory of
Policy
Analysis and Some Preliminary Applications," paper
prepared for
delivery at the annual meeting of the American Political
Science
Association, Washington, D.C, September 2-7, 1968 ,
mimeo
Also reprinted in Ira Sharkansky (ed.), Pol ic^
Anaj^ in
ical Science (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company,
lv/0).
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that occurs in a tGchnologically sophisticated system, roughly
from distributive to regulatory policy. "^^ They retain Lowi's
three categories and add a fourth--self-rGgulatory.
Their thesis is that there is a fundamental distinction to
be made between decisions v;hich allocate tangible benefits direct-
ly to persons or groups, and decisions which establish rules or
structures of authority to guide future allocations. An example
borrowed from Salisbury and Heinz should illustrate this dis-
tinction :
One state legislature receives the budgetary requests
from the several state colleges and universities and
makes the decisions about how much money each will
receive, A neighboring state legislature wakes a
de facto delegation of authority to a state board of
higher education to receive and adjust the budget
requests for che stale scliuols and ratifies the
board's recommendations. In the former case the
legislature makes an allocative decision, typically
a highly distributive one in v;hich each institution
gets an incremental increase over its last appropria-
tion. In the latter state, hov?ever, the legislature
has, in effect, opted out of the allocation and in-
stead chosen to make a structural, or regulatory,
decision by establishing the state board.
To round out the picture, tvjo examples of quasi-goveramental
bodies established through decisions which can be classified as
self-rcgulatory are the American Bar Association and the Aii:ierican
Medical Association. These bodies are de facto public licensing
^^Ibid.
,
p. 2.
^^TJiiether this is an addition or merely a sub-division of
another category is an issue which need not detain us here.
60ibid.
,
p. 4.
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bodies since they detenrdnc standards for admission and retention
in their respective professions, design and administer the rele-
vant eni-.rance examinations, etc.
Salisbury and Heinz 's organizing concept is "integration,"
and their two crucial variables are the integration/ fragmentation
of the demand system and of the decision-making structure. Any
decisional system must achieve some degree of integration to
make any decision. The question is not the amount of integration
achieved but rather hovj difficult or costly it is to achieve the
requisite coalition. The more costly it is to organize decisional
coalitions the more fragmented v;e may regard the decisional unit
regardless of how oft en it achieves a coalition. There are
three cinjcial elements which enter into the cost-benefit calcula-
tions of decision-makers: first, the value, positive and nega-
tive, to the decision-maker of acting so as to confer benefits
upon some relevant constituency; second, the costs of informing
himself about the issue sufficiently to develop a position, and;
third, the costs of investing time, energy and resources in
C -I
negotiating a favorable winning coalition. The degree of frag-
mentation of the demand system will of course exert considerable
influence on this cost-benefit calculus. From these considera-
tions emerged their central hypothesis:
See ibid
. ,
pp. 3-4.
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The more costly it is to organize the requisite
coalition on an issue, the more likely it is thatthe policy outcone will be structural rather than
allocative.
The hypothesis is illustrated graphically below:^^
D
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M
Decision-making Structure
Integrated Fragmented
Integrated Redistributive
...
Self-Reeulator/
Fragmented Regulatory Distributive
The above discussion has, hopefully, indicated some of the
potential of policy t>-pologies. At this point that of Salisbury
and Heinz shows the most promise, mostly because of their creati-
vity in devising the categories and their detailed e:cplanation
of the conceptualization and implications of the schema. The
task no\} falls to public policy analysts to test thesS typologies
against real world referents.
Methodolocrical Caveats
The major methodological problems extant in the state policy
Ibid.
,
p. A. .
^^See ibid. . d. 8
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studies have been discussed in the context of the relevant
literature at various points in this report. Two additional
ones merit some attention.
The more serious of these concerns "the assumption of
linearity in complex statistical relationships . "'^''^
-jl^e output
studies typically have relied upon multiple regression and/or
correlation programs. As employed, there is a tacit assumption
of linearity in the relationships studies. But this assumption
is arbitrary, for there are no a priori reasons why these rela-
tionships could not be assumed to be non-linear. This criticism
becomes particularly severe when applied to analyses of data
for different points in time. This is all the more discouraging
in light oi liofferbert's finding that the connection
between
'•ecological development" and policy has been altered^
considerably
over the past several decades.
It is an eminently plausible hypothesis that
there are
several dimensions contained within the data of
the policy
studies. These dimensions cannot be deciphered
without the as-
sistance of an inforracd and imaginative
methodology. At the
very least, tests for "curvilinearity"
might be perfom.ed. Cur-
^Vnis phrase was taken from Coulter, o£.
ext., who provided
Change in the American States,"
Midwest Journal of Polxtrcal
Science 10 (November, 1966).
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vilincar relationships cannot be discovered ia i unless curvilinear
If one expects (assumes) line-ir roln^-- , •) ^mca relationships and uses only
.n..e..c
.p„...„,
^^^^^^^^^
^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^
The 0U,c. poin. co„ee„3
.h. concope.aU..«..,
„,easu.e™en.
and inplicnticus of the notion of "fecdbnck " .J-eeaoa . Somehow, relevant
info^ation conconUn, the conse.uenees of potiticaf
.,.te™
<Ie=l=lon= t.a„=.ftted to those who have political authority.
This inioCTiation v;ill bear on uthe character of future inputs.
But by V7hat mechanisms i (-1.-;c. ^ -, • ,this accomplished? it is tL^^e that
i-he notion of fot^flh-ir-i- ^„ •eedback be assigned an importance which transcends
its inclusion in the .odd merely to .a,ce that model more elab-
orate/' It has always been assumed that feedback e^rists, but
relatively little attention has been devoted to studying its
operation. Perhaps more serious future consideration of elite
'
activity and conversion processes will have a spiU-ovcr effect .
on the study of the feedback loop. Pursuant to this ^ask. it
is perhaps time to consider briefly an alternate approach to the
df... '^f''"' °E- £ii-. pp. 127-29, for a more detaileddlscus.sion of the notion of "feedback "
" LaU
"t^Tht"'^"n'd°'W "''l^f
"iseussion of the trade-offs between
The f I "•^"^ Przeworski and Henry Teune
flo^i.tr'f—^r^~— ^23HilZ (New York: Johl IZTy'o. ^) n.,
,
iy/0), especially pp. 17-24.
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study of public policy.
An Alternate Approach to the Study of Public Policy
There are several paths which the study of public policy
Tni[',ht traverse fruitfully. It is perhaps appropriate to clo<5c
this vjork v;ith a brief discussion of one of these ideas.
The area vjhich seems to hold the most potential concerns the
notion of alternate rr.odels or paradigms of the policy process.
The research reported above is an example of one policy analytic
frame of reference--systems analysis. In a rather innovating
ft P<
work Dye presented six models of the policy process. He argued
persuasively that different m.odels apply to different policy
"events," and, therefore, the choice of the appropriate model
is necessary for accurate explanations of policy phenomena. In
addition to the systems model the others he discussed were: the
elite model, pluralist model, ''^ rational model, incremental
^^Thomas R. Dye, Understanding^; Public Policy (Englev.'ood
Cliffs. Nevj Jersey: Prentice-Iiall , Inc., 1972).
6^Sce, for example, Stephen K. Bailey, The Office of Educa-
tion and the Education Act o_f 1965, Inter-University Case Pro-
gram ('rlOO) Indianapolis: Dobbs-Merrill Company, Inc.).
'*^See, for example, David B. Truman, The Governmental Pro -
cess (Nev; York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1951); Eugene Eidcnberg
and Roy D. Horey, An Act of Congress (New York: W.W. Norton
and Company, 1969).
71see, for example L.L. Wade and R.L. Curry, Jr., A Lo
^
of Public Policy: Aspects of Political Economy (Belmont,
California": iJadsworth Publishing Company, 1970); Alice M. Rivlin,
Systematic Thinking for Social Action (Washington, D.C. : The
Brookings Institution, 1971); Joseph A. Kershaw, Government
Against Poverty (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970).
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model, and the institutional model. More detailed explana-
tions and examples of the models applied to real world referents
are list^^d in the footnotes as indicated above.
Dye's ideas are well-taken. His arguments can he taken a
step further. Allison argued that the only method by v?hich we
can achieve comprehensive explanations of policy issues is by
employing different models simultaneously .'^'^ In explaining
"what happened" in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 Allison
utilized three models--rational actor, organizational process,
and bureaucratic politics. He found that each model provided a
coherent, plausible, yet different oq^lanation than did its
counterparts. This led him to claim that no one model produces
"the correct" explanation but rather each is influenced
in its
explanation by the particular conceptual lens which the
m.odel
imposes upon the analysis. He concluded:
Su-h variance airong interpretations demonstrates
each model's tendency to produce different
answers
72see, for example, Charles E. Lindblom,
''The ScieW of
'Muddling Through'," Public A^lEilH.^itr^
1959)- David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom,
A Strategy ^1
Decision (New York: The Free Press 1963).
TTEce for example, Allan P. Sindler, ed., Policy
an^
Politics i; .V.e_rica (Boston: Little Brown
-^^^^7^^^^' Jf.f,'75^r^a"frAllison, Essence of Decision (Boston. LiLtie,
Brown and Company, 1971).
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to the same question. But as we obser\'e the models
at work, what is equally striking are the differ-
ences in the ways the analysts conceive of the prob-
lem, shape the puzzle, unpack the summary questions,
and pick up the pieces of the world in search of an
answer.
Spectacles magnify one set of factors rather than
,
another and thus not only lead analysts to produce
different explanations of problems that appear, in
their summary questions, to be the sam.e, but also
influence the character of the analyst's puzzle, the
evidence he assumes to be relevant, the concepts he
uses in examining the evidence, and what he takes to
be an explanation. Kone of our three analysts would
deny that during the Cuban Missile Crisis several
million people v;ere performing actions relevant to
the event. But in offering his e>rplanation, each
analyst attempts to emphasize what is relevant and
important, and different conceptual lenses lead
analysts to different judgments about what is rele-
vant and important. ^-^
It is important, therefore, that the policy analyst not allow him
self to be "locked into" any particular paradigm. Rather, he
must utilize several different models to study the sam.e problem
and thereby synethesize the (necessarily) partial explanations
-t (.
of each model into a more comprehensive policy analysis.' The
precise contours of such an enterprise must, for now, be left
for future research, although Allison has certainly indicated
7^Ibid
. ,
pp. 249 and 251.
76xheoretical treatments of these ideas can be found in
William E. Connolly, "Theoretical Self-Consciousness," Polity
6 (Fall, 1973), and Connolly, Political Science and Ideology
(New York: Atherton Press, 1966). These arguments are illus^
trated in a coherent package of readings edited by Connolly
ai
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general directions these
endeavors .ight folio.. These
issues a.ait our attention,
and perhaps not until .e
tacUle
.he. .ill .e be ahle to
provide ans.ers to that
perennial
question of politics: -Vli.at
.ahes things happen-
A Pnlitical Theor:>'
(Lexxngton,
1 n Social Structure
and o ^^^^^^
Glen Gordon, ^ ^ , coinpany, }^^^^ ' Jl'u developed
Kassachusetts:
^^e notion of the "P^^^f"'^^',court
,
,orks drav; ^^^^^^^^ °^,'fxo"V and Utopia
(Ke. York 1 a. .
by Karl liannhexm
Ide^^
--^^^
analysis of thes
t^r"'tir i-rXs^iences
see~ ^
-^-^^of
as ^PP^^"^
',%fientific Revolutions
(Chicago.
Structure of Sc en„_
Chicago press, U^-)-
APPENDIX
VARIABLE LIST
, , ,otal general
expenditures per capita
J = Police P'^°"'='=^°^,^„s education
I :
ruurttirare1:.ren"tures. per
capita
iigicin^^^—
BS = Book of the
States.
Variable
Number _
1
2
3
4
5
Variable Description
Variable Source
median family incon^e,
1959
population density, i960
median school year
completed, I960
urbanization, i960
industrialisation, i960
CP: 1970, Vol.
I
CP: 1970, Vol.
I, P-^t A
^^.^ ;^970, Vol. I,
^^^^ ^
CP: Vol. r,
Part A
CP: 1970, vol.
I. Part A
SA: 1962, p.
^-23.
6 T.,
I960
SA: 1961, p.
^25.
7 P.,
I960
SA: 1963, P-.
^110-
8 E.,
I960
SA: 1962, p.
^^-3-
9 W.,
I960
SA: 1961, p.
287.
10 A.,
I960
SA: 1963, p.
^2^-
11 T..
1961
SA: 1962, p.
'•*-3^-
12 P. ,
1961
BS- 1962-63,
p. 316
13 E.,
1961
SA : 1963, p.
^2^-
14 W.,
1961
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Variable
Number
Variable Description Variable Source
15 A. , 1961 bA; lyb/. , p. ^ziy
16 T., 1962 o/\ ; i?DM-, p, H^J
17 P., 1962
18 E., 1962
19 W., 1962
an. iqfiA n 425
20 A., 1962
OA. 1963 13 308
21 T., 1963
Oh
. IQfiS D 430
22 P., 1963 SA- 1964, p.
439
23 E., 1963 SA: 1964, p.
124
24 VJ., 1963 SA: 1965,
p. 430
25 A., 1963 SA: 1964,
p. 307
26 T., 1964 BS:
1966-67, p. 195
27 P., 1964
CP: Government Employ-
ment: 1964, p. 22
28 E.» 1%4 SA: 1965, p.
105
29 W., 1964
BS: 1966-67, p. 195
30 A., 1964
SA: 1965, p._ 309
31 T., 1965
SA: 1966, p. 427
32 P., 1965
CP- Public Emplo:>'ment
in 1965, p. 29
33 E., 1965
SA: 1966, p. 104
34 W., 1965
SA: 1966, p. 427
35 A., 1965
SA: 1966, p. 305
36 T., 1966
SA: 1968, p. 417
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38
39
40
41
48
variable Variable Description
Variable Source
yiumber — ~ '
~
CP- Government Employment
37 ^^^^ in* 1966, p. 30
BS: 1968-69, p. 288
E., 1966
1965
'''''
A.. 1965
I'"'
T, 1967
1969, p. 417
CP- Government Employment
42 P., 196/ in'l967, p. 30
SA: 1967, p. 10"^
SA: 1969, p. '^^H
SA: 1968, p. 301
SA: 1970, p. ^^15
CP: Government
Employment
in' 1968, p. 30
SA: 1968, p. 102
SA: 1970, p. ^^13
SA: 1969, p. 299
SA: 1971. p. ^^07
43 E., 1967
44 w., 1967
45 A., 1967
46 T. , 1968
47 P., 1968
E., 1968
49 VJ., 1968
50 A., 1968
51 T., 1969
52
Cp. Government
Emplo>nncnt
P., 1969 in" 1969, p. 30
53 E., 1969
54 W., 1969
55 A., 1969
56 median family
income.
SA: 1969, p. 98
SA: 1971, p.
SA: 1970, p. 301
CP: 1970, Vol. X
57 popu
1970 CP: 1970,
Vol. 1, ^
copulation dens:Lty,
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Variable Variable Description Variable Source
Number
58 median school year com- CP: Vol. I, Part A
pleted, 1970
59 urbanization, 1970 CP: Vol. I, Part A
60 industrialization, 1970 CP: Vol. I, Part A
61 T., 1970 SA: 1972, p. 419
62 P., 1970 CP: Government Employment
in 1970 p. 30
Oj F 1970 SA: 1970, p. 100
DM- u 1970 SA: 1972, p. 419
cOJ A 1 970 SA: 1971, p. 294
dd T 1971 SA: 1973, .p. 423
D / P 19 71 CP: Government
Employment
in 1971 ; p. 30
68 E., 1971 SA: 1971, p. 98
69 W., 1971 SA: 1973, p.
423
70 A., 1971 SA: 1972, p.
302
71 Standard, 1958 Composite
72 Standard, 1960 Composite
73 Standard, 1962 Composite
74 Standard, 1964
Composite
75 Standard, 1966
Composite
76 Standard, 1968
Composite
77 New, 1958
Composite
78 New, 1960
Composite
79 New, 1962
Composite
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Variable
Number
Variable Description Variable Source
80 New, 1964 Composite
oi Ingw y JL ^ u u Composite
82 New, 1968 Composite -,
83 Standard, composite Composite, 1958-68
84 New, composite Composite,
1958-68
ADDITIONAL INF0R>1ATI0N CONCERNING DATA
(1) Blank spaces
(a) data were not available for the 1958
legislative
elections in Colorado.
(b) no legislative elections were held
in Connecticut
in 1964.
(c) no elections for state offices
were held in Hawaii
^n the years between 1958 and 19b2.
Data for 1959
were put in 1958 spaces.
(d^ In Illinois, elections for the
lower house in 1964
iere held o^ an at-large basis
because the leg.s-
Tature was not able to agree on
a new re-apportion-
ment scheme in time for the
election.
_
^
(e) no elections for the upper
house were held in 1968.
could not be determined for
that state lor
(„) no elections for the
upper house in New Jersey
v-ere
held in 1969.
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(2) For the following states,
there were no gubernatorial
elections in 1958; 1956 data were used
instead:
Illinois
Indiana
Missouri
West Virginia
Illinois
Indiana
West Virginia
C4) For the following
states,
^f^l^ll^^f^^lT V^tl 1968:
used for 1960 spaces as well,
1962 for lyb^,
Alaska
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Hawaii for 68; previous
Massachusetts C-^f --;,/,,,i,,3 were held every
l^evada
New Jersey
2 years)
.
T ^o<-o adiu';ted since New Jersey
d s:Lt^;L:tfons on
o«-n-^ere. year.
.
The output data was also
adjusted to take
this into account)
.
l^ew York ^
Wyoming
,3) in «e„ Vor. In
1966 and ..o^lng in «
3 8 ^^^^^
winning candidates
"".ved a .ajo-j
competition
=^"«/",*;,|ges o£ the two-party vote.
S«"^thL°:n\hrprtLntase3 of the total
vote.
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